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Abstract
This report introduces findings from ten digital rights landscape country 
reports on Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Egypt, and Cameroon. They analyse how the openings and closings 
of online civic space affect citizens’ digital rights. They show that: 
a. When civic space closes offline citizens often respond by opening 
civic space online.
b. When civic space opens online governments often take measures 
to close online space.
c. The resulting reduction in digital rights makes it impossible to 
achieve the kind of inclusive governance defined in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). 
We know far more about openings and closings of online civic space in the 
global North than we do in the global South. What little we do know about 
Africa is mainly about a single country, a single event, or single technology. 
For the first time, these reports make possible a comparative analysis of 
openings and closings of online civic space in Africa. They document 65 
examples of the use of digital technologies to open online civic space and 
115 examples of techniques used to close online civic space. The five tactics 
used most often to close online civic space in Africa are digital surveillance, 
disinformation, internet shutdowns, legislation, and arrests for online speech. 
The reports show clearly that any comprehensive analysis of digital rights 
requires consideration of the wider political, civic space, and technological 
contexts. We argue that countering the threats to democracy and digital 
rights discussed in the reports requires new evidence, awareness, and 
capacity. We propose applied research to build capacity in each country to 
effectively monitor, analyse, and counter the insidious impact of surveillance 
and disinformation; and a programme to raise awareness and mobilise 
opinion to open civic space and improve citizens’ ability to exercise, defend, 
and expand their digital rights.
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1. Introduction
Civic space remains open in only two of Africa’s 54 countries,1 according 
to CIVICUS (2020). The reduction in safe public spaces in which democratic 
debate can take place represents a breach of citizens’ digital rights 
and makes achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
impossible. This report presents the literature review used by the African 
Digital Rights Network2 to provide the conceptual framing for the 
commissioning of digital rights landscape country reports on ten African 
countries. It also presents preliminary findings and makes tentative 
recommendations designed to enhance the ability of citizens to exercise, 
defend, and expand their digital rights. 
Civic space refers to the public places where citizens can freely exercise 
their human rights. This includes the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. Civic spaces can be offline physical locations, such as village 
halls or public squares, or online virtual spaces for digital discussion, online 
petitions, or hashtag campaigns. Online civic space can provide a refuge for 
marginalised or opposition groups, particularly in offline contexts where such 
voices are disciplined or oppressed. Civic space is crucial for any open and 
democratic country in which citizens and civil society are free to hold power-
holders accountable, draw attention to neglected issues, and foster inclusive 
decision-making at all levels (Kode 2018). 
Digital rights are human rights in online spaces. These rights include, but are 
not limited to, the right to privacy, freedom of opinion and speech, freedom 
of information and communication, gender rights, and the right to freedom 
from violence (APC 2006; Abraham 2014; UN 1948). Citizens’ digital rights are 
breached if they are the subject of digital surveillance; if they are covertly 
targeted with disinformation to manipulate their beliefs and behaviour; if 
their mobile or internet connection is restricted; or if they are arrested or 
attacked for expressing political opinion online (Jorgensen 2006; GISWatch 
2014; GISWatch 2019; Zuboff 2019). Examples of digital rights breaches 
include online gender-based violence perpetrated by misogynist groups; 
mass interception of digital communications by state spy agencies; or 
private sector actors trading citizens’ digital profiles to enable covert voter 
disinformation campaigns. 
As governments close civic space offline, citizens often open civic space 
online (Buyse 2018; Roberts 2019). Mechanisms used to close offline civic 
space have included laws, regulations, limits on funding, threats and 
1 The two island states of Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Principe.
2 African Digital Rights Network.
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violence, arbitrary arrest, and detention (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash 2014; 
Hossain et al. 2017, 2019). Although research on closing offline civic space 
is beginning to receive the attention that it deserves (PartnersGlobal et al. 
2017; Hossain et al. 2018), there has been much less research attention on the 
openings and closings of online civic space in Africa. 
When citizens open online civic space, governments often act to close it 
down. For example, since citizens used SMS (short message service) text 
messages to organise politically in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, governments in 
50 African countries imposed compulsory SIM (subscriber identity module) 
card registration (Privacy International 2019). Then, when citizens used social 
media to voice opposition, some governments blocked it or introduced price 
rises to make accessing it unaffordable (Nanfuka 2019). Zeynep Tufekci’s book 
Twitter and Tear Gas (Tufekci 2017) is a comprehensive account of how citizen 
use of digital tools in Egypt was met with concerted state repression to close 
democratic space. Tech-savvy activists initially gained an advantage over 
established political actors by using mobile and internet campaigning to 
create online civic spaces. However, governments are now rapidly building 
their own capabilities to dominate these online spaces using digital 
surveillance, disinformation and intentional internet disruptions including 
shutdowns, bandwidth throttling (slowing down), bans and blocking (CIPESA 
2016; Freyburg and Garbe 2018; Freedom House 2018; Taye 2020). 
Use of online civic space has its own limitations and risks. The ability to 
access and make productive use of digital technologies is uneven across 
gender, income, and ethnic groups, such that its patterns of use reflect, 
reproduce, and amplify existing intersectional inequalities (Hernandez 
and Roberts 2018; Roberts and Hernandez 2019). Women activists and 
politicians often face sustained abuse and violence if they are vocal online, 
creating a chilling effect (Faith and Fraser 2018). The use of mobile devices 
and online spaces involves leaving digital traces that enable systematic 
surveillance (Bradshaw and Howard 2019; Zuboff 2019). This digital 
surveillance is used to target covert voter disinformation and manipulation 
(Nyabola 2018; Howard 2020); to disrupt internet access to information and 
communications (Taye 2018); and to mark individuals for arrest, torture or 
even murder (Ibrahim 2020). 
The repressive use of digital technologies by states and corporations has 
been characterised as ‘digital authoritarianism’ (Freedom House 2018). The 
Egyptian and Zimbabwean governments are among those who are known 
to have imported artificial intelligence-based surveillance technologies 
from the US and China to spy on their own citizens’ mobile and internet 
communications (Feldstein 2019). Governments are buying new mobile phone 
interception (Marczak et al. 2020) and internet shutdown and disruption 
technologies (Taye 2020). Politicians are using digital technologies to inflame 
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ethnic division and drown out democratic dialogue and debate (Nyabola 
2018; Woolley and Howard 2019). This closes civic space and diminishes 
citizens’ rights to freedom of opinion and expression.
These tactics could threaten the integrity of elections in over 50 African 
countries that have elections scheduled in the next five years (EISA 2020). 
They could also influence the outcomes of critical policy debates, including 
those on vaccines, climate change, gender, and sexual rights – all of which 
are known targets for digital disinformation and covert influence by powerful 
foreign and domestic lobbying interests (Jones 2019; Woolley and Howard 
2019). In the 2017 elections in Kenya, political elites reportedly spent US$20m 
on fake news and covert disinformation campaigns designed to manipulate 
citizens’ beliefs and voting behaviour (Brown 2019). In 2020, the number of 
intentional internet shutdowns by African governments rose from 21 to 25. 
They were often scheduled at the time of elections or popular protests (Taye 
2020). Shutting down the internet reduces the rights to access information 
and to communicate freely, and the economic right of online traders to 
conduct business (Statista 2020).
Existing research on the use of digital tools to close civic space is limited, 
ad hoc, and fragmented. Currently, we know more about digital openings of 
civic space than we do about digital closings of civic space. We also know 
far more about the global North than we do about the distinctive features in 
the global South. The research evidence about African countries that does 
exist is typically about a single event, or single technology, in a single country. 
Technical studies are often divorced from consideration of explanatory political 
and civic contexts. There is currently little comparative analysis on openings 
and closings of civic space across Africa. Without more detailed empirical 
evidence about the dimensions and distinctive dynamics of the problem 
on the African continent, it is impossible for local actors to design effective 
remedies and countermeasures to restore civic space and secure digital rights.
The ten country reports contained in this collection were commissioned 
to address these gaps. The reports are from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Uganda, 
Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Cameroon. They 
are intended to provide an initial scoping of the digital rights landscape 
within each nation and across the African continent. Each report begins 
with three sections that review key developments between 2000 and 2020 
in the country’s political history, civic space dynamics and key technological 
changes. To aid cross-country comparison, each report contains two 
summary tables illustrating the timeline of key developments in the opening 
and closing of civic space, and the use of digital technologies by citizens and 
governments. The reports present preliminary findings and make tentative 
recommendations about how to open civic space and enhance citizens’ 
ability to exercise, defend and expand their digital rights. 
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Initial research results include 180 examples of the use of digital 
technologies to either open or close civic space. The reports illustrate how 
wider political dynamics, and increasing availability of mobile and internet 
technologies, have shaped both openings and closings of civic space. In 
many of the country reports, the opening of civic space that characterised 
the years preceding the millennium has been replaced by closing civic 
space a decade later. The reports provide almost twice as many examples 
of digital technologies being used to close civic space as to open it. The 
current wave of surveillance and disinformation technologies has potentially 
serious implications for the possibility of inclusive dialogue and sustainable 
development. This turn to digital authoritarianism became especially 
pronounced in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, when citizen 
uprisings unsettled entrenched political elites, who then scrambled to build 
their own arsenal of digital tactics and techniques to control online discourse.
The country reports show clearly that a comprehensive understanding of 
digital rights requires cognisance of the wider political, civic space and 
technological contexts. Taken together, the reports identify the need for 
an applied research programme that addresses existing gaps in evidence, 
awareness, legislation, and capacity. We argue that a multi-sector network 
is necessary to enhance the domestic capacity in each African country to 
overcome closing civic space and breaches of digital rights. To this end, we 
recommend engaging with four key constituencies:
– Researchers – to produce new evidence about surveillance actors, 
tools, tactics and techniques.
– Journalists – to raise public awareness about the practices and 
consequences of surveillance. 
– Policymakers – to map existing legislation, identify gaps and advance 
a public policy agenda.
– Activists – to expand civic engagement to tackle surveillance, 
disinformation and shutdowns.
The next section of this report will outline the literature review that provided 
the conceptual framing for the ten country reports. Preliminary findings from 
the country reports are then presented on the range of technologies tools, 
tactics and techniques identified, before drawing some tentative conclusions 
and summarising the recommendations made by the report’s authors.
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2. Literature review
This section presents the literature review and conceptual framing used in 
commissioning the ten digital rights landscape country reports. The section 
summarises the literature on: (a) digital rights; (b) civic space and sustainable 
development; and (c) closing civic space. It concludes by identifying gaps in 
the existing literature and opportunities for further research. 
Human rights are the rights and freedoms that every person is entitled to. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights bestows the same rights on 
every human irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, wealth, 
political or religious opinion or other status (UN 1948). These human rights 
include freedom of opinion and speech, political affiliation, privacy, and 
assembly. Everyone has the right to information, freedom of association, 
communication, and direct and indirect participation in political and public 
affairs (OHCHR 2020). 
Digital rights are those same rights in online spaces. Given the increasing 
centrality of the internet as a space for information exchange and following 
the findings of the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression (UNHRC 2011), the UN declared that ‘the same rights 
people have offline must also be protected online’. The UN General Assembly 
later recognised the ‘unique and transformative nature of the internet, not 
only to enable individuals to exercise their right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, but also a range of other human rights, and to promote the 
development of society as a whole’ (UNHRC 2018). The African Declaration 
on Internet Rights and Freedoms (African Declaration 2019) built upon 
these foundations to provide a detailed articulation of digital rights. The 
declaration includes a civil society section giving them the duty to ‘advocate 
for Internet rights and freedoms; monitor Internet laws and regulations; and 
highlight abuses’ (ibid.). 
There is broad agreement that use of digital technologies can enable 
sustainable development (UNDP 2015; World Bank 2016; WSIS 2018); affect 
government transparency and accountability (OECD 2018; McGee et al. 
2018); enhance civil society (Michelson 2006); and play a positive role in 
women’s empowerment (Buskens and Webb 2009; Moolman, Primo and 
Shackleton 2011; Hafkin 2012; Buskens and Webb 2014). As a result, SDGs 
include specific targets for extending mobile and internet use (SDG 9c); 
expanding access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
(SDG 17.6 and 17.8); and women’s empowerment (SDG 5b). There is extensive 
literature documenting the ways in which the use of digital technologies can 
support social mobilisation and collective action by connecting citizens, 
16Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Opening and Closing Online Civic Space in Africa: 
An Introduction to the Ten Digital Rights Landscape Reports
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Tony Roberts & Abrar Mohamed Ali © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.005
creating new spaces for engagement between citizens and the state, and 
helping to empower citizens and strengthen their agency for engagement 
(McGee et al. 2018). 
However, the use of digital technologies can also constrain citizens’ voices, 
undermine and obstruct accountability, and facilitate surveillance and 
repression (ibid.). Any technology has more than one potential application. 
It is common for technologies to be appropriated for purposes other than 
those originally in the mind of their inventors. As Kranzberg’s first law of 
technology notes, the technologies themselves are neither good nor bad, but 
nor are they ever neutral (Kranzberg 1986). The inherent ‘interpretive flexibility’ 
of technologies (Pinch and Bijker 1984) allows them to be used in ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ ways, with the use of technologies often reflecting the politics and 
values of society and users (MacKensie and Wajcman 1985; Feenberg 1992).
Affordances are a useful concept for analysing the use of technology to 
open and close civic space. The concept of affordances concerns what 
‘action possibilities’ a particular technology allows, invites or enables (Gibson 
1977; Norman 1988). For example, the use of social media affords citizens 
the action possibility of publishing opinion and images instantly, at scale 
and internationally, enabling real-time reporting of police brutality or viral 
hashtag campaigns such as #BlackLivesMatter or #MeToo. However, social 
media also affords governments and corporations the action possibility of 
surveillance-profiling and disinformation micro-targeting in order to covertly 
manipulate citizens’ beliefs and voting behaviour (O’Neil 2016; Benjamin 
2019; Zuboff 2019; Sadowski 2020). Analysing the affordances of different 
technologies is advantageous in understanding their use in opening and 
closing civic space in ways that enhance or diminish digital rights. 
Africa has experienced a rapid – but uneven – expansion in the use of 
mobile and internet technologies. This has produced digital dividends for 
some in the form of improved social and economic development (Buskens 
and Webb 2014; WSIS 2018). However, access to digital devices and 
connectivity is uneven, creating new exclusions, and digital divides. These 
divides exist both within and between countries (World Bank 2016). The use 
of digital technologies has been shown to reflect, reproduce, and amplify 
existing patterns of (dis)advantage (O’Neil 2016; Eubanks 2017; Hernandez 
and Roberts 2018). Technology access and the ability to make effective use 
of it, is uneven across intersecting divides of gender, class, and ethnicity 
(Eubanks 2017; Noble 2018; Benjamin 2019). A mobile gender gap exists across 
low- and middle-income countries: 300 million fewer women than men 
have access to mobile internet (GSMA 2020). The gap continues to grow 
between those who are able to regularly upgrade to the latest devices and 
fastest connections, and those who remain unconnected or digitally illiterate 
(Roberts and Hernandez 2019).
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Uneven digital access and digital literacy create hierarchies of digital 
citizenship. Citizenship is often understood narrowly as the relationship of 
rights and responsibilities between an individual and the state. A broader 
and more inclusive understanding of citizenship focuses on the actions 
of a person or persons, whether formally documented citizens or not, in 
exercising, defending, or claiming rights. This agency-based rights-claiming 
conception of citizenship is the most appropriate in the context of digital 
rights. Digital citizenship is this same rights-claiming citizen agency but in 
online spaces (Isin and Ruppert 2015; Hintz, Dencik and Wahl-Jorgensen 
2019). Due to uneven technology access, not all citizens are digital citizens; 
and not all digital citizens have equal access to the kind of digital devices, 
online spaces, or digital literacy necessary to exercise, defend, or expand 
digital rights. 
The UN is among those arguing that an open and vibrant civic space is 
essential to inclusive democracy and sustainable development (UNDP 
2015; World Bank 2016). To reflect this belief SDG 16 commits signatory 
governments to achieving ‘inclusive, participatory, and representative 
decision-making at every level’; and SDG 17 requires building a partnership 
for development between civil society, governments, and the private sector 
(UNDP 2015). All ten countries included in this study are signatories to the 
SDGs. The UN High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the High-Level 
Panel on the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda both underscored the 
central role of civil society as partners in delivering the SDGs (UN 2013; ACT 
Alliance and CIDSE 2014; ICNL 2016). 
However, in many countries the civic space necessary for inclusive, 
participatory dialogue and policy deliberation is rapidly shrinking (Dupuy, 
Ron and Prakash 2016; Hossain et al. 2018; CIPESA 2019; Freedom House 2019a). 
In 2020, over 90 per cent of African countries were experiencing significant 
restrictions to basic civic freedoms, with only 2 out of 54 countries categorised 
as having open3 civic space (CIVICUS 2020). Mechanisms used to close 
civic space have included deregistering non-governmental organisations, 
regulations to cut off funding, violence and harassment, arbitrary arrest and 
disappearance of civil society actors (Dupuy et al. 2016; Hossain et al. 2018). 
Citizens who propose policy alternatives, publicly criticise the government or 
organise political opposition are at risk of arrest and violence (CIVICUS 2019). 
In terms of political rights and civil liberties, 2020 was the 14th consecutive 
year of global decline (Freedom House 2020). Trust in politicians and the 
democratic process is in decline globally (Bertsou 2019). Unless this democratic 
backsliding is reversed, the global challenge of achieving inclusive and 
sustainable development as defined in the SDGs is unattainable by 2030.
3 CIVICUS Monitor uses five categories of open, narrowed, obstructed, restricted and closed.
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During periods of closing civic space activists forced underground or into exile 
have often fought back by opening online civic space from where their right to 
freedom of speech and assembly can be exercised and defended (Buyse 2018; 
Roberts 2019). The use of SMS text messages by Kenyan activists to create an 
online map of unfolding election violence in 2007 (Okolloh 2009; Roberts and 
Marchais 2018) and by Egyptian feminists to map sexual harassment in Cairo 
(Peuchaud 2014) are positive examples of using digital technologies to create 
online civic space. The opening of civic space online has been characterised 
by hashtag campaigns, viral memes, and civic technologies as mechanisms 
for digital rights advocacy (Nyabola 2018; Solomon 2018). Online civic space 
has been particularly valuable for repressed groups to discuss sensitive 
subjects; to project the voices of underrepresented groups, such as LGBTQI 
and ethnic minorities; and to propose policies that have been inadequately 
represented by establishment media and political parties (Tufekci 2017; 
Gurumurthy, Bharthur and Chami 2017; Hossain et al. 2019). However, online 
civic space is not open to everyone equally. For example, women, including 
female politicians, and LGBTQI groups often experience gender-based 
violence in online spaces (APC 2018; Faith and Fraser 2018; Vlahakis 2018).
Repressive governments often deploy digital technologies to close online 
civic space. In recent years, those with political and economic power have 
been able to expand their arsenal of digital technology tools and tactics to 
disrupt, drown out or shut down online civic space. This was exemplified by 
‘political marketing’ consultancy Cambridge Analytica testing its covert voter 
manipulation methods in Kenya’s 2013 election prior to their deployment in 
the UK’s Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign 
victory (Nyabola 2018; Solomon 2018). In South Africa, another political 
marketing consultancy, Bell Pottinger, coordinated a network of trolls and 
bots4 to fan the flames of racial division for political advantage (Fraser 2017). 
Political parties now routinely hire private companies – such as Cambridge 
Analytica and Bell Pottinger – to profile citizens using Facebook, mobile 
phone and other personal data (Zuboff 2018; Sadowski 2020) in order to 
micro-target voters with fake news and disinformation, via troll farms, cyborg 
networks, bot armies,5 and other ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’ 
(Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Woolley and Howard 2017; Howard 2020).
Internet surveillance and mobile intercept technologies are now regularly 
employed by African governments. In addition to the social media 
surveillance discussed above, African governments are now buying mass 
surveillance technologies from the US or China to spy on citizens’ email 
4 Disinformation can be posted manually by people (called trolls) or automatically by programs 
(called bots).
5 Coordinated disinformation campaigns can be run by teams of trolls (working in troll ‘farms’), by 
large numbers of automated bots (called ‘bot-nets’ or bot armies) and by integrated part-troll-
part-bot ‘cyborg networks’. 
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and internet communications (Feldstein 2019; Freedom House 2019). 
Some African governments are buying new mobile phone interception 
technologies (Marczak et al. 2020), and internet shutdown and disruption 
technologies (Access Now 2020). The number of intentional internet 
shutdowns in Africa rose from 21 in 2019 to 25 in 2020 (Taye 2020). In African 
elections over the next few years, incumbents and powerful challengers 
will continue to be able to hire troll farms and bot armies to disrupt debate, 
manufacture opinion and covertly manipulate voting behaviour (Baker and 
Blaagaard 2016; Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Woolley and Howard 2019). 
These covert measures damage democracy and diminish digital rights, 
making impossible the kind of inclusive and participatory governance 
outlined in the SDGs. 
Existing surveillance and disinformation literature is limited in detailing 
the dimensions and dynamics of the African experience. From the first use 
of SMS in protest movements (Ekine 2010) to viral social media hashtag 
campaigns, researchers have documented African citizens’ use of mobile 
phones and social media to open new online spaces (Nyamnjoh 2016; 
Tufekci 2017; Egbunike 2018). Members of the African Digital Rights Network 
have made important contributions to the growing literature on the use 
of digital technologies by citizens to open civic space (Gagliardone 
2014; Nyabola 2018; Ojebode 2018; Bosch 2019; Karekwaivanane 2019a; 
Oosterom 2019; Roberts 2019; CIPESA 2019b, 2020). However, the closing of 
online civic space by African governments is relatively under-researched. 
The existing literature on digital surveillance and disinformation is 
predominantly focused on the global North. Relatively little is known about 
how these digital practices affect the 1.3 billion citizens of the 54 countries 
on the African continent. Addressing this gap is urgent given the critical 
importance of digital rights and open civic space to inclusive democracy 
and sustainable development. The research that does exist on Africa 
is primarily composed of single-technology, single-event, and single-
country studies. There is not yet any comparative African literature to 
identify trends, build theory, and guide policy and practice. Without clear 
definition of the detail, dimensions, and dynamics of the use of digital 
technologies to close civic space, it is impossible to design adequate 
remedies.
Drawing on this literature review, the African Digital Rights Network resolved 
to make a preliminary contribution to addressing gaps in existing literature 
by producing a series of ten digital rights landscape country reports. Our 
intention was to conduct an initial scoping of which actors are using which 
digital technologies to both open and close civic space. The concepts 
of digital rights and literature on closing civic space were central to the 
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framing of the reports. Although the concepts of digital citizenship, gender 
inequalities, and digital affordances emerged from the literature review 
as a potentially useful lens, it was decided not to use them to frame the 
preliminary country reports, and to use them instead in the thematic papers 
planned in the next research phase.
Country report authors were required to preface their analysis of the digital 
rights landscape with three sections charting the most relevant political, 
civic space, and technology developments in each country’s history between 
2000 and 2020. This was in order to assess the extent to which contextual 
political events and technology developments affect openings and closings 
of civic space, and the ability of citizens to exercise their digital rights.
Before presenting the initial findings arising out of the ten digital 
rights landscape country reports, the next section briefly explains the 
methodological design and country sample.
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3. Methodology
The African Digital Rights Network6 was established in May 2020 using a 
Global Challenges Research Fund-UK Research and Innovation Digital 
Innovation for Development in Africa Networking Grant7 to develop a network 
of activists, researchers, journalists, and policymakers working on digital 
rights in Africa. Its aim was to build new relationships that would stimulate 
novel research and innovation ideas that enhance citizens’ ability to exercise, 
defend and expand their digital rights.
The network brought together 20 activists, analysts, and academics, some of 
whom had already published research on the use of digital activism to open 
civic space (Abraham 2014; Gagliardone 2014; Nyabola 2018; Ojebode 2018; 
Bosch 2019; Karekwaivanane 2019; Oosterom 2019; Roberts 2019), as well as 
internet shutdowns and disruption to close civic space (Taye 2019).
The initial focus was to document which actors were using which tools 
to open and close online civic space; and to identify gaps in evidence, 
awareness, and domestic capacity. The short-term goal was to inform the 
articulation of a multi-year research and innovation strategy to enhance 
digital rights in Africa. In the first six months, network members resolved to 
conduct an initial scoping of digital rights by producing country reports that 
provided a preliminary mapping and analysis of the drivers, actors, tools, 
and tactics being used in the ten countries both to open and close civic 
space. The medium-term objective was to build capacity for research and 
innovation that supported change in policy and practice. The longer-term 
aim was to open civic space and for citizens to be better able to exercise, 
defend and expand their digital rights.
The authors of ten digital rights landscape reports were asked to identify 
who was using which digital technologies, tools, tactics, or techniques to 
either open or close civic space in their country. In order to analyse the drivers 
of both openings and closings of civic space, authors were asked to preface 
their analysis of the current digital rights situation with a review of the key 
political, civic space, and technological developments that have shaped 
the digital rights landscape since the turn of the millennium. To enable cross-
country comparison, each country report adopted this same structure and 
contained two tables: the first summarised key openings and closings of civic 
space between 2000 and 2020; while the second provided a timeline of the 
most relevant digital technology developments for the same period.
6 African Digital Rights Network project page, Institute of Development Studies website.
7 GCRF Digital Innovation for Development in Africa.
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The ten-country sample was selected to be representative of the main 
geographical regions of the continent, as well as a range of levels of 
civic space openness, political and internet freedoms and economic 
development (Table 3.1). The sample was also pragmatically shaped by 
resource constraints, network contacts and positive responses to outreach. 
Table 3.1 Country selection










79 Narrowed 70 0.709 63 56.2
2 Zambia 54 Obstructed 59 0.584 57 39.3
3 Kenya 48 Obstructed 67 0.601 41 87.2
4 Nigeria 47 Obstructed 60 0.539 35 61.2
5 Uganda 34 Repressed 56 0.544 43 40.5
6 Zimbabwe 29 Repressed 46 0.571 44 56.5
7 Ethiopia 24 Repressed 29 0.485 35 17.8
8 Egypt 21 Closed 26 0.707 32 48.1
9 Cameroon 18 Repressed n/a 0.563 47 29.7
10 Sudan 12 Repressed 30 0.510 34 29.9
Note: HDI = Human Development Index
Source: Authors’ own.
Rather than produce our own digital rights index, we chose instead to build 
on existing freedom and civic space scorecards by CIVICUS and Freedom 
House (see Table 3.1) and contribute country reports that provided a 
qualitative assessment of the dynamic nature of openings and closings and 
to document the wide range of digital tools, tactics and techniques being 
deployed to enhance and constrain digital rights. The intention was that this 
would enable textured findings that, when analysed, would shed light on the 
causes and solutions to the diminution of civic space and digital rights. 
8 Countries and Territories, Freedom House.
9 Monitor: Tracking Civic Space, CIVICUS.
10 Internet Freedom Scores, Freedom House.
11 Human Development Index, Human Development Reports.
12 Gini coefficient index, World Bank.
13 Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics.
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The ten digital rights country landscape reports were commissioned from 
network members and external experts. The reports identified 65 examples 
of digital technologies being used to open civic space across Africa; and 115 
examples of technologies, tactics and techniques used to close civic space. 
Several rounds of inductive coding were used to cluster these examples 
into ten categories of openings and 12 categories of closings, which are 
tabulated in the next section. 
The country reports were prepared in the second half of 2020 during the 
coronavirus disease (Covid-19) pandemic. Covid-19 restrictions meant 
that all research activities had to be desk based and virtual. Research 
carried out was predominantly qualitative desk review of online secondary 
sources. The next phase of this research should incorporate primary data 
collection, including interviews with key informants to validate secondary 
data sources and deepen analysis in those areas identified as key during 
this initial scoping (e.g., surveillance, disinformation, and internet shutdowns). 
This qualitative analysis should be complemented with quantitative data 
analysis using software such as NodeXL to provide detailed analysis of 
the dimensions, principal actors and timelines of online hashtag and 
disinformation campaigns. 
The next section presents some preliminary findings from the country reports 
and discusses their relevance to extending citizens’ digital rights.
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4. Findings and discussion
When this research was originally conceived, we imagined that our 
contribution might be to complement the closing civic space literature with 
data and analysis of opening civic space online. However, our findings about 
closing online civic space are at least as significant. Report authors identified 
almost twice as many examples of digital closings as digital openings.
The ten country reports provide 65 examples of digital openings and 115 
examples of digital closings. We categorised the 65 examples of digital 
technology used to open civic space into ten main categories (Table 4.1). 
The 115 examples of technologies, tactics and techniques used to close civic 
space were coded into the 12 categories. The following sections present 
our findings from a preliminary analysis across the ten country reports and 
discuss their relevance for opening civic space and enhancing digital rights. 
Table 4.1 Digital openings
 Digital openings of civic space – 65 examples presented in 10 categories
1 Increased – but uneven – access 
to mobile devices and internet
ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
2 SMS activism ZW ZM
3 Social media activism ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
4 Civic tech activism ZW ZM SA NG KE ET CM
5 Diaspora amplifies message to 
apply international pressure 
ZW UG SD NG KE ET CM
6 Laws conferring new (digital) rights 
and entitlements
ZM UG SA NG KE EG
7 Digital policies promoting access, 
rights, open data, etc. 
SA NG KE CM
9 Digital security (e.g. Signal, 
VPNs, encryption)
ZW ZM SD EG CM
8 Strategic litigation to defend 
digital rights
SA KE
10 IMSI sniffer app ZW
Note: IMSI = International mobile subscriber identity; VPN = virtual private network
Country key: CM = Cameroon; EG = Egypt; ET = Ethiopia; KE = Kenya; NG = Nigeria; SA = South Africa; 
SD = Sudan; UG = Uganda; ZM = Zambia; ZW = Zimbabwe
Source: Authors’ own.
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The rapid increase in mobile and internet access is a key driver of opening 
civic space online. Although computers have long been used by activists, 
only a small percentage of the population in many countries had access 
to them. The relatively high levels of mobile phone ownership afforded new 
action possibilities for wider civic engagement. In all ten country reports 
the dramatic expansion of mobile phone use and internet access was 
highlighted as providing new means to instantly exchange information and 
to communicate interactively over long distances. These new affordances 
qualitatively increased the speed, scale and reach of citizen-led advocacy 
and civic engagement. However, as discussed below, access to digital 
devices and connectivity is uneven across gender and income, such that 
previously (under)privileged groups are often further (dis)advantaged.
Figure 4.1 Growth in internet access
Source: Adapted from Internet World Stats14 
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SMS activism was the first widespread digital tool used to create virtual 
civic space. The Ethiopia country report (Gagliardone 2021, this collection) 
shows how the successful use of SMS text messages to issue ‘calls to action’ 
during the dramatic opening of civic space ahead of the 2005 election led 
the government to block and interrupt SMS services. In the country reports on 
Sudan and Uganda, the authors note that governments became so fearful 
of the power of SMS after the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that they 
temporarily blocked SMS in their countries (in this collection: Mohamed Ali 
2021 and Nanfuka 2021). 
The report by Karekwaivanane (2021, this collection) shows how sending 
bulk text messages became part of the repertoire of activists’ methods in 
Zimbabwe and resulted in the government issuing a ban on all bulk SMS 
messaging in 2013. Around the same time, many African governments also 
started introducing mandatory SIM card registration, taking advantage of 
the surveillance affordances of mobile phones. Fifty of Africa’s 54 countries 
had mandatory SIM card registration in place by 2019 (Privacy International 
2019). Mobile phone SIM card registration removed from citizens the mobile 
affordance of anonymity, which preserved their right to privacy, and replaced 
it with the new action possibility for governments to surveil, geolocate, track 
and target citizens. 
Social media activism to open civic space online is the most evident tactic 
in the ten reports. Although text messaging dominated in the first decade 
of the millennium, between 2010 and 2020 social media became the most 
used online civic space. The Zambia and Ethiopia country reports are among 
those that point to the key role played by independent citizen bloggers 
in opening online civic space (in this collection: Phiri and Zorro 2021 and 
Gagliardone 2021). The affordances of social media allowed ‘unruly’ citizen 
publication of opinion by individuals from outside establishment media, 
political parties, or civil society structures (Khanna et al. 2013). 
However, by the second decade of the millennium corporate social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp had in effect colonised 
online civic space. Citizens famously made use of Facebook and Twitter in 
the Egyptian revolution (Farahat 2021, this collection) and the platform quickly 
became central to digital citizenship across the continent. Some governments 
that perceive social media as more of a threat than an opportunity have 
sought to address this threat by blocking or limiting its use. The Zimbabwe 
government used massive price hikes to make social media unaffordable 
during periods of civic action, raising the cost by 500 per cent in 2016 and by 
2,500 per cent in 2017 (Karekwaivanane 2021, this collection). The Ugandan 
government introduced a ‘social media tax’ (Nanfuka 2021, this collection). 
The majority of country reports (8 out of 10) document incidents in which those 
using social media to criticise the government are arrested or jailed. 
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Civic tech activism became a popular way to open civic space in some 
African countries from around 2010 onwards. The Nigeria country report 
(Oladapo and Ojebode 2021, this collection) shows how technology activism 
organisation BudgIT15 used online space to monitor government budget 
implementation and hold extractive industries to account. The same report 
provides the example of activist organisation Enough is Enough Nigeria16 
promoting good governance and citizen engagement using the affordances 
of digital technologies for connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). 
The South Africa country report (Bosch and Roberts 2021, this collection) 
documents the increase in civic tech organisations that afford possibilities 
for citizen campaigns, civic engagement and budget scrutiny, including 
Amandla.mobi,17 GovChat18 and Vulekamali.19 Unlike SMS and social media 
activism, the country reports do not mention government efforts to close 
down the civic space opened by this form of activism. Further research could 
usefully seek to understand whether incumbent governments see civic 
tech as a significant threat to their interests, whether there are examples 
of blocking or shutting down civic tech, and whether it is easier to contain 
and co-opt civic tech.
Diaspora engagement positively amplifies the international impact of 
online campaigns. A clear theme emerging from the country reports was 
the importance of African diaspora engagement in amplifying domestic 
social media campaigns across the globe. The Cameroon country report 
(Ndongmo 2021, this collection) provides the example of #AnglophoneCrisis, 
which went viral internationally. Other hashtag campaigns mentioned in 
the country reports that were able to enlist the African diaspora to bring 
international pressure to bear on their governments were the Nigerian 
#BringBackOurGirls campaign, the Ugandan #FreeStellaNyanzi campaign, 
and the Ethiopian #FreeZone9Bloggers campaign (in this collection: 
Oladapo and Ojebode 2021, Nanfuka 2021, and Gagliardone 2021). It is 
worth noting that the ability for viral citizen-led campaigns to take place 
is enabled by the digital affordances of social media for instant, global, 
communication of calls to action, images, and video reportage. This finding 
reinforces the need to build international networks of digital rights activists, 
journalists, and researchers to build public engagement and mobilise 
political pressure for policy change; and to facilitate South-to-South and 
international knowledge and experience exchanges. 
15 BudgIT.
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Digital security tools are effective but under-used. A second important 
theme emerging from the reports was that secure digital practices are useful 
in opening civic space and extending digital rights. When the Sudanese 
government in 2018 shut down social media during pro-democracy protests, 
citizens used virtual private networks (VPNs) to stay online (Mohamed Ali 2021, 
this collection), but not everyone had the technical awareness to do so. The 
increase in surveillance and arrests for online speech creates a need for new 
tools, awareness, and skills to practice online safety and data safeguarding. 
The use of VPNs helps citizens to disguise their location and evade state 
censorship and blocking. Digital encryption allows activists and researchers 
to encode their emails, text and instant messages, and secure sensitive or 
personal data on their phones or other digital devices. 
The uptake of the secure Signal messaging app among activists and 
journalists is one example of this trend. The Egypt country report notes 
that its use was considered significant enough for the government to block 
all use of the Signal app for a week in December 2016 (Farahat 2021, this 
collection). Too few African citizens, rights activists, and researchers know 
how to safely save, access, or send sensitive information using mobile 
phones, email, or apps (THRDC 2016). A significant amount of work has gone 
into producing digital security toolkits and training (Ganesh and Gutermuth 
2014). However, levels of awareness and uptake remain low, and there is 
no existing knowledge infrastructure to efficiently share new surveillance 
and security resources. Work to increase knowledge, make available, and 
enable effective use of digital security tools like VPNs, Signal and the 
Tor20 internet browser should be built into project awareness-raising and 
capacity-building programmes.
Intersectional inequalities affect access to civic space, digital citizenship, 
and digital rights. An emerging theme from the country reports that 
demands more focused attention in subsequent research phases is the 
complex ways in which gender and intersectional inequalities shape digital 
access, digital citizenship, and digital rights (Ganesh, Deutch and Schulte 
2016). The country report on Cameroon (Ndongmo 2021, this collection) 
illustrates how LGBTQI citizens are restricted in their use of physical and online 
civic space. Similar closing of civic space occurred for citizens in Uganda and 
Nigeria (in this collection: Nanfuka 2021 and Oladapo and Ojebode 2021). 
Civic space and digital rights are sometimes treated as universal categories, 
but as several country reports in this collection illustrate, women – especially 
low-income women, black women politicians, and LGBTQI citizens – do not 
enjoy equal access to digital tools or connectivity. They are subject to gender-
based violence online, and this restricts their effective access and rights (APC 
20 Unlike market-leading browsers from Google or Microsoft, the Tor browser disables tracking and cookies.
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2018; Faith and Fraser 2018; Vlahakis 2018). It is important to be mindful that 
the use of all digital technologies generally excludes some entirely, and for 
others it creates hierarchies of access and ability (Roberts and Hernandez 
2019). In order to produce a more nuanced analysis, subsequent phases of this 
research should avoid binary conceptions of open/closed civic space and 
ask, ‘Open to whom?’ and ‘Which civic space?’ to produce more detailed and 
actionable analysis.
Table 4.3 Digital closings
 Digital closings of civic space – 115 examples presented in 12 categories
1 Surveillance ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
2 Disinformation ZW ZM SD SA NG KE EG
3 Internet shutdowns ZW ZM UG SD NG ET EG CM
4 Laws and regulations ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
5 Arrests for online speech ZW ZM UG SD NG KE ET EG CM
6 Closing civic space to specific groups ZW UG SA NG ET EG CM
7 Mandatory mobile SIM card registration21 ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
8 Price hikes, social media tax ZW ZM UG CM
9 Mandatory registration of bloggers ZM UG
10 Mandatory ID for internet cafe use EG
11 Bulk SMS ban ZW
12 Murder of digital election official KE
Country key: CM = Cameroon; EG = Egypt; ET = Ethiopia; KE = Kenya; NG = Nigeria; SA = South Africa; 
SD = Sudan; UG = Uganda; ZM = Zambia; ZW = Zimbabwe
Source: Authors’ own.
Surveillance is the technique mentioned most often in country reports 
as closing civic space and diminishing digital rights. The Kenya country 
report documents funding from the US and China to build mass surveillance 
infrastructure (Nyabola 2018). China and the US supply surveillance 
technologies to many African countries including Nigeria, South Africa, 
21 Six of the country reports explicitly mention mandatory SIM card registration. We were able to 
establish that it is compulsory in all ten countries in this study, and in 50 of Africa’s 54 countries 
overall (Privacy International 2019). 
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Sudan, Egypt, Cameroon, and Zambia. The Government of Uganda is 
among those which have procured mobile phone intercept technologies 
from Italian company Hacking Team (Nanfuka 2021, this collection), which 
also supplies the Sudanese government (Mohamed Ali 2021, this collection). 
While still in office President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe received a ‘gift’ of 
monitoring and surveillance technology from Iran that included mobile phone 
scanners, enabling his government to intercept citizens’ private mobile 
communications and locations (Karekwaivanane 2021, this collection). 
In addition to the above state surveillance technologies, the advent of 
‘surveillance capitalism’ (Zuboff 2018) means that African governments are 
now able to buy surveillance as a commercial service from social media 
companies, intermediate data brokers, and political marketing consultancies 
such as Cambridge Analytica and Bell Pottinger. US corporations including 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and WhatsApp have effectively privatised and 
monopolised online civic space. This enables those corporations to monitor 
and track millions of citizens in key marginal constituencies; ascertain their 
political preferences, ‘likes’ and trigger issues; predict their voting behaviour; 
and then sell their digital profiles as a commodity to powerful politicians 
for targeting and covert manipulation (Bradshaw and Howard 2017; Zuboff 
2019; Sadowski 2020). Minimal detailed research and analysis exists on 
surveillance drivers, actors, mechanisms, and appropriate responses in 
Africa. This is a critical area in which further research is urgently needed.
Surveillance involves an inherent power imbalance between the watcher 
and the watched. Ways to redress the power imbalance include building 
public awareness about rights and surveillance practices and building the 
‘sousveillance’ (Mann et al. 2003) capacity – or ‘inverse surveillance’ capacity 
– of those being watched to better understand the tools and techniques of 
the watchers and inform the design of effective legal and policy responses. 
This inversion of surveillance can be used as a tactic to build the knowledge, 
agency and critical digital literacy of citizens and to inform policy changes 
that protect and extend digital rights. 
Disinformation is increasingly common across Africa and a key feature 
of election campaigns. Disinformation has long been part of political 
campaigning, but in the era of traditional mass media a single message was 
broadcast nationwide. Now, increased use of mobile phones and social media 
affords the possibility to precisely profile millions of citizens and to micro-
target each one with highly tailored disinformation messaging, instantly, 
repeatedly and at relatively low cost. The country reports on Kenya and South 
Africa are among those that record the use of voter manipulation and political 
disinformation (in this collection: Nyabola 2021 and Bosch and Roberts 2021). 
The affordances of algorithmic analysis and machine learning make this 
digital disinformation qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from pre-
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digital mechanisms. Disinformation is not only used to covertly manipulate 
citizens’ beliefs and voting behaviour, but also to manipulate public opinion 
on crucial policy issues such as vaccines, climate change, immigration, 
agriculture and education. The country reports on Sudan and Zimbabwe 
document disinformation being deployed around the Covid-19 pandemic 
(in this collection: Mohamed Ali 2021 and Karekwaivanane 2021). The country 
reports on Cameroon, Kenya and South Africa document the weaponisation 
of disinformation to enflame ethnic hatred for political gain (in this collection: 
Ndongmo 2021, Nyabola 2021, and Bosch and Roberts 2021). 
Digital disinformation and the use of automated ‘computational 
propaganda’ is on the rise in a growing list of countries in Africa (Bradshaw 
and Howard 2019). There is good reason to expect elections and public 
policy debates in Africa to continue to be impacted by digital surveillance, 
profiling and micro-targeting of citizens with disinformation. Disinformation 
threatens all democracies, but the threat is arguably greatest in fragile 
democracies: those with weak legal and regulatory oversight, poor 
institutional protections and where levels of disinformation literacy are 
lowest. The clear threat to African democracies, open civic space and 
digital rights presented by the increasing use of covert disinformation to 
manipulate citizens’ beliefs and behaviour, coupled with significant gaps in 
our knowledge of the dimensions and dynamics of disinformation in African 
countries, mean that further research is urgently needed in this area. 
Internet shutdowns are on the rise in African countries. The Ugandan 
government began blocking individual websites as early as 2006 (Nanfuka 
2021, this collection). Now, it is increasingly common for governments to shut 
down the entire internet or mobile phone system. The number of intentional 
internet shutdowns by governments in Africa rose to 25 in 2020, up from 21 in 
2019, with Algeria, Ethiopia and Sudan the worst-affected countries in Africa 
(Taye 2020). However, digital disruptions short of nationwide blackouts – 
such as bandwidth throttling and blocking individual applications, locations, 
or users – are often not captured in this top-level data and require further 
research attention. The Sudan country report documents the government’s 
blocking, controlling, jamming, and throttling of pro-democracy websites and 
private accounts (Mohamed Ali 2021, this collection). The Zambia country report 
documents the government’s 2016 blocking of accountability websites such 
as Zambian Watchdog (Phiri and Zorro 2021, this collection). Building domestic 
capacity to monitor and report on internet shutdowns and disruptions would 
help raise awareness, protect civic space, and defend digital rights.
Arrests for online speech feature in nine of the ten country reports. The right to 
freedom of speech and freedoms of political opinion, affiliation and association 
are guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many other 
international treaties and conventions to which all ten countries in this study 
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are signatories. However, as nine of the ten country reports show, criticising 
the president or government policies on social media can get you arrested in 
countries including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria (in this collection: Farahat 2021, 
Gagliardone 2021, and Oladapo and Ojebode 2021). The affordances of digital 
technologies to track the geolocation of a citizen who the state wants to arrest 
is becoming increasingly easy, as individuals leave digital traces whenever they 
use social media, use mobile money or a credit card, pass a facial recognition 
camera, or use their mobile phone (Privacy International 2020). 
When citizens open civic space online, governments regularly close it down. 
A pattern emerges from the country reports of the contestation of civic 
space between citizens and government online. As citizens incorporate new 
and different digital tools into their repertoire for opening civic space, some 
governments develop additional tactics and techniques to counter them 
and close civic space. Citizens’ use of SMS for activism has been followed 
by bans and mandatory registration; citizen bloggers have been arrested 
and jailed; social media has been privatised; feminist activists online have 
been attacked by misogynists; ethnic groups have been targeted; Facebook 
and Twitter have become sites of surveillance and disinformation; and 
during protests and elections, governments have intentionally shut down or 
disrupted online civic space (see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Openings and responses
Digital opening Government responses Example





Zimbabwe, Uganda, Zambia, Cameroon, 
Nigeria







Arrests for online speech
Internet shutdowns
Disinformation
Coordinating trolls, cyborgs, 
bots
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria
Zimbabwe, Zambia
Uganda
All countries except South Africa and Kenya
All countries except South Africa and Kenya
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Zambia, South Africa
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Legislation was ranked as highly important in both opening and closing 
civic space. A series of laws are highlighted in country reports that enhance 
digital rights by providing freedom of information, legal protections against 
spying and surveillance, or entitlements to internet access and use. The 2005 
Access to Information Acts in Sudan and Uganda are examples of legislation 
to enable digital citizenship and extend digital rights (in this collection: 
Mohamed Ali 2021 and Nanfuka 2021). 
Several country report sections draw attention to laws that significantly 
diminish digital rights by giving new powers to the state to surveil and 
intercept citizens’ private communications or which criminalise political 
speech. The 2010 Cybersecurity Act in Cameroon specifically limits freedom 
of speech online (Ndongmo 2021, this collection) and the 2012 National 
Intelligence Service Act in Kenya gives the state new powers of citizen 
surveillance (Nyabola 2021, this collection). Similarly, the Zimbabwe country 
report uses the example of the Interception of Communications Act, which 
was introduced in 2006 in response to increasing use of digital platforms to 
criticise the government (Karekwaivanane 2021, this collection). 
It is clear from reading the country reports that legislation is a potentially 
powerful mechanism for extending digital access, enabling digital citizenship, 
expanding civic space, and enhancing digital rights. This preliminary scoping 
study has only scraped the surface of this critically important issue. This is 
an area that requires focused and in-depth attention to survey existing 
legal provisions, breaches, and gaps, and to identify where and why legal 
provisions translate into effective protections that expand civic space and 
digital rights.
The ten country reports make a series of recommendations arising from their 
analysis of the digital rights landscape, as summarised in Table 4.5. Foremost 
among the recommendations is the urgent need to dramatically expand 
evidence, awareness, and capacity around the threats to democracy 
presented by surveillance, disinformation, and internet shutdowns. Other 
recommendations include extending the provision of fast and affordable 
internet to excluded groups, to review and improve legal protections, and 
raise awareness about available digital security tools. 
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Table 4.5 Recommendations
 Recommendation Actors Countries





ZW ZM UG SD SA NG KE ET EG CM
2 Capacity-building and 
strengthening programmes 
Civil society ZW ZM UG SA KE ET EG
3 Access to fast and 
affordable internet 
Governments UG SD SA EG CM
4 Disinformation awareness Public and 
journalists 
ZW SD SA NG ET EG CM
5 Anti-surveillance awareness 
(e.g. VPNs, Tor, Signal)
Public and 
civil society 
ZW ZM UG SD KE EG CM
6 Strategic litigation to 
defend digital rights 
Lawyers ZW UG SA EG
7 Advocacy for domestic 
digital rights law
Civil society UG SD NG KE EG
8 South–South networks and 
knowledge exchanges 
CSOs ZM SD KE
9 Local language translation 
of digital rights materials
Civil society SA KE
Country key: CM = Cameroon; EG = Egypt; ET = Ethiopia; KE = Kenya; NG = Nigeria; SA = South Africa; 
SD = Sudan; UG = Uganda; ZM = Zambia; ZW = Zimbabwe
Source: Authors’ own.
Building domestic capacity to monitor, analyse and develop solutions 
to closing civic space is fundamental to improving digital rights. All the 
country reports identified gaps in knowledge, public awareness, and civil 
society capabilities. The reports’ authors make a series of recommendations 
designed to mitigate and overcome the threat to democracy posed by 
growing digital authoritarianism. Local activists, journalists, researchers, 
and policymakers lack detailed knowledge of the dimensions of digital 
surveillance, disinformation, and disruption in their countries. The Zambia 
country report is one of several to recommend that civil society actors 
should be equipped with the necessary skills and technologies to enable 
the systematic monitoring of state and private actors’ online disinformation 
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(Phiri and Zorro 2021, this collection). The Zimbabwe country report 
concludes that there is an urgent need to build domestic technical abilities 
to monitor, analyse and combat the increased use of surveillance and 
digital propaganda by pro-government actors (Karekwaivanane 2021, this 
collection). Until local actors can accurately detail the dimensions and 
dynamics of the problem in their own countries, it is impossible for them to 
define and develop effective countermeasures to restore civic space and 
digital rights. 
Digital citizenship, digital affordances and digital inequalities are 
potentially useful conceptual lenses for the future study of civic space and 
digital rights. Analysing the findings from the ten digital rights landscape 
country reports has made clear the importance of contextual political, 
civic space, and technological developments to understand the digital 
rights landscape in a country. New laws and technical innovations need 
to be part of opening civic space online to expand digital rights. However, 
approaches that ignore the wider political dynamics and power imbalances 
will be insufficient and potentially counterproductive. The conceptual 
framing of digital citizenship has emerged as a potentially useful means 
to centre citizen agency and rights-claiming as phenomena that need 
to be expanded, rather than relying more narrowly on techno- or legal-
centric perspectives. Throughout this exercise, the concept of affordances 
has proved to be a valuable lens for understanding and articulating the 
possibilities for action afforded by specific technologies for opening or 
closing civic space and digital rights. We acknowledge that to date we have 
paid insufficient attention to how different social groups experience unequal 
access to digital technologies and unequal civic space online in ways that 
constrain the scope of their digital citizenship and ability to exercise digital 
rights. In future research it will be important to ask, ‘Open to whom?’ and 
‘Open by how much?’ in order to produce a more nuanced analysis of who is 
(dis)advantaged when civic space is opened or closed.
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5. Conclusion
The digital rights landscape country reports set out to provide new evidence 
about the drivers, actors, tools and techniques being used to open and close 
civic space in ten African countries. We set out to understand more about 
how digital rights were being shaped by the wider political, civic space and 
technological landscape. We documented 180 examples that illustrate who 
is using which digital technologies, in which countries, to either open or close 
civic space, and with what implications for digital rights. 
At the outset, we imagined that our contribution would mainly illustrate the 
range of creative ways that citizens have responded to closing civic space 
offline by opening civic space online. In fact, our contribution is as much 
about how powerful actors are now closing civic space online. We found 
nearly twice as many examples of the use of digital tactics to close civic 
space online as we found of the use of digital tactics to open civic space 
online. A pattern emerged of citizens using digital technologies to open 
civic space online and exercise their digital rights, and of governments using 
digital technologies to close civic space online and diminish digital rights. 
Although digital technologies are potentially available to anyone, unequal 
power relationships explain unequal patterns of access and an overall 
decline in democratic space and digital rights. Some citizens gain access to 
digital technologies, online civic space, and a degree of digital citizenship. 
However, governments have access to pervasive digital surveillance, and 
the ability to deploy disinformation and covertly manipulate citizens’ beliefs 
and behaviour; and they can choose to shut down the internet or imprison 
citizens for online speech. The country reports also provide examples of civic 
space being closed by powerful actors other than governments, including 
corporations and dominant gender or ethnic groups, which sometimes also 
use their power to disrupt democratic dialogue, dominate discourse, and 
diminish digital rights. 
These findings resonate with Kranzberg’s first rule that technologies 
themselves are neither good nor bad, but they are never neutral. 
Technologies such as social media have affordances that can be used to 
open civic space, close civic space, or both. How they are used in practice 
will generally reflect wider political dynamics. Unequal power relationships 
result in unequal access to technologies; unequal ability to open or close civic 
space; uneven digital citizenship capabilities and digital rights. The country 
reports make several key recommendations about how to increase the power 
of citizens to better exercise, defend and expand their digital rights. 
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All ten country reports identify gaps in existing evidence, awareness, and civil 
society capacity to independently monitor, analyse, and respond to activities 
that close civic space and diminish digital rights. A key recommendation 
overall is for further research by African researchers and activists to increase 
what is known about the dimensions and distinctive dynamics of emerging 
tactics in digital surveillance and disinformation. 
Until local researchers, journalists, activists, and policymakers can accurately 
detail the dimensions and dynamics of problems in their own countries, it 
is impossible for them to define and develop effective countermeasures to 
restore civic space and digital rights. The necessary research should not 
be conducted in an ivory tower. An applied multi-actor, interdisciplinary 
research programme is required to build domestic capacity in each country 
to effectively monitor, analyse and overcome threats to democratic space 
and digital rights. 
While further research, technical capacity and legal remedies are necessary 
elements of the solution, they are likely to prove insufficient in isolation from 
raised public awareness and citizen-led political movement for change. Any 
such movement requires an active alliance of multiple actors and initiatives. 
As indicated in section 1, the next steps therefore involve working with:
– Researchers – to produce new evidence about surveillance actors, tools, 
tactics and techniques.
– Journalists – to raise public awareness about the practices and 
consequences of surveillance. 
– Policymakers – to map existing legislation, identify gaps and advance a 
public policy agenda.
– Activists – to expand civic engagement to tackle surveillance, 
disinformation and shutdowns.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been a rapid adoption of mobile and 
internet technologies in Zimbabwe. This has empowered citizens but also 
expanded the repressive capacity of the state. This double-edged impact of 
technology on civic space and digital rights can only be fully understood in 
the context of the country’s protracted political crisis and authoritarian state. 
We begin by discussing the political developments in the country since 
the late 1990s that have provided the backdrop for the adoption and 
use of digital technology in the country. This is followed in section 3 by a 
discussion of the alternating openings and closings of civic space that 
emerged out of political contests. Section 4 examines the ways that digital 
media has been employed by citizens and the state in the prosecution of 
different sociopolitical agendas. Section 5 assesses the digital landscape 
in the country and offers recommendations for ways that the digital rights 
regime can be strengthened. In section 6 we offer some reflections on the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on digital rights. Finally, we end with some 
concluding observations.
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2. Political landscape 
Since the early 2000s, Zimbabwe’s politics has been characterised by an 
unresolved contest. On one side is the Zimbabwe African National Union–
Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), a liberation party that has been in power since 
independence in 1980, but which has proven unable to reform itself or the 
country, and is willing to violate the spirit and the letter of the law to hold on 
to power. On the other is the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The 
opposition party has managed to attract significant popular support, but 
has failed to mobilise citizens beyond its urban strongholds; and is unable to 
maintain sufficient unity within its ranks and to consistently act strategically. 
In the face of this unresolved battle, the country has found itself unable to 
break out of a socioeconomic crisis in which it has been trapped for the 
better part of two decades. 
Antonio Gramsci (1971)’s concept of the ‘interregnum’ is a useful prism 
through which to understand Zimbabwe’s political circumstances. ‘The 
crisis’, Gramsci argues, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying 
and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid 
symptoms appear’ (ibid.: 276). However, it would be incorrect to suggest 
that the past 20 years have been marked by an inexorable descent into 
an ever-deepening crisis. Instead, there has been an alternation between 
periods of opening and closing of civic space. However, it is arguably 
true that there has been a progressive drift away from open, inclusive 
democratic practices.
Between 2000 and 2008, ZANU–PF passed a series of repressive laws, 
interfered with the workings of the judiciary, manipulated elections and 
used violence and intimidation against opposition supporters and officials 
(Karekwaivanane 2017). It also deployed a discourse of exclusion, which 
divided society into ‘patriots’ who supported it and ‘sell-outs’ who supported 
the MDC (Tendi 2020: 53, 57). The ever-broadening category of sell-outs 
came to include civil society, private media and other organisations 
that sought to hold the government to account. Crucially, by discursively 
constructing these groups and individuals as sell-outs or traitors ZANU–PF 
rendered them legitimate objects of violence.
The political deadlock led to a deepening social and economic crisis marked 
by record-breaking inflation and a massive exodus of Zimbabweans into the 
diaspora. The crisis ultimately led to mediation efforts by the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Matters came to a head in mid-2008 when 
President Robert Mugabe mounted a violent campaign in the lead-up to the 
June run-off election, compelling the MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai to pull out of 
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the election. Although Mugabe declared himself the winner, he was faced 
with an acute crisis of legitimacy at home and abroad. He was thus forced to 
agree to a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the opposition.
The five-year term of the GNU (2009–13) was a period of relative political 
opening, designed to allow for the implementation of reforms and drafting 
of a new constitution, as detailed in the Global Political Agreement 
(Raftopoulos 2013). However, few political reforms were fully implemented. 
The signature achievement of the GNU was the adoption of a new 
constitution in 2013. However, since ‘winning’ the 2013 presidential and 
parliamentary elections ZANU–PF has been reluctant to bring the repressive 
laws on the statute book into line with the new Constitution. The thinking 
that informed ZANU–PF inertia is summed up in the statement by the then 
cabinet minister Prof. Jonathan Moyo that ‘Zanu PF will never reform itself 
out of power’ (Tshili 2016).
When ZANU–PF returned to sole power following the 2013 election, there was 
a significant loss in investor confidence. Much of the social and economic 
progress made under the GNU was reversed and Mugabe was drawn into 
bitter infighting within his party. In November 2017, Mugabe was deposed in a 
military coup and died in hospital less than two years later. The protagonists 
of the coup were anxious to mark a break with the past and styled their 
government ‘the new dispensation’ or ‘the second republic’. However, 
as we show in the next section the repressive political strategies of the 
administrations of Mugabe and his successor Emmerson Mnangagwa have 
been very similar.
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3. Civic space landscape
The political developments described in section 2 had important implications 
for the opening and closing of civic space in the country. It is arguably true 
that the more ZANU–PF has felt politically threatened, the more severe the 
attacks it has made on civic space. The period between 2000 and 2020 thus 
witnessed prolonged periods of rapidly shrinking civic space punctuated by 
windows of expanding civic space. Nevertheless, the predominant trend has 
been towards shrinking civic space. 
Unsurprisingly, the key political indicators for the period show only very slight 
improvements between 2000 and 2019, if at all. For example, Zimbabwe’s 
2019 freedom ranking of ‘partly free’ was a return to the 2000 level after a 
prolonged period in the ‘not free’ ranking (see Figure 3.1). Recent political 
developments indicate that these very modest gains are not guaranteed to 
be permanent and that the trend might be moving in the opposite direction.
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–191
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
1  Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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The 1987 Unity Accord in effect removed any political threat to ZANU–PF 
from rival political parties.2 This absence of serious political threats partly 
explains why the ruling party allowed an expansion of civic space 
throughout the 1990s. This period witnessed the emergence or growth of 
several organisations that went on to play an important role in civil society. 
These included the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association, Zimbabwe Lawyers 
for Human Rights (ZLHR), the National Constitutional Assembly and the 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (Masunungure 2014: 10). 
The period 2000–08 was marked by a drastic closing of civic space as 
ZANU–PF sought to fend off the political challenge posed by the MDC. The 
security agencies, war veterans, and youth militia were used to intimidate, 
assault and, in some instances, kill the ruling party’s political opponents 
(Karekwaivanane 2017: 220). The law was also used to criminalise political 
dissent. A lot of the violence and intimidation centred on the elections that 
were held in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008. 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) made significant efforts to challenge the 
government’s repression. The earlier generation of CSOs were joined by a 
host of new ones such as Zimbabwe Peace Project, Zimbabwe Electoral 
Support Network, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and Women of Zimbabwe 
Arise (Masunungure 2014: 10). The excessive nature of the violence ultimately 
backfired as it undermined the legitimacy of Mugabe’s government 
and forced SADC to intervene. It was this intervention that led to the 
establishment in 2008 of the power-sharing GNU.
Between 2008 and 2013 the power-sharing arrangement resulted in 
a significant expansion of civic space. The countrywide constitutional 
consultation process, flawed as it was, helped to create the space for wide-
ranging grassroots-level political debate (Sachikonye 2013). The process 
resulted in a progressive constitution with a justiciable bill of rights, although 
few concrete steps were taken to implement transitional justice measures.
The GNU came to an abrupt end in 2013 when a hastily organised election 
returned ZANU–PF to power with a two-thirds majority in Parliament. With 
ZANU–PF in full control of the state, the years leading up to 2017 saw a 
progressive weakening in the capacity of civil society and opposition political 
organisations. The weakness in these institutions led to a proliferation of 
citizen-led protests. The Occupy Africa Unity Square campaign began 
in 2014 and the #ThisFlag, #Tajamuka, #BeatThePot and #ThisGown 
campaigns of 2016 followed in quick succession (Karekwaivanane and Mare 
2019). What is significant about this period was the growing use of social 
2 The 1987 Unity Accord led to a merger between ZANU-PF and the main opposition party, Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (PF–ZAPU). The accord ended the government-directed violence against 
PF–ZAPU members and leaders. 
© 2021 George Karekwaivanane & Natasha Msonza © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.006
49ids.ac.uk Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Zimbabwe Digital Rights Landscape Report
media by citizens to mobilise and coordinate social and political action. 
However, these campaigns were frequently met with firm state repression 
that was reminiscent of the period between 2000 and 2008. 
Ironically, the military coup of 2017 ushered in a short period of widening 
civic space between the November 2017 coup and the July 2018 elections. 
The new dispensation allowed a measure of freedom of association and 
expression in order to convince potential investors that they were reform 
minded. However, this superficial commitment to greater freedoms was 
already fraying in the weeks leading up to the July 2018 elections. 
Amidst heightened anxiety and suspicion over vote counting and 
announcement of the election results, the government ordered the army 
on to the streets of the capital Harare to suppress growing protests. 
The crackdown left six civilians dead and dozens more seriously injured 
(Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry 2018). Fuel price protests in January 2019 
were met with another military crackdown, during which more citizens were 
killed, and an internet shutdown was imposed (Amnesty International 2019). 
Abductions of prominent voices of dissent such as journalists, union leaders, 
comedians and opposition officials became more commonplace (OHCHR 
2020). This trend of closing civic space continued in 2020.
Table 3.1 Civic space timeline 
Year Shift Implication
1997–99 Emergence of a civil society coalition 
under the National Constitutional 
Assembly. 
Opening of civic space and formation 
of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC).
2000–08 All-out effort by the Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front 
(ZANU–PF) to hold on to power.
Rapidly shrinking civic space and 
targeting of civil society and 
opposition activists.
2008–13 Government of National Unity. Expansion of civic space and 
adoption of new Constitution.
2013–late-2017 ZANU–PF’s shock defeat of opposition 
MDC.
Renewed shrinking of civic space and 




Following a military coup, a new 
government led by Emmerson 
Mnangagwa takes office.
Broadening civic space and 




Post-election killings usher in a return 
to overt repression. 
Closing of civic space, and 
carrot-and-stick approach towards 
opposition politicians, civil society 
activists and unionists.
Source: Authors’ own.
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4. Technology landscape 
Over the past 20 years, there has been a significant expansion in the uptake 
of the internet and mobile phones in Zimbabwe. Between 2000 and 2019 the 
mobile penetration rate rose from 2.3 per cent to 90.6 per cent of the total 
population (POTRAZ 2019). From 2009 to 2019 the internet penetration level 
rose from 5.1 per cent to 60.6 per cent of the total population (ibid.). However, 
the high cost of data means that subscribers often cannot afford regular 
access to the internet. In addition, there remains a significant disparity in 
internet access among citizens. Increased internet and mobile penetration 
has been accompanied by a rise in the use of social media platforms such 
as WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter. WhatsApp is the most widely used, 
followed by Facebook, which was estimated to have 994,000 subscribers in 
Zimbabwe at the end of 2019 (Internet World Stats 2020). 
Due to its widespread availability, digital technology has played an important 
role in the opening and closing of civic space. On the one hand, citizens have 
used digital technologies in increasingly innovative ways to expand and take full 
advantage of civic space. On the other, the government has employed digital 
technologies to control and conduct surveillance on its citizens. In this section 
we highlight the main steps taken by the government and citizens, respectively. 
The legal basis for repressing digital rights in Zimbabwe rests on laws such as 
the 2003 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). AIPPA 
has been used by the government to inhibit media freedom (Article 19 and 
MISA-Zimbabwe 2004). The Interception of Communications Act (ICA) of 
2007 was introduced at a time when Zimbabweans were increasingly using 
digital platforms to criticise the government. The legislation empowered the 
government to set up the Interception of Communications Monitoring Centre, 
which enabled it to place its critics under intrusive surveillance in the name 
of national security (The President and the Parliament of Zimbabwe 2007). 
Section 9 of the act requires telecommunications service providers to provide 
the state with ‘real time and full time monitoring facilities for the interception 
of communications’ and failure to comply is punishable by a fine or a jail term 
of up to three years (ibid: 7). 
During the 2013 election campaign, the government banned the use of bulk 
SMS (text messaging) (Batambuze III 2013) on the grounds that it was trying 
to ensure that telecommunications operators respected ‘the constitutional 
right of customers to personal privacy’ and to protect customers from 
‘unsolicited Bulk SMS’ (POTRAZ 2013). However, bulk SMS messages were 
a powerful means for activists and non-governmental organisations in 
Zimbabwe to reach wide audiences with civic education information. The 
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ban thus curtailed access to information, especially for those who could not 
afford smartphones and mobile data. 
In 2013, the government claimed that the introduction of mandatory SIM card 
registration was in line with the global trend and was intended to ‘safeguard 
national security’ and control crime (POTRAZ 2013). However, it effectively 
expanded state surveillance capabilities while reducing citizens’ privacy and 
freedoms. 
This capability has on occasion been used to instil fear in citizens. For example, 
on the day of the July 2016 stay-away co-ordinated by the #ThisFlag 
campaign,3 the government, through the Post and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ), issued a veiled threat through a 
public notice in the press (Gambanga 2016). The notice stipulated that people 
who were sharing ‘abusive and subversive materials’ would be ‘disconnected… 
arrested and dealt with accordingly in the national interest’. The public notice 
further warned that: ‘All SIM cards in Zimbabwe are registered in the name of 
the user. Perpetrators can easily be identified’ (ibid.).
The government has also used pricing of data to close down online 
opposition. On 4 August 2016, during a period of sustained online 
campaigning and a nationwide stay-away campaign, the government 
increased the cost of mobile data by 500 per cent (Htxt 2016; Muzulu 2017). 
This timing stoked speculation that the price hikes were a deliberate move 
by the government to quash social activism and online organising. Public 
uproar at the price rises led to a policy reversal five days later, but the tactic 
was deployed again in 2017; this time prices were hiked by 2,500 per cent in 
January (Muzulu 2017). Many Zimbabweans were temporarily forced to go 
offline and forfeit their freedom of expression, demonstrating the increasing 
centrality of mobile data access to digital rights. 
Price hikes were not the only tactic in President Mugabe’s arsenal for closing 
civic space. In 2015, he received a ‘gift’ of monitoring and surveillance 
technology from Iran including international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) 
catchers that make it possible to intercept mobile phone traffic, as well as 
track the location data of mobile phone users (Bulawayo24 2015). This gave 
the government new capabilities to target government critics or perceived 
enemies of the state. A study by cybersecurity researchers used an IMSI 
catcher sniffer app to detect IMSI catchers ‘on the cell phone towers of the 
government-owned cell phone provider NetOne’ (Gwagwa and Hove n.d.). 
According to media reports about the alleged bugging of the mobile phones 
of opposition officials, the government is using such technology to conduct 
surveillance on Zimbabwean citizens (Ndlela 2020). 
3 A stay-away is a form of protest in which citizens stay away from their places of work for a set period 
of time. The goal is to bring the economy to a standstill while avoiding violent confrontations with 
the authorities.
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In addition to installing IMSI catchers, the government has also extended 
its surveillance capabilities through the installation of a large-scale 
facial recognition programme, as part of a 2018 ‘strategic’ public-private 
partnership backed by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (Quartz 
Africa 2018). This partnership is an example of the way that the Chinese 
information control model is being diffused via the digital silk road (Weber 
2019). For its part, the government intends to use the facial recognition 
system for law enforcement purposes. Cloudwalk Technology, the Chinese 
company providing the facial recognition equipment, will receive a stock 
of photographs that will be used to ‘train the racial bias out of its facial 
recognition systems’ (Quartz Africa 2018). 
In addition, data collected by researchers at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace show that artificial intelligence surveillance technology 
from two other Chinese firms, Huawei and Hikvision, is currently being used 
in Zimbabwe (Feldstein 2019). This has stoked fears that the adoption of this 
technology signals a broader adoption of China’s information control model, 
and that the facial recognition programme may represent a step towards 
the pervasive and panoptic surveillance measures used in Chinese cities 
(Weber 2019). 
This progressive increase in state surveillance capabilities may be linked to 
a rise in arrests of individuals for their online activities. Since July 2014, ZLHR 
has assisted at least 200 people who have been arrested for posts that they 
have made on social media sites (CIPESA 2020). These include former editor 
of the state-owned Sunday Mail newspaper Edmund Kudzayi (Laiton 2014) 
and prominent journalist Hopewell Chin’ono, who was arrested in a round-up 
of government critics ahead of the anti-corruption protests planned for 31 
July 2020 (New Zimbabwe 2020). These arrests have had a chilling effect on 
citizens, causing government critics to use pseudonyms to engage in online 
discussions of politics, or self-censor to avoid arrest (Mokwetsi 2014).
Social media has become an important space partly due to aggressive 
policing of street protests. The opening of online civic space is a response 
to the repressive closing of physical civic space – the two are intimately 
connected. The opening of online civic space has produced a number of 
influential hashtag campaigns in Zimbabwe that have produced street 
demonstrations. The #ThisFlag campaign of 2016 was triggered by a social 
media video in which Pastor Evan Mawarire bemoaned the protracted 
socioeconomic and political crises confronting the country (Karekwaivanane 
and Mare 2019). Unemployed university graduates took advantage of the 
momentum by initiating the #ThisGown campaign. #ShutDownZimbabwe 
also started through online cyber-activism, but culminated in nationwide 
street protests in January 2019, which turned violent and led to the destruction 
of property and loss of lives. 
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Ahead of elections in July 2018, the president issued a ‘call to arms’4 to his 
supporters to ‘rakasha’ (thrash) his opponents online. This led to an upsurge in 
new social media accounts amplifying ruling party propaganda and derailing 
critical political conversations. This has been described locally as the 
‘Varakashi’ phenomenon,5 which has played out as online mobs of individual 
trolls and ‘sock puppet’ accounts who actively close online civic space by 
harassing opposition voices and coordinating disinformation campaigns. 
The Varakashi illustrate the regime’s shift to appropriating the same 
technology tools and platforms used by its opponents. Our research 
has shown that during the 2018 election season, pro-government trolls 
succeeded in intimidating opposition voices and shutting down civic space. 
Activists became aware that everything political that they posted was being 
closely monitored, sometimes culminating in threats of violence in their offline 
lives. Varakashi continued to play a role in Zimbabwe’s politically polarised 
landscape in 2020, aggressively targeting opposition party members and 
activists who try to speak out about ongoing human rights violations. 
At the time of writing, the most recent influential hashtag campaign has 
been #ZimbabweanLivesMatter, which rose to prominence in August 2020. 
The campaign has kept open civic space and hopes of democratic reform, 
as other forms of civic protest are being suppressed through harassment, 
intimidation and arrests of citizens (Karombo and Brown 2020). Our research 
has found that the level of global attention to the #ZimbabweanLivesMatter 
campaign has clearly unsettled the government, as there has been a spike in 
the number of individuals arrested for their online activities. 
Overall, there is a discernible pattern of hashtags emerging in times of 
significant sociopolitical turmoil. The hashtags open civic space online and 
tend to draw large followings. They have woken up a lot of Zimbabwe to 
the concept of cyber-activism and campaigning as an alternative form of 
protest. Concerns about surveillance have also led to greater awareness 
about the need for security, resulting in the adoption of messaging apps that 
are deemed to be more secure, such as Telegram and Signal.
The first countrywide internet shutdown happened in January 2019, following 
massive protests against a 150 per cent fuel price hike and the struggle for 
economic justice. The shutdown was in effect for six days, during which time 
the armed forces unleashed a wave of terror, killing over a dozen people 
(Ndlovu 2019). Through his Twitter and Facebook accounts,6 President 
Mnangagwa justified the shutdown, saying that ‘social networks [were] being 
4 Alex T Magaisa tweet, 13 April 2018.
5 ‘Varakashi’ refers to the group of pro-government voices on Twitter who actively defend the 
government and troll its opponents.
6 President Mnangagwa Facebook post, January 2019.
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used to plan and incite disorder and to spread misinformation leading to 
violence’ (Chaparadza 2019). 
In response, many Zimbabweans began downloading virtual private network 
software in order to circumvent the shutdown. The Zimbabwe chapter of the 
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) successfully challenged the shutdown 
in the High Court on a legal technicality (Dzirutwe 2019). However, given that 
the constitutionality of the shutdown was not decided on, the government can 
implement a shutdown again so long as it uses the right procedure to do so.
Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Year Shift Implication
2001–02 Legislation to restrict digital 
rights.
Freedom of expression reduced by Broadcasting 
Services Act (2001) and Access to Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002). 
2013 Bulk SMS ban. Closed means for civic information, especially 
voter education.
2014 Mandatory SIM card 
registration.
Reduced right to privacy and increased state 
capacity for digital surveillance.
2015 State surveillance tools 
procured. 
International mobile subscriber identity catchers, 
GPS trackers, vehicle trackers and mobile phone 
bugging of opposition politicians and civic 
activists for their online activities.
2016 Emergence of hashtag 
campaigns.
Opening of new online civic space. 
500% price increase for mobile 
data.
Introduction of strategy to limit access and stifle 
freedom of expression.
2017 Cybersecurity and Data 
Protection Bill.
Multiple problematic provisions that can be used 
to shrink freedom of expression.
2018 Facial recognition technology. Zimbabwe–China relationship over problematic 
Cloudwalk Technology (in terms of privacy 
rights).
Varakashi – pro-government 
trolls.
Coordinated misinformation used to close civic 
space online. 
2019 Internet shutdown for six days 
in January. 
Zimbabwe’s first total internet shutdown closes 
off online civic space and entirely removes digital 
rights.
2020 Hashtag protests. #ZimbabweanLivesMatter, #ZanuPFMustGo.
Source: Authors’ own.
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5. Digital rights landscape
What is clear from the previous section is that although Zimbabwean 
citizens have been making use of digital technologies to open civic space 
and express their digital rights, significant challenges persist. The laws and 
policies implemented by the state – such as the provisions that allow for the 
interception of communications or the collection of user data – and bans on 
specific technologies all stand in the way of achieving internet freedom and 
the full enjoyment of digital rights. 
Although smartphones have provided citizens with many powerful tools to 
voice their concerns, the government’s growing arsenal is quite substantial. 
The asymmetry is very apparent and building the capacity of civil society is 
urgent if the government is to be held accountable and citizens are to be 
able to express and defend their digital rights. Efforts have to be targeted at 
two connected levels: (a) building up technical capacities; and (b) building 
up awareness. 
Due to the political struggles of the past two decades, the language of 
rights has become very common in the Zimbabwean public sphere. However, 
debates have rarely extended to issues of digital rights. This is despite the 
fact that as digital technologies become embedded in people’s lives ‘offline’ 
and ‘online’ rights are becoming increasingly interdependent. Valuable 
documents that set out important principles for digital rights such as the 
African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms, which was produced 
by a transnational coalition of CSOs (including MISA-Zimbabwe) are rarely, if 
ever, invoked (African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms 2020).
The strong legal capacity in Zimbabwean civil society provides a foundation 
to build on in defending digital rights, but much more needs to be done to 
build the capacity of lawyers to engage with issues such as privacy and 
personal data protection. There is also an urgent need to push for greater 
checks and balances, as well as transparency in the way that laws relating 
to the interception of communications are implemented. 
Aside from the legal capacity there is need for greater information and 
communications technology (ICT) capacity in order for CSOs to be able 
to monitor and detect issues such as the use of intrusive surveillance 
technologies and bring these to the attention of legal experts and advocacy 
groups. This should also extend to raising the capacity of civic organisations 
to protect their data and communications in the face of an authoritarian 
state that is intensifying surveillance. The combined efforts of ICT experts 
and legal experts can produce strong grounds for legal challenges to the 
constitutionality of repressive legislation.
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Given the prevailing socioeconomic hardships, many Zimbabweans are 
focused on meeting their basic needs rather than digital rights. Issues 
such as SIM card registration, facial recognition and online disinformation 
are not given the attention they deserve. At the same time, there is limited 
realisation that the continued suppression of civic space and curtailment 
of digital rights leaves Zimbabweans limited in their ability to contest 
political corruption, fuel and food prices, or abuse of civil liberties and 
political freedom. 
Organisations such as the Digital Society of Africa (DSA) have in some 
instances tracked activity around bandwidth throttling and network 
interference when they have occurred in Zimbabwe. However, this is not 
the primary work of the organisation and such activities are intermittent. 
Although these efforts have unearthed revealing behaviours, patterns 
and trends, they have been discontinued on grounds of lack of capacity. 
Ultimately, there is a need to develop public awareness, civic capacity and 
technical abilities to undertake systematic monitoring, tracking, analysis and 
public education on digital rights developments. Such local capacity needs 
to be complemented with transnational partnerships.
Much more needs to be done to increase public awareness of the actions 
of the state, corporate organisations and, indeed, other citizens that affect 
people’s digital rights. To a degree, many of the legal and technological 
strategies employed by the government to suppress digital rights are neither 
widely publicised nor understood. It is also not uncommon for draconian 
legislation to be passed without meaningful public consultation. Much more 
needs to be done to promote public awareness of the key principles of 
internet freedom and digital rights. The study of efforts to promote human 
rights across the continent has shown that the most sustainable and 
successful efforts have to be centred on and driven by citizens (Englund 2005; 
Neocosmos 2006).
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6. Digital rights in times of Covid-19
The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has tended to accentuate existing 
social and political dynamics in Zimbabwe. In keeping with the aphorism 
‘never let a good crisis go to waste’, the government has tried to use the 
pandemic in multiple ways to aid its own agenda. It has expanded the 
powers of the police and passed regulations that enable them to arrest 
individuals who are found to be acting in ways that are deemed to promote 
the spread of the virus. 
These laws have been used to suppress civic expressions of dissent. There 
has also been a proliferation of conspiracy theories around Covid-19 
on social media and, in some instances, these have been disseminated 
to serve political purposes. For example, Deputy Minister of Defence 
Victor Matemadanda sought to discourage citizens from participating in 
anticorruption protests planned for 31 July 2020 by arguing that foreign 
agents were planning on infecting the participants with coronavirus.7 It is 
difficult to determine what impact such Covid-19 disinformation has had. 
However, what it does indicate is an effort to weaponise Covid-19-related 
disinformation.
In 2020, the economic situation worsened under lockdown conditions and 
this has intensified the focus on corrupt activities of the political elite. The 
restrictions on movement have forced protest activities to move online. For 
example, citizen activists started a protest online using two campaigns. One 
aimed to have massive numbers of people unfollow the president on Twitter, 
on the basis that: ‘Dictatorships thrive on public validation. Unfollowing 
is a great form of resistance against his corrupt rule… it is public rejection 
which he can’t rig!’ (Mashininga 2020). Another hashtag campaign during 
lockdown was #July31st, used concurrently with #ZanuPFMustGo, challenging 
Zimbabweans to go out on to the streets in protest against government 
ineptitude. Ruling party supporters attempted to hijack #ZanuPFMustGo 
by creating the counter-hashtag: #ZanuPFMustGoOn. Because Twitter 
sometimes auto-completes popular hashtags, some less observant Twitter 
users accidentally ended up tacking on the wrong hashtag. 
7 Dewa Mavhinga tweet, 1 August 2020. 
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7. Conclusion
The preceding sections have illustrated that over the past two decades 
digital technology has been increasingly enlisted in the struggles that are 
animating Zimbabwean politics. In all of this it has functioned as a double-
edged sword, empowering citizens on the one hand and reinforcing state 
power on the other. We have also underscored the asymmetric nature of 
these struggles due to the vast resources the state has at its disposal to 
counter any empowering aspects of digital technologies. 
If digital media are to play a greater role in expanding civic space and 
ending the interregnum that Zimbabwe finds itself trapped in, two steps 
need to be taken. 
First, there is a critical need for civil society’s capacity to be strengthened 
in order to deal with three important areas: (a) monitoring, (b) lobbying 
policymakers and (c) building public awareness. Zimbabwean civil society 
is very weak in the area of digital rights and there is an urgent need to build 
up technical abilities to monitor developments in the digital sphere, from the 
adoption of cutting-edge surveillance technology to the implementation of 
different forms of computational propaganda. This ICT capacity has to be 
coupled with the legal capacity to evaluate legislation and formulate policy 
alternatives. Building public awareness is a crucial part of any digital rights 
strategy. 
Second, local and transnational partnerships have to be central to any 
strategy to build a stronger digital rights regime in Zimbabwe. There is ample 
scope for building synergistic partnerships between organisations that 
have decades of experience on human rights work, such as ZLHR, and those 
working in the area of digital security, such as the DSA. Partnerships between 
organisations across the continent can foster important opportunities for 
knowledge exchange.
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1. Introduction
This report offers an overview of the digital rights situation in Zambia. The 
purpose is to scope the rights landscape in Zambia; and to document the 
political, civic, and technological areas. The report is dependent on desk 
reviews of existing documents about what is taking place in the country. The 
overall objectives of this study are to: promote an understanding of the civic 
and digital rights situation in the country; identify local Zambian capabilities 
and existing gaps; reflect upon the digital technologies used by government 
and civil society; and, finally, to recommend areas for further research, civic 
activism, and policy change. 
Generally, it is observed that Zambia’s civic space has, over the years, 
narrowed through a combination of factors. These factors include 
government political and legal actions on one side, and the rather weak 
civil society base on the other. Ultimately, though, in promoting a better 
understanding of the digital rights situation in Zambia, this report seeks to 
ensure that citizens continue advocating for the expansion of local civic 
spaces. At the same time, scholars are expected to back up this ‘pushback 
movement’ with the requisite empirical research into this critical area of 
social practice. By so doing, civil society, scholars, and policymakers, jointly 
or separately, will hopefully build new platforms and bases, to promote policy 
change and new policy directions.
For our purposes, we define civic space as ‘the set of conditions that 
determine the extent to which all members of society, both as individuals 
and in informal or organised groups, are able to freely, effectively and without 
discrimination exercise their basic civil rights’ (Malena 2015: 14) and delimit the 
notion of digital rights to human rights during the era of the internet. These 
are basically civil rights that relate to the right of online privacy, freedom of 
expression and freedom of online association (Hutt 2020).
Thus, the report takes a bird’s eye view of the political situation over the past 
20 years, closely examines the status of Zambian civic space and scrutinises 
the technologies used. It concludes that the fortunes of the country’s digital 
rights situation could depend on: the emergence of more vibrant civic 
activism; the building of a culture of respect for human rights; creation of 
more open civic spaces; and ensuring greater civic participation in policy 
formulation and implementation.
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2. Political landscape
Zambia, with a population of 18 million people, has been an independent 
state since October 1964. In a period of 56 years, it has undergone three 
major political phases. These are the eras of multiparty democracy, one-
party rule and then a return to multiparty democracy in 1990. Since then, 
Zambia has enjoyed a relatively free and peaceful political environment, 
albeit with a lot of economic and other social problems.
However, throughout these periods, what has remained constant is the 
powerful position occupied by the executive wing of government over all 
other sectors such as parliament, the judiciary, the media, and civil society 
formations. What Zambia has had since 1964 has been an authoritative 
patrimonial and almost imperial presidency that is ably reinforced by a 
governing party and looms large across all sections of society. 
This is despite Zambia having had three different constitutions and two 
additional major constitutional amendments in 1964, 1969, 1973, 1991 and 1996, 
respectively (ZIS 1991; Chinyere and Hamauswa 2016). However, the basics of 
the winner-takes-all one-party rule paradigm have remained unchanged. 
This static situation has generally impacted upon Zambia’s human rights 
ethos and resulted in a weak participative culture in civic activities by its 
citizens.
Besides, from the initial years of Zambia’s independence, its first president, 
Kenneth Kaunda, established an oppressive and ubiquitous eavesdropping 
state security apparatus, which spied on citizens and bugged 
communication lines, such as telephones (Sardanis 2014: 89). This ‘System’ as 
it is colloquially called, was supported by an entrenched pyramidal political 
party structure. This was the supreme governing body of the country that 
since independence in 1964 had continued to vest itself with more and more 
powers (ibid.: 89). This entrenched a tradition of social control that has largely 
continued and is now impacting on human rights and digital citizenship.
However, after the changes of 1990–91, when the country returned to 
multiparty democracy, there were promising signs that the socio-political 
dominance of governing political parties as described above was to take a 
back seat and that spaces for media and civil society would open up. This 
hope did not last long. By 2011, such positive political reforms had dwindled. 
Systemically and then, quickly, they were reversed when new President 
Michael Sata came into office. 
Sata, who cut his political teeth during the one-party era, was sent to 
the Soviet Union by the Kaunda government to study as a ‘commissar’ in 
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political party organisation (Scott 2019: 54). After becoming president, he 
subsequently reasserted the supremacy of his governing political party, the 
Patriotic Front (PF), placed the PF’s chief executive officer on the government 
payroll, and ensured that government ministers genuflected to the PF. Social 
policy, too, was generated from the corridors of the party offices, as was the 
case before 1991. Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 changes, 
the governing party was distanced from the government, Sata reasserted 
the supremacy of the PF as the overlord ‘ruling’ party, thereby placing state 
functionaries into submissive roles to those of PF party officials (Zambia 
Reports 2012a). The reversal was almost complete.
Further, Sata ensured that the Public Order Act (POA) – an old, repressive 
colonial law, enacted in 1955, and, originally meant to subdue anti-colonial 
protests – was used to the maximum, to reduce dissent, paralyse civil society 
activism and mollify opposition elements. In fact, within six months of being in 
office, Sata said that the POA, which when in opposition he had considered 
reprehensible, was in fact a good law for maintaining social order (Zambia 
Reports 2012b; Zambian Watchdog 2012). 
These reversals were strongly opposed by civil society organisations (CSOs) 
including the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), representing the Catholic 
Church; the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) for the legal fraternity; and the 
Council of Churches in Zambia, on behalf of Protestant Christians. Summing 
up the feelings of the times, ZEC said: ‘looking at what is happening… it would 
seem to us that the ideals of a politically plural society have not been fully 
understood and appreciated by those who aspire for political leadership 
in our successive governments’. The ZEC called on political leaders to 
‘prudently exercise the power that the Zambian people have entrusted in 
them’ (Zambia Reports 2013).
Since then, there has been a closing-in of political spaces for actors with 
alternative views such as the CSOs. Old laws have been harshly enforced. New 
ones have been put in place. Hopes for a more open society have been largely 
dashed. Among the laws and regulations in Zambia that now specifically 
oversee digital citizenship, or govern digital rights are those listed below.1
2.1 Information and Technologies Act of 2009
A unique feature of this law is that it takes ‘supremacy’ where there is 
inconsistency between it and any other law with regard to the regulation 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs). Also, it empowers 
the regulatory authority, the Zambia Information and Communications 
Technologies Authority (ZICTA), which it created, to be responsible for radio 
1 All the cited laws are available on the Zambian National Assembly website. 
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frequency transmissions. This has a direct effect on the broadcasting sector 
in Zambia. For instance, in August 2020 the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority (IBA), the broadcasting regulatory authority that works in tandem 
with ZICTA, claimed that all online broadcasting should be licensed because 
according to the IBA, the law states that: 
Any person wishing to operate or provide broadcasting service in Zambia, 
regardless of whether the broadcasting service is conveyed through 
radio frequency spectrum or any electronic communication networks 
such as the Internet, is required to obtain a broadcasting license from the 
IBA. Operating without a broadcasting license amounts to an offence.
(News Diggers 2020)
The IBA was responding to a Zambia-based online television station, Spring 
TV, which had incorrectly reported the suicide of a fired government minister. 
General Education Minister David Mabumba had been dropped from the 
cabinet for producing and distributing pornography on the internet, but he 
was alive (The Mast 2020; The Zambian Observer 2020).
2.2 Electronic Communication and Transaction Act 
of 2009
This law allows for the ‘lawful’ interception of communications; for service 
providers to install interception devices/software in their infrastructure; for 
the minister to instruct service providers to disclose ‘alleged illegal activities’ 
of suspects, and for the establishment of a government-controlled Central 
Monitoring and Coordination Centre, which, on behalf of the state, aggregates 
all communications interceptions. Further, there is an absence of data protection 
and privacy laws to safeguard the interests of digital citizens in Zambia. Whereas, 
in brief, this law ostensibly forbids service providers from monitoring user 
activities, nonetheless the minister can order that they install devices for real-
time monitoring of suspects and disclose suspects’ activities to the authorities. 
Moreover, there are no safeguards for data collected by telecoms companies, 
traffic police, insurance companies, and even hospitals since the emergence of 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and the coronavirus disease (Covid-19).
2.3 Statutory Instrument No. 65 of 2011
This sub-legislation provides for the registration of all SIM cards used in 
Zambia. Owners are expected to give personal details regarding their 
residences and particulars of national registration cards (NRCs). All Zambians 
are compelled to be registered and are expected to carry their NRC with 
them at all times from the age of 16 years.
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2.4 Non-Governmental Organisations Act No. 16 
of 2009 
This law requires that all non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including 
those engaged in digital rights work, whether local or international, be 
registered with the Registrar of Societies. It is also a requirement that NGOs 
should on an annual basis submit their activity reports to the government 
department responsible for NGOs, the Ministry of Social Welfare. The inflows 
and outflows of the finances of NGOs are also closely monitored by the 
government. This means that any organisation that is working in the civic 
sphere, whether on aspects of human or digital rights or not, is closely 
monitored by the government. Such oversight has been considered ‘highly 
restrictive’ (CIVICUS 2017) by some observers. Moreover, the mere presence 
of the demand that all CSOs should be registered by a government agency 
presupposes the absence of privacy for civic activists. The good thing, 
though, is that this act is under revision, with some limited consultation with 
the NGO sector. 
2.5 Preservation of Public Security Act (PPSA) of 1960
This law has been used to control public gatherings; ban publications 
considered to be ‘prejudicial to public security’; and regulate assemblies, 
including those of political parties and CSOs. The law also authorises the 
president to do anything ‘as appear[s] to him to be strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation in Zambia’. This law was used in 1996 to ban the 
online issue of The Post newspaper, including its hard-copy edition. On many 
occasions, it has been used to stop unauthorised public gatherings, arrest 
protesters, and violently disperse public gatherings, including those of NGOs 
and opposition political parties, actions which in some instances have led to 
deaths (ibid.).
Clearly, Zambia has witnessed the government exercising greater control 
over its people. Also, the country has observed that the state was getting as 
much information as possible about people’s private lives and activities (MTN 
2020). Then, too, the domestic civic space has been substantially narrowed 
especially for human rights activists, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people, bloggers, academic researchers and all 
others who are on the margins of, or outside, government thinking. 
The next section focuses on how this political and legal context has shaped 
the civic space in Zambia.
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3. Civic space landscape
Since its independence from Great Britain in 1964, Zambia has enjoyed a 
diverse and active civil society, which includes labour unions, community-
based human rights activists, development organisations, and church 
groups. Additionally, the country has maintained peace and stability since 
the change in 1990–91 to multiparty politics, marking a break from 19 years of 
one-party rule, which had been established in 1972. 
As a result, the Freedom in the World report of 2019 scores Zambia as partly 
free with a total of 54 points on a scale of 1 to 100 (Freedom House 2019a). 
According to the report, Zambia scores 22 out of 40 for political rights and 32 
out of 60 for civil liberties.
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–192
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019b)
2 Data not available for 2010 and 2012.











Free Partially free Not free
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Further, a 2017 overview of Zambia by CIVICUS states that civil society’s 
challenges include limited capacity for networking and high dependency on 
external resources. However, other broader societal challenges include 
political polarisation, lack of judicial independence, and practices such as 
torture and unlawful killings by the police force (CIVICUS 2017). 
Therefore, a current source of concern for the operations of civil society is the 
introduction of legislation to control civic and public space. One example 
of this is the Non-Governmental Organisations Act No. 16 of 2009, referred 
to above, that provides for the coordination and regulation of NGOs; and 
establishment of the Non-Governmental Organisations’ Registration Board 
(NGO Board) and the Zambia Congress of Non-Governmental Organisations, 
for the ostensible reason of enhancing transparency and accountability in 
the activities of the NGO sector (PMRC 2016). 
The act was introduced in spite of CSOs’ efforts at self-regulation. Earlier 
in 1999, CSOs had instead created a voluntary code of conduct for self-
regulation in response to government plans to regulate them. The voluntary 
code was meant to strengthen CSOs’ capacity to work independently and 
to negotiate with government.
According to Leah Mitaba, the director of the Zambia Council for Social 
Development, the NGO Act contravenes the constitution and places Zambia 
in a bad light globally and among its people who, since the return to the 
multiparty system, have wished to ensure that Zambia thrives through an 
active citizenry that holds its government to account (Chakwe 2020). 
The NGO Act contains provisions that make it susceptible to abuse and 
offers the state the opportunity of constraining the freedoms of NGOs. 
Key points requiring review in the legislation are: the definition of what 
NGOs are; excessive ministerial authority; severity of penalties; imbalanced 
representation on the NGO Board; and the absence of an appeals process 
(PMRC 2016).
Other pieces of legislation that at the time of writing were yet to be 
brought before parliament by the government, albeit with notably low 
public engagement, include: The E-Government Bill; Data Protection Bill; 
E-Transactions and E-Commerce Bill; and the Cyber Security and Cyber 
Crime Bill. 
For Mitaba, civil society needs to engage the state to ensure that any such 
proposed legislation complies with Zambia’s international and continental 
obligations, as well as best practices, and that they offer an enabling 
environment for civil society operations.
Table 3.1 offers a perspective on the implications of the above-mentioned 
laws and political actions for civic space in Zambia.
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline
Year Shift Implication
1999 CSOs create voluntary code of 
conduct 
Strengthens CSOs’ capacity to work 
independently and to negotiate with government
2000–
present 
Increased inter-party violence during 
elections
Narrowing of space for political activity as citizens 
are generally fearful of partaking in political 
activities, including elections
2004 Government publishes contentious 
NGO Bill
Plans to give government control over CSOs 
financing, registration and other activities




Abuse of Public Order Act Obstruction of public policy debate, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association
2011 Forced registration of SIM cards Makes it easier for government to check and 
follow citizens’ communication
2013 Secret service ordered to tap phone 
conversations and emails of all people 
in Zambia
Fear among the public of talking openly and freely
2013 Online websites forcibly shut down Free flow of information and free exchange of 
views curtailed





Introduction of well-funded social 
media accounts by state functionaries
Promotion of fake news, disinformation, misinformation 
and the drowning out of alternative voices
2018 Introduction of tariffs on internet 
phone calls
High cost of communication reduces the amount 
of communication taking place in society
2018 CSOs form own Council of Non-
Governmental Organisations in Zambia 
to strengthen the independence from 
government of NGOs
Pushback by CSOs against government control
2019 Independent television station Prime 
TV closed
Media freedom curtailed
2019 Government introduces tax on online 
streaming platform Netflix with the 
purpose of sharing profits
High costs bar entry and access into this new form 
of social communication
2019 Cabinet approves Access to 
Information Bill, which has been on ice 
since 2002
Hopes for a more open government raised – but 
as of 25 January 2021 the Bill had not gone before 
parliament, once again dashing hope and optimism
2019 Introduction of constitutional 
amendments to strengthen the 
presidency and weaken the judiciary 
and parliament
Public debate around this constitutional 
amendment (Bill No.10 of 2019) splits the country as 
a substantial number of CSOs and the public are 
against the intended changes
2020 Arrests of social media ‘bloggers’ Public disengagement from free expression on 
matters of public policy; increased levels of fear 
generally among the public
Source: Authors’ own.
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As can be seen from Table 3.1, the introduction of the internet and social 
media has substantially increased interactions in digital spaces. This 
dynamism, however, has also attracted government attention. Further, 
although observers expected greater civic activism and dialogues within 
the available digital spaces, especially where the enduring and pervasive 
restrictions on physical space had not yet taken root, this hope remains 
under threat.
 Section 4 therefore looks closely at how CSOs have responded to these 
challenges through the use of ICTs.
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4.  Technology landscape
According to ZICTA, since 2000 there has been a consistent increase in 
the number of households in Zambia that have access to the internet. It is 
estimated that 32 per cent of households in urban areas and just under 7 
per cent in rural areas access the internet on a regular basis (ZICTA 2020: 
32). Further, according to IWS (2020), in the first quarter of 2020 internet 
penetration within the Zambian population had reached 54 per cent, which 
is an almost 50 per cent growth within 20 years. On the other hand, the 
Paradigm Initiative (2020) states that in 2019 Zambia’s internet penetration 
stood at 59 per cent, accounting for over 10 million users, most of whom 
access the internet using mobile devices. Moreover, out of a population of 18 
million people, about 2.25 million are on Facebook (IWS 2020). 
This digital presence and interactivity have given rise to a desire for 
expanded digital rights. As said above, digital rights are universal human 
rights in digital spaces. They include, but are not limited to, the right to 
privacy, freedom from violence, freedom of political opinion, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association (IDS 2020). 
In this vein, several organisations are engaged in digital rights work in 
Zambia. Some of these are the Paradigm Initiative for Africa, which is 
supporting dialogues on digital rights in Zambia and the Southern African 
region; the Internet Governance Forum, an open and inclusive space for 
dialogue on internet governance issues of relevance to people in Zambia; 
the Internet Society Zambia Chapter (ISOCzm), a platform committed to 
fostering internet access; the Zambian Bloggers Network, an autonomous 
space for bloggers, internet content developers and journalists; and MISA 
Zambia (Media Institute for Southern Africa Zambia), a membership-driven 
organisation for independent Zambian media institutions and practitioners.
Notable among these is the Paradigm Initiative, which is an international 
organisation that was initiated from Nigeria and has offices in Abuja, Accra 
in Ghana, Douala in Cameroon, Nairobi in Kenya, and the Zambian capital 
Lusaka. It is a continental operation that advocates for digital rights in order 
to improve the lives of the youth (Paradigm Initiative 2020). The Lusaka office 
looks after digital rights interests in Southern Africa, especially Zambia, 
Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Broadly, its objectives are to empower CSOs to 
defend and advocate for digital rights; train media to report on, follow trends 
in and analyse digital rights issues; and to articulate an Africa-wide digital 
rights strategy around its four main action pillars: 
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– Existing threats and opportunities.
This is a youthful centre of activism and among the most interesting 
organisations working on digital rights in Zambia. The other organisations 
referred to above are doing similar things, but approach issues differently.
Along with several other CSOs, they constitute a public response to emerging 
rights abuses in the country. For example, when it was learnt that tough 
secrecy bills were in the offing, journalists, CSOs, media and bloggers 
launched the hashtag #OpenSpaceZM, fearing that the new laws could 
have ‘rights repressing clauses’ (Paradigm Initiative 2020), and called for more 
openness and fuller public participation in the development of these laws.
Earlier, in 2016, prior to the general election CSOs came together and formed the 
Zambia Elections Information Centre (ZEIC) whose objective was to offer timely 
and credible information about the elections; be a platform for e-participation; 
offer weekly reports on the progress of the campaigns; and run a popular 
hashtag campaign, #TakeZambiaBack (this campaign was quite successful; in 
one week alone, in June 2016, ZEIC noted that there were 254,000 impressions). 
Since then, there have been other CSO-based hashtag campaigns such 
as #YellowCard, #Bill10, #42X42, #Zambia and #HandsOffOurConstitution. 
These have dealt with corruption in government, and government attempts 
to meddle with the national constitution. In Table 4.1, we briefly examine the 
impact of state responses on civic digital activism.
Table 4.1 Technology crackdown
2016–
present
Shutdowns of internet and communication 
services in certain regions of the country 
that are strongholds of opposition parties
The regularity of these unexplained events 
suggests that this could have been a ploy to 
curtail the flow of political information and 
freedom of choice in affected areas
2019 Government establishes the ‘Cybersecurity 
Crack Squad’ aimed at tackling cybercrime 
on digital platforms
The squad consists of all the top security 
agencies, including the intelligence services 
– its formation spreads fear and has a 
chilling effect on freedom of expression
2019 A teacher is jailed for two years for defaming 
the president on his social media account
Chilling effect on public policy debates
2020 Former Law Association of Zambia president 
Lawrence Kasonde is arrested for ‘insulting’ 
President Lungu in a self-recorded viral video 
posted in a WhatsApp group where Kasonde 
displays a voter’s card before unleashing 
insults on Lungu and his government
The government has the technological 
capability to locate sources of anti-state 
viral videos even on secure private platforms 
– this has a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression
Sources: ZNBC (2020); News Diggers (2019); Zambia Today (2020).
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The incidents listed in Table 4.1 lead us into discussing in some detail the 
existing technology landscape in Zambia today. Moreover, as indicated in 
section 2, in 1996 the government took down the online edition of The Post 
and banned the paper under the PPSA of 1960, initially passed in 1955. This 
law was adapted from an earlier British, law which has since been scrapped 
from the British statute books. 
Nonetheless, in 2013 President Sata authorised the secret service to tap the 
phone calls and emails of ‘anyone living in Zambia’ (Zambian Watchdog 
2013). In the same year, the government blocked four websites: Zambian 
Watchdog, Zambia Reports, Barotse Post and Radio Barotse. In March 2020, 
a 15-year-old nicknamed ‘Zoom’ was arrested for defaming President Lungu 
in his Facebook posts. The juvenile faces five years in prison if convicted.
The above actions have raised concern both locally and internationally. For 
instance, international organisations such as the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace have speculated that by 2013 the Zambia government 
had the means, through deep packet inspection (DPI) software, to internally 
monitor internet activity within its territory. The DPI technologies are used for 
‘online filtering and surveillance’ (Weber 2020) of citizens’ communication. 
Besides that, the Zambian government reportedly, has facial recognition and 
artificial intelligence technologies that enable it to monitor citizens’ activities 
beyond the internet. This ability was made possible by equipment imported 
from China and other countries, installed by companies such as Huawei, 
Hikvion, and ZTE (Carnegie 2020). According to Freedom House (2019a), 
Zambia is among 45 countries that use Israeli spyware, Pegasus, to spy on 
its citizens. Further, the extensive interconnectedness between Zambia and 
China reveals that Zambia is positioned at the core of China’s technological 
sphere of influence (‘techno-sphere’) in Africa. In order to control its domestic 
population, the Zambian government has relied on censorship and 
surveillance gear supplied by Huawei and ZTE (Carnegie 2020). 
It is claimed that Huawei employees allegedly aid the Zambian government to 
intercept digital communications of journalists and opposition groups (OONI 
2016; Stratfor 2019; Citizen Lab 2020). Moreover, Huawei has also implemented 
a US$210m Lusaka smart city programme, which has increased the 
government’s physical surveillance capabilities. This initiative has augmented 
the government’s power to police its citizens, track those with dissenting views 
and compare their faces with records in the national data centre. In the near 
future, it will help build mobile broadband connectivity infrastructure that 
will reach rural villages, a platform where government programmes will be 
promoted (Bloomberg 2019). In addition, the media landscape of the country 
has been influenced by Chinese soft diplomacy, which has seen Zambian 
journalists attending various training programmes in China. 
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In terms of the uses and abuses of this power, there are already some 
indications of this. For example, in 2014 a ‘fake account’, Edgar Lungu for 
2016, appeared in cyberspace touting and promoting Lungu, then officially 
only a ‘junior’ minister, for the presidency. Observers suspected that this was 
part of an emerging trend of what some later called the ‘misinformation, 
disinformation, and impersonation of politicians and high profile individuals 
using fake social media accounts’ (Paradigm Initiative 2020). Whether or 
not this particular account qualifies to be described as such, is unproven. 
Nonetheless, Lungu disassociated himself from the account; but two years 
later he was elected president.
 Of note is that when the newly elected President Sata announced his initial 
cabinet on 29 September 2011, Lungu was officially named as deputy vice 
president in the office of Vice President Guy Scott (Bloomberg 2011). This 
appointment raised eyebrows because Scott, a Zambian of Scottish origins, 
could not in any circumstances constitutionally succeed the incumbent 
president because of his foreign roots. The concept of a ‘deputy vice 
presidency’ was quietly shelved from public discussions, as such a post did 
not exist in the national constitution, but may in fact have continued to exist, 
out of the public gaze.
Although Lungu was not officially deputy vice president, events before 
and in the aftermath of the death in office of President Sata may indicate 
otherwise. Whereas just before Sata’s death, Lungu was anointed as chief 
executive officer of the ruling PF party, he was also named as minister of 
justice, defence, and home affairs concurrently. At the time of Sata’s death, 
Lungu had ‘no fewer than five high ranking titles’ (Mukwita 2017: 111).
 Of this transition period, Scott writes that after Sata’s death, a power 
struggle ensued, adding that:
there were significant breaches of the law and the constitution… the actions 
of some people influenced what happened then and what continues to 
happen. However, I am bound by the State Security Act, and I cannot give a 
partial account as it would be rather lopsided… a full account exists, and it 
will be made available at some time in the distant future.
(Scott 2019: 239)
However, during the presidential election of August 2016, Zambian 
technology blog TechTrends reported several internet connectivity 
interruptions (Techzim 2016). No one really knows what caused these internet 
outages, but Lungu won the election by a slim margin of 100,530 votes of the 
3,621,224 valid votes cast (ECZ 2020). The quick emergence of Lungu as Sata’s 
successor, combined with digital interruptions that had not previously been 
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experienced, and the ever-growing Chinese presence in Zambian economic, 
digital and financial affairs, and ever since, in a country reportedly positioned 
at the core of China’s techno-sphere (Carnegie 2020), are matters that are 
open to conjecture. 
Table 4.2 illustrates public events that have had an impact on civic activism 
in Zambia since 2003.
Table 4.2 Technology timeline
 






Outrage among CSOs 
against a less inclusive 
review process
Civic space slightly widens as 
CSOs push back
2010–14 Government insists 
on proceeding with 
the review process 
without CSOs
Red Card Campaign for a 
people-driven constitution
CSOs resist government pressure 
to close civic space
2015 Presidential by-
election




2016 General election and 
referendum to 
amend constitution
New constitution in place; 
CSOs monitor 2016 general 
election and referendum
CSOs reassert themselves and 
civic activism strengthens
2018 Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) created 
by government
Revelations of deep 
corruption in the purchase 
of 42 fire engines for 
US$42m
Civic space expands through use 
of various platforms including 
Twitter, Facebook, SMS, 
WhatsApp, blogs, websites, 
hashtags and community-based 
radio
2019 FIC reveals more 
corrupt practices in 
government
Yellow Card Campaign 
results in some government 
ministers being fired 
Civic activism increases
2020 Youth for 
accountability 
movement emerges
Youths launch campaign 
for jobs and government 
accountability, and against 
corruption
Emergence of youth activism 








arise among CSOs, clergy 
and youth
Further struggle between the 
state and CSOs for control of 
civic space
Source: Authors’ own.
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5. Technology assessment
Clearly, going by what has been discussed above, there are evidently digital 
technological competences in Zambia on the part of both the state and civil 
society. However, what is still unclear is the available capability in terms of 
CSOs’ and individuals’ abilities to monitor and analyse the effectiveness of 
their own digital-level campaigns, including hashtags. It is also unclear to the 
authors to what extent CSOs are able to monitor the secretive activities of 
the state and those of other powerful politicians.
However, what also emerges is that the Zambian government has the 
capacity to censor content on the internet, as was done between July 2013 
and April 2014 when four online media outlets – Zambian Watchdog, Zambia 
Reports, Barotse Post and Radio Barotse – were blocked for critical coverage 
of the government (OONI 2016). According to a study conducted by the Centre 
for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (CIPIT) at Strathmore 
University in Kenya and the Open Observatory of Network Interference 
(OONI), DPI filtering tactics were used to block the Zambian Watchdog 
website. Moreover, during the CIPIT and OONI’s 12-day test, it was found 
that at least ten different websites were ‘consistently inaccessible’ in Zambia 
immediately after the 2016 polls. These included dating sites for LGBTQI 
people; the website of the Organisation for American States, which promotes 
human rights in the Americas, and the World Economic Forum’s website. Others 
were photo-sharing site Pinterest; and that of the World Zionist Organization, 
which campaigns for a Jewish homeland in Palestine (OONI 2016). 
It is further argued that the Zambian government in 2019, arrested a group 
of bloggers who ran an opposition news site with the aid of a specialised 
cyber-surveillance unit located in ZICTA. The unit worked with the police to 
pinpoint the bloggers’ locations and track their phones (Citizen Lab 2020).
Thus, as Zambia approaches the day of the general election in August 
2021, there may be an upswing in state and other actors’ actions in terms of 
disruption of online debates, cyber-surveillance of citizens online activities, 
blocking of critical websites and blogs, disinformation, misinformation or 
indeed influence-peddling exerted through fake news and other tricks. 
CSO activism will also substantially increase as CSOs lock horns with the 
government over control of civic spaces.
For now, it is perhaps important to reflect upon the impact that the 
emergence of the global Covid-19 pandemic has had on the human and 
digital rights landscape in Zambia. In doing so below, we reflect on some 
past health incidents, and how the state responded. The state’s past 
responses echo current reactions in Zambia. 
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6. Digital rights landscape 
in times of Covid-19
Looking back, we are able to see that draconian force, closing civic space, 
and the circumvention of digital rights have not only been the mainstay 
of government reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic and other health 
emergencies, but that such state responses are nothing new in Zambia. 
They have happened many times before. The government has acted 
rashly in cholera outbreaks, during almost every other rainy season, and 
throughout other health emergencies. For instance, in 2018 the army was 
sent into one of Lusaka’s high-density suburbs, Kanyama, to end protests 
after the forced closure of a market when cholera broke out in the area 
(Reuters 2018). 
The rains fall in Zambia from the end of October to March the following 
year. During several such occasions, the army has been sent into the streets 
of the main towns, either to clean up the dirty parts or to enforce order, 
without the necessity of supportive legislation, or without the necessity 
of a declaration of a state of emergency. The same practice has been 
witnessed during the Covid-19 outbreak. A presidential statement is 
deemed adequate for such tough measures, which include the closure of 
civic spaces and the violation of human rights, although civil society groups 
have often objected to such expressions of state overreach.
The brutality exercised by the military during these clean-up activities – 
such as beating up people in all manner of ways, enforcing unregulated 
curfews in poorer and densely populated townships, and so on – openly 
violates human rights and limits civic spaces for citizens. Markets are closed, 
vendors who may have previously resisted local councils’ directives to 
move off the streets are beaten or locked up, and/or forcibly chased out of 
business centres (districts) without being offered alternative trading places. 
As a result, their rights and sources of livelihood are blocked. Protests by 
civic actors are ignored by the government, as if the nation were under a 
state of emergency. 
A good example of events that have impelled human rights violations 
happened in the early part of 2020. Unknown assailants attacked citizens 
in their residences at night with an unspecified gas. The public response 
came through vigilante mobs that killed suspects randomly across the 
country. This nationwide strife resulted in the government deploying troops 
to quell unrest (Bloomberg 2020). A few alleged masterminds were arrested 
but have yet to be brought before the courts. A few suspected perpetrators 
were released without charge.
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Earlier, in 2017 and other previous years, cholera outbreaks were used as an 
excuse to curtail citizens’ rights. Often, the army is sent into the streets to beat 
and torture vendors and other street sellers under the guise of cleaning up 
the cities (AFP 2017). Likewise, in 2017 a state of emergency was declared after 
a series of mysterious fires gutted markets in Lusaka and Copperbelt Province. 
The sources of those fires have not been identified. The same year, opposition 
leader Hakainde Hichilema was arrested and charged with treason for 
refusing to give way to a presidential motorcade. Before that, in 2016, there 
erupted sudden, but yet to be explained xenophobic violence against 
Rwandese residents in Zambia. All these incidents led to the evocation of 
emergency powers by the government. The government is seemingly not 
sparing when abusing these powers at the slightest excuse in a manner that 
has been referred to as a ‘suspension of human rights approach’, which in 
such circumstances is detrimental to democracy (Kayumba-Kalunga 2020).
In the case of the Covid-19 outbreak, Zambia may have witnessed what 
University of Zambia scholar Felicity Kayumba-Kalunga describes as 
‘executive disorder’, as the government went about in an illegal, disorderly, 
and illegitimate fashion when faced with the new pandemic (ibid.). To critics, 
the state’s response was not only a ‘suspension of human rights approach’, 
which included suspending freedom of association, but its actions were 
unconstitutional and unaccountable, especially with respect to the 
fundamental rights of citizens (ibid.).
The Covid-19 background is that Zambia recorded its first cases in March 
2020 and since then the disease has spread to almost all parts of the 
country. By August 2020, there were more than 11,082 reported cases, which 
included 280 deaths, making it a 2.5 per cent death rate (Kasonde 2020). The 
government’s response to the pandemic, which the state has referred to as 
the ‘new normal’, has been nothing short of draconian.
Without declaring the pandemic a national emergency, as required by 
law, the government proceeded to issue Statutory Instruments Numbers 21 
and 22 of 2020, under the Public Health Act, which were followed by several 
presidential directives that were not backed by any written law.
Critics such as Lawrence Kasonde, a former LAZ president, and now 
heading civic organisation the Chapter One Foundation, have labelled 
the government’s response to Covid-19 as being governed by political 
expediency and disrespect for human rights.
According to Kasonde, the most prominent victim of Covid-19 in Zambia 
has been the popular, privately owned Prime Television station, which on 
9 April 2020 was shut down for refusing to broadcast advertisements and 
programmes on Covid-19 for free. The official reason for the closure was that 
the television station’s licence had expired a month before.
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Also, in June when a group of youths protested over unemployment and 
the lack of opportunities in an economy that was expected to shrink by 4.5 
per cent in 2020, armed troops were sent into the Lusaka streets to stop the 
protest. However, the innovative youths went into the bush, about 150km 
east of the capital city, to stream their protest online, on various social media 
platforms, with an audience estimated at about 300,000 (ibid.).
Further, under the ostensible excuse of the spread of the pandemic, the 
government has used the Public Order Act to restrict public gatherings such 
as weddings and church meetings; and to curtail peaceful assemblies and 
freedom of association and expression. The law requires that gatherings of 
more than five people must be authorised by either the Ministry of Health or 
local government authorities.
However, in practice the above-mentioned laws and regulations have been 
applied selectively. They have not been used to stop political campaigns 
and other ruling party gatherings in preparation for the general election set 
for August 2021. 
Nevertheless, in summary, this is what has happened since March 2020 when 
the first Covid-19 cases were detected in Zambia:
– Immediate and indefinite closure of all learning institutions throughout 
Zambia;
– Restriction of public gatherings, including funerals and religious services 
to not more than 50 people;
– Immediate closure of all social places, including bars and gyms, and 
reducing restaurants to takeaway facilities only;
– Lockdown of Kafue and Nakonde towns and restrictions on the 
movement of the people in and outside those two towns. Kafue is a 
small riverside town with about 50,000 people, while Nakonde and 
its environs, bordering Tanzania, host about 70,000 people. These 
measures directly affected more than 120,000 people in one swoop;
– Thereafter, the president in August 2020 decreed the mandatory 
wearing of face masks in all public places. Thus, the police were 
‘empowered’ to stop public conveyance systems at any time and 
arrest people not wearing masks, fining them equivalent to US$40; or 
take them to court to face up to six months in prison. These measures 
were quickly abandoned when the state, under pressure from the LAZ, 
realised that there was no specific law backing them. However, shops 
and supermarkets have continued denying entry to people without 
face masks. 
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All these state actions are a demonstration of the narrowing of civic space 
under the pretext of the fear of the spread of Covid-19. In the meantime, the 
ruling PF party has taken advantage of these measures to print and widely 
distribute PF message-embroidered campaign masks in preparation for the 
2021 general election. No opposition political party regalia, or masks, have 
been allowed on the streets by militarised PF political cadres (Lusaka Times 
2020).
To enforce presidential directives, accompanied by government officials 
such as Lusaka Province minister Bowman Lusambo and Lusaka Mayor 
Miles Sampa, the police have raided, often at night, many privately owned 
premises including hair salons, restaurants, bars, Chinese factories and so 
on, closing them down, or whipping and beating up people found there, or in 
the vicinity. The have also stopped buses and harassed passengers. This has 
been done without any legal backing at all (Zambian Eye 2020). 
However, there has been a degree of easing of some of these measures in 
recent weeks. For example, suspected public state beatings have eased, 
and the lockdowns in Kafue and Nakonde were lifted after a few days: 
schools and other learning institutions have partially reopened, but bars, 
stadiums, gyms and other such places remain closed. In the main, though, 
the measures remain in place.
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7. Discussion, conclusions 
and recommendations
From the above, what we see is a government that has taken advantage of 
a combination of factors to entrench itself and to narrow civic space. These 
factors pre-existed or have freshly presented themselves to the state.
Such factors include old pre-colonial laws that are still on the statute book; 
and the existence of a weakened civil society movement, a movement 
enfeebled by laws such as the NGO Act, the Public Order Act and all the 
subsidiary statutory instruments that have been enacted since the arrival of 
Covid-19. 
On the other side, there has been evident concern with the growing activism 
of civil society groups, especially youths and the clergy, as discussed above. 
This activism, seemingly, has pushed back the boundaries of civic space 
in Zambia. An expanded civic space necessitates a sapped state. The 
problem is in maintaining a reasonable balance to the satisfaction of the two 
competing sides.
Instead, what has been observed has been that the state, which is the 
stronger of the two forces, has pushed hardest and almost deformed the 
breathing space for CSOs by fiat and through other actions or instruments. 
Moreover, the state has tampered with the digital rights of its people in 
several ways, including surveillance, arrests and the banning of publications.
With the arrival of Covid-19, as was seen during cholera outbreaks, and 
other emergencies such as xenophobic attacks on Rwandan refugees, the 
destruction of town market centres, or unexplained vigilante mob violence, 
the pandemic has provided a new platform for the state to further justify its 
actions against civic actors.
As argued above, civic space and human rights are intertwined, between 
themselves and with digital rights. These three parts essentially cannot be 
prised apart. When one of them is under attack – when the state closes civic 
spaces, violates human rights and suppresses digital citizenship – the others 
suffer. It is therefore imperative that ways are found to sustain the viability of 
the three factors and interested CSOs against alleged state assaults.
As shown above, through the discussions of digital space and other related 
events surrounding civic activism, the figures seem to suggest that the 
number of digital citizens in Zambia has exponentially increased. These are 
people with the knowledge and skills to effectively use digital technologies 
to communicate with others, define their social spaces, and to confidently 
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participate in social affairs, competently, while creating digital content and 
using technologies (DTHub 2020).
From the foregoing, it is recommended that a number of things be done by 
NGOs, civil society groups, international actors, the government and other 
interested parties in responsibly responding to emergent situations. These 
actions include that:
– Zambian CSOs/NGOs should be linked to similarly inclined social 
movements across the continent and in Africa, as the ADRN is trying to do;
– African research institutes, higher-learning institutions and other 
similarly inclined organisations should embark on further research 
into the socio-political dynamics that are taking place in Zambia;
– Zambian CSOs should be equipped with the skills and 
technologies necessary for the systematic monitoring of 
state and other powerful elements’ activities; and
– The ADRN should work towards redefining the 
manifestations or characteristics and meanings of digital 
citizenship and digital politics in Zambia today.
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1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the civic landscape in Africa has gone through a 
plethora of changes that have shaped its impact, influence and perceptions 
in ways both positive and negative. These have run parallel to increased 
awareness about human rights, as well as the growth in availability of and 
reliance on information and communication technology (ICT). 
The aim of this report is to improve understanding of the political and 
technological landscapes as they have shaped openings and closings of 
civic space in Uganda and how these have affected citizens’ digital rights. 
The report will describe the main contours of the dynamic political, civic and 
technological landscapes. It will then conclude with recommendations for 
practice, policy and further research that the author believes is necessary 
in order to enable citizens and civil society organisations to more effectively 
open civic space and exercise, defend and expand digital rights.
In the following sections, the evolution of the relationship between civic 
space, its related actors and digital rights is presented. 
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2. Political landscape
As of 2019, Uganda was ranked 99th (of 165 countries) by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit on its democracy index. It also describes the country as a 
hybrid regime due to its authoritarian tendencies, despite democratic rules 
in place. Since the civil war of the 1980s, the country has not experienced 
particularly extreme political volatility, even though political tensions have 
been present for an extended period of time. 
Since 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) has been the ruling 
party under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni. In recent years, 
various amendments have been made to the Constitution that have 
enabled Museveni’s protracted stay in office. 
In 2005, the Parliament of Uganda voted to lift presidential term limits 
(Lacey 2005) through an amendment of the Constitution. This move allowed 
Museveni to seek a third term in the elections of 2006; the same year also 
marked the first elections under a multiparty system (Makara et al. 2005). 
Taking a similar stance, in 2019 the Constitutional Court upheld an amendment 
that would allow Museveni (at the time 73 years old) to seek another term in 
office, including the freedom to contest the presidency indefinitely after the 
2021 elections and past the age of 75 (Al Jazeera 2018). The 1995 Constitution 
prohibited anyone younger than 35 or older than 75 from serving as president.
These actions have been used by a number of opposition actors and 
pressure groups against the president and the ruling party, arguing that 
the state is autocratic, monopolistic and authoritarian. Further to this, they 
have continuously alleged that the first presidential election held in 1996 was 
rigged (Nalumansi 2016). 
Among the main political parties in the country are the Forum for Democratic 
Change (FDC), which grew out of the NRM and is the largest opposition 
party, through which Dr Kizza Besigye has challenged for the presidency on 
four separate occasions since 2001. With no success at any of the elections, 
Dr Besigye has raised accusations of rigging by the president – on two 
occasions (in 2001 and 2006), taking the matter to the Supreme Court. On 
both occasions, there was a unanimous ruling that acknowledged there had 
been widespread rigging but that it had not been enough to warrant the 
reversal of the final result. Dr Besigye will not stand in the 2021 presidential 
race (Draku 2020). 
Other long-term key opposition parties include the Democratic Party, the 
Uganda People’s Congress and a more recent entrant, as of 2019, the Alliance 
for National Transformation, which was launched by a former FDC leader, 
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General Mugisha Muntu. Meanwhile, the National Unity Platform, a pressure 
group led by Member of Parliament (MP) Robert Kyaluganyi Ssentamu (also 
known as ‘Bobi Wine’), has gained momentum in response to Museveni’s 
plans to extend his 31-year term (Bariyo 2017) and has been particularly 
critical of the ruling party and its leaders. 
Various laws have been introduced that have enabled the curtailing of 
critical voices, and the work of civic actors and the media, in addition to also 
affecting key rights such as access to information and freedom of expression. 
These laws have been introduced despite the 1995 Constitution, which 
states in Article 29(1)(a) that ‘every person shall have the right to freedom of 
expression and speech which includes freedom of the press and other media’ 
(ILO 1995). 
Over the years, more laws and regulations have been introduced that largely 
protect the political interests of the ruling party and the president more than 
those of citizens. Coupled with an increased use of technology to underpin 
these developments, concerns over data protection, surveillance, digital 
inclusion and self-censorship have come to shape the political relationship 
between citizens, civic actors, the media and the state.
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) notes that the legal 
framework for civil society in Uganda is generally supportive of civil society 
organisations, but only insofar as their sphere of activity is politically and 
socially acceptable to the government (ICNL 2020).
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3. Civic space landscape 
3.1 The early years: 2000–10
Aided by the 1995 Constitution, during this decade, civic space and actors 
were establishing themselves, seeking out niche areas of focus, often in 
the traditional human rights sphere. Among the highlights of these early 
years was the introduction of the Access to Information Act, 2005. However, 
its potential to support civic space has largely remained underutilised. 
Nonetheless, the act was used successfully by journalists in 2015 when a 
chief magistrate’s court ruled in their favour against the National Forestry 
Authority, which had denied them access to information related to a World 
Bank grant (Mugagura 2015).
The first multiparty elections in 2006 marked the emergence of civil society 
with an interest in ‘mobilising and facilitating citizen participation in political, 
economic and social processes aimed at promoting transparency and 
accountability in governance’ (Mugisha, Kiranda and Mbate 2019). While civil 
society had often worked on issues of social concern, increasingly they were 
beginning to challenge state actions and inaction – often critically. 
It was during this period after the 2006 elections that civil society 
organisations evolved to include rights-based and political issues in their 
work. Growing concerns over state actions contributed to rising civic concern 
and public outcry, which started emerging during the mid-2000s. Among 
these was the 2007 civic reaction against the state sale of part of the 
Mabira Forest to a private entity to expand its cane plantation (Kavuma 
2011). In the years that followed, restrictions increased on assemblies led by 
political opposition members (United States Department of State 2008) – 
including of Dr Besigye, whose spate of repeated arrests by the state started 
during this period. 
3.2 A wave of new laws: 2010–20
On 11 July 2010, Somalia-based militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for bomb attacks during the screening of the FIFA World Cup 
final at two separate venues in the capital Kampala. This resulted in more 
restrictive measures being written into law; for example, the Regulation of 
Interception of Communications Act, which served to reinforce the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2002, which had been introduced following the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.
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In 2011, the second presidential election was held, which granted Museveni 
another term following a highly contested win. However, during this time more 
open public protest took place, aided by online platforms, such as the Walk 
to Work campaign against rising food and fuel prices. These public protests 
also resulted in the arrests of campaigners and members of opposition 
parties (Namiti 2011). 
This saw the introduction of the bill for the Public Order Management Act 
(POMA) in Parliament in 2011. The bill was signed into law two years later on 2 
October 2013. POMA sought to ‘provide for the regulation of public meetings; 
to provide for the duties and responsibilities of the police, organisers and 
participants in relation to public meetings; to prescribe measures for 
safeguarding public order; and for related matters’ (ULII 2013: 5). The act 
in effect also handed the police the power to regulate public meetings, 
including the power to prevent the holding of meetings and stop meetings 
already in progress. 
Since its introduction, POMA has been used on numerous occasions against 
civil society, the media and members of the opposition. The lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community has largely remained 
unable to organise publicly, while opposition actors have also faced 
restrictions. It is interesting to note that ahead of the 2021 elections, on 26 
March 2020, the Constitutional Court annulled POMA and also declared 
all acts done under the law null and void. The court ruled that the law was 
inconsistent with the country’s Constitution (Chapter Four 2020). 
However, the Covid-19 pandemic has provided the excuse for the state to 
limit assemblies and public gatherings (Macdonald and Owor 2020) initiated 
by the opposition, despite the ruling party attracting large crowds at its 
own campaigns (Kizza 2020). This has raised concerns over the extent to 
which civic space will be utilised – or restricted – in the lead up to the 2021 
elections. 
Political issues were among those highlighted in a 2012 report by Human 
Rights Watch. It noted that evidence-based research and civil society 
organisations with an advocacy focus on controversial issues in the 
Uganda context – such as transparency in the oil sector; compensation 
and reparations for land acquisitions and sales; political and legal reform; 
and protection of human rights, including the rights of LGBTI people – had 
experienced decreasing room to manoeuvre (HRW 2012). 
Meanwhile, religion, education, tribal affiliations, proximity to wealth and 
even gender have also had an influence on civic space and how civic actors 
are politically perceived and positioned in mainstream narratives online and 
offline. These differences have even been used in political power plays, such 
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as during the 2014 controversy around the Anti-Homosexuality Bill where 
religion was used against civic actors advocating against the bill, but was 
also used as the political moral high ground, which worked in favour of those 
seeking political seats in the 2016 elections (Amnesty International 2014). 
The topic of corruption is one that civil society and the media have treated 
with particular scrutiny over the years due to the vast amounts of aid funding 
the country receives, but with limited transparency and accountability over 
its use – regardless of the presence of the Access to Information Act.
In 2012, international donors withheld aid following allegations of 
embezzlement of donor funds amounting to US$12.7m by the Office of the 
Prime Minister (Al Jazeera 2012). This act saw the government unable to 
pay the salaries of public service workers such as police and teachers. In 
response to rampant corruption, civil society organised the Black Monday 
Movement (BMM) – due to the movement leaders encouraging the wearing 
of black clothes on Mondays (Mujuni 2013). This served as one of the key early 
campaigns by civil society that started gaining traction in online spaces. It 
aimed to work against the theft of public money by government (Uganda 
National NGO Forum 2013).
In the months that followed the establishment of BMM, the movement’s 
efforts were thwarted by police including through unwarranted arrests for 
‘inciting violence’ (HRNJ – Uganda 2013; IFEX 2013). Actions such as those 
taken against BMM by the state served to influence other civic actors in 
the long run. The charge of ‘inciting violence’ is one that has remained in 
common use, including against political activists such as social justice 
activist Dr Stella Nyanzi and Bobi Wine, as well as journalists and civil society 
activists (HRW 2014).
In 2013, the Non-Governmental Organisations Registration (Amendment) Bill 
was introduced, which sought to amend the NGO Act. The bill aimed to limit 
the work and activities of NGOs and called for changes in the processes for 
registering with authorities. It also appeared to be a deliberate move by the 
government towards the control of NGO and civic activities (Article19 2015). 
According to Amnesty International, by 2014 some organisations had 
stopped working, scaled back on activities or significantly changed 
their work on ‘sensitive’ content areas due to continued targeting by the 
authorities. Meanwhile, self-censorship due to fear of closure also became a 
key issue among human rights organisations (Amnesty International 2014). 
It was around this time that Uganda’s position in Freedom House’s (2019) 
Freedom Index began to descend from ‘partially free’ to ‘not free’ (see 
Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–191
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
As such, these actions appeared to be increasingly shrinking civic space at 
a time when there was increasing public interest in political affairs, service 
delivery and state transparency, coupled with rising internet penetration and 
growing numbers of citizen journalists. 
In 2014, several controversial laws were introduced that had implications for 
both civic and online spaces. Among these was the Anti-Pornography Act of 
2014. The law fuelled a negative narrative against women, in particular, and 
went on to be used against women who fell victim to revenge pornography 
and had their nude images published or shared online without their consent 
(African Feminism 2020). The law also provided for the establishment of a 
Pornography Control Committee. In 2017, a nine-member committee was 
announced, accompanied with a budget of $516,000 per year (Gitta 2017) 
illustrating the state’s commitment towards the work of the committee.
Upon the introduction of the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, a Minority Report 
arguing that the bill was discriminatory and that homosexuality was 
prohibited under existing laws was presented by opposing parliamentarians 
1   Data not available for 2010 and 2012.











Free Partially free Not free
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(Parliament of the Republic of Uganda 2012). However, although President 
Museveni expressed concern about the Anti-Homosexuality Bill, it was 
signed into law on 24 February 2014 and gazetted on 10 March 2014 
(New Vision 2014). This led to a petition being filed by civil society on the 
constitutionality of the act. A few months later, in August 2014, the act was 
declared null and void by the Constitutional Court, on the grounds that 
there was no quorum in court when it was passed (FIDH 2014). 
However, the increased national narrative around anti-homosexuality laws 
fuelled further stigmatisation of the LGBTI community and exposed civic 
actors in the space to even further homophobic backlash. Organisations 
working on sexual minority rights, in addition to general civic organisations, 
became the targets of office break-ins. Unknown parties reportedly took 
computing equipment and other electronic devices. Police responded with 
limited investigations and the prevalence of these raids continue to pose 
a threat to the privacy of information held by civic organisations (CIPESA 
2019). 
Uganda passed the controversial Non-Governmental Organisation Bill in 
2016, which sought to govern the activities of civil society. This marked a 
new era of concerns, especially for entities dealing with contentious issues 
such as sexual rights, abortion advocacy, politics, transparency and land 
grabbing (Paulat 2015). 
In 2017, the might of civic actors and social media users in Uganda came 
into the spotlight through the #FreeStellaNyanzi campaign, which also 
gained international following. It sought the release of Dr Stella Nyanzi, who 
had protested against poor service delivery by the state (Kelly et al. 2017). Dr 
Nyanzi was detained in April 2017 and charged with ‘cyber harassment’ for 
her use of Facebook to criticise the president and his wife Janet Museveni 
for their poor service delivery (Al Jazeera 2017).
The Ugandan feminists’ voice online has also grown despite the continued 
pushback against it through trolling and cyber harassment (CIPESA 2020). 
In 2018, the state attempted to frustrate efforts by women who wanted to 
march in protest against the threat of continued violence against women. A 
march eventually took place in July 2018 (Sadurni 2018). 
Some hope, and indeed protection for civic space and its actors, emerged 
in 2020 with the Human Rights Defenders Protection Bill. In July, a motion 
was passed for MP Komakech Lyandro to go ahead with the development 
of the bill (Kivumbi 2020).
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline
Year Shift Implication
2002 Anti-Terrorism Act. Exposes civic actors and the media to 
interception and intrusion on an undefined 
basis.
2005 Access to Information Act. Civic actors and media can request state 
information more freely. 
2006 President Museveni, leading the NRM, wins 
first multiparty elections.
Draws more civic actors into political 
discourse, and promotes public political 
discourse and participation.
2007 Civil society saves Mabira Forest. Civil society advocates against state-
enabled deforestation and wins.
2009 National Information Technology Authority 
Act.
The authority guides data collection and 
the policies shaping it.
2010 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications Act enacted, reinforcing 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002.
Communications of civic actors, critics of 
the state, opposition, etc. can now be 
more easily intercepted and surveiled.
2011 Public Order Management Act (POMA) 
introduced in Parliament in 2011 (signed 
into law two years later, on 2 October 2013).
POMA presents direct state control of civic 
space including over rights of association 
and assembly.
2012 Black Monday Movement (BMM) aims to 
work against government theft of public 
money.
BMM is one of the key early civil society 
campaigns that starts gaining traction in 
online spaces. 
2012 State interest in purchasing digital 
communications interception equipment.
Likely targets of interception include state 
critics, civic actors, journalists and 
opposition members.
2013 Non-Governmental Organisations 
Registration (Amendment) Bill.
Potential to restrict the work of civic actors.
2014 Data Protection and Privacy Bill is drafted; 
Anti-Homosexuality Bill 2014 is assented to, 
but a few months later the Constitutional 
Court rules it invalid due to lack of quorum.
One of the few bills released for public 
commentary; civic actors point out gaps in 
the proposed law that expose individuals 
and organisations working on LGBTI issues to 
both state and non-state initiated violence. 
2016 Non-Governmental Organisation Bill. Affront to civic actors, especially those 
dealing with contentious issues such as 
sexual rights, abortion advocacy, politics, 
transparency and land grabbing.
2017 #FreeStellaNyanzi. Amasses local and international following 
on social justice concerns.
2020 Constitutional Court annuls POMA and 
declares all acts done under the law null and 
void; announcement that Human Rights 
Defenders Protection Bill is to be developed.
Potential respite for the civic space and 
actors.
Source: Author’s own.
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4. Technology landscape 
4.1 The early days
At the turn of the century, Uganda had an internet penetration of 0.2 per 
cent, showing its infancy at the time. There were limited national frameworks 
directly pertaining to internet infrastructure, regulations and use. However, 
usage was steadily growing and by 2005, internet penetration stood at 1.5 
per cent. More media houses had started generating online content and so 
had independent individuals and entities, some of whom were very critical 
of the state. The government regulatory body, the Uganda Communications 
Commission (UCC), had been established in 1995 and in early 2003 set up 
the Rural Communications Development Fund, which sought to develop 
communications infrastructure beyond the country’s urban centres and 
enable last-mile access. Internet penetration has increased substantially 
since the early days; at the end of June 2020, internet penetration stood at 
46 internet connections for every 100 Ugandans, according to the Uganda 
Communications Commission (UCC 2020). 
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Uganda
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4.2 The dawn of digital restrictions
In 2006, the government ordered internet service providers (ISPs) to block 
access to a website that published anti-government stories, radiokatwe.com. 
It accused the website of publishing ‘malicious and false information against 
the ruling party NRM and its presidential candidate’ (CPJ 2006). This happened 
in the same year that the first multiparty elections were held in Uganda.
The practice of blocking or closing media houses would become a common 
form of censorship, often in the guise of maintaining public order or preventing 
incitement of violence. Often, it served to drown out criticism of the state. 
In 2009, the state closed (the now defunct) Broadcasting Council of four 
radio stations, which were accused of fanning ethnic tensions (Eastern Africa 
Journalists Association 2009). These actions contributed to self-censorship by 
journalists and ordinary citizens alike on digital platforms.
In response to the 2010 Al-Shabaab bombings in Kampala, and in the support 
of the ‘national security’ argument often cited by the state, in 2011 the Computer 
Misuse Act, the Electronic Signatures Act and the Electronic Transactions Act 
were signed into law with no process of public consultation. These have been 
used against civil society actors, as well as critics of the state. 
In 2011, the second presidential election was held. During that year, the 
regulations accompanying the Access to Information Act of 2005 were 
introduced. However, despite this progressive law, the 1964 Official Secrets Act 
continued to be cited as the basis for not disclosing information that should 
be in the public domain, including through open access platforms (e.g. www.
askyourgov.ug). Thus, the work of civil society has continued to be undermined 
due to limited access to information, despite the presence of this law aimed at 
promoting transparency and accountability of state organs (Kyogabirwe 2017). 
Some early social media campaigns were tightly linked to shrinking civic 
space and social justice concerns, such as the 2011 #WalkToWork protest and 
campaign (Oola 2011), which were in response to rising fuel and food prices. 
Meanwhile, the state also recognised the engaging nature of social media. 
ISPs temporarily blocked access to Facebook and Twitter for 24 hours following 
the #WalkToWork protests. Earlier in the year, the state had issued a directive 
to telecoms companies to block and regulate text messages that could 
‘instigate hatred, violence and unrest’ during the presidential election period 
(Echwalu 2011). However, this was also seen as a move to stifle communications.
In 2012, the #AskThePM hashtag campaign aimed to provide a platform for 
the then prime minister, Amama Mbabazi, to engage with Twitter users more 
immediately and directly. This campaign tried to address the public image of the 
Office of the Prime Minister, which had been accused of embezzling US$12.7m 
with disastrous consequences for public service delivery and infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, in July 2012, according to a ministerial policy statement the Office of the 
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President was looking for funds to purchase equipment that would enable 
interception of communications (Kiggundu 2012). The government’s interest in 
intercepting communications raised concern among civil society actors and 
the media.
In 2013, the Uganda Communications Act was introduced. It enabled the 
communications regulator to ‘monitor, inspect, license, supervise, control, and 
regulate communications services’ and to ‘monitor, and enforce compliance 
relating to content’ (Freedom House 2016). By 2013, the state announced that it 
would monitor social media users, ‘who are bent to cause a security threat to 
the nation’ (CIPESA 2013), reigniting language used upon the introduction of the 
2002 Anti-Terrorism Act and the Regulation of Interception of Communications 
Act of 2010. Both acts had elevated the surveillance powers of the state, 
reinforcing a culture of self-censorship online and raising surveillance concerns 
among civil society. The 2014 call for public commentary on the Data Protection 
and Privacy Bill did little to alleviate surveillance concerns.
In 2013, two newspaper outlets were closed following allegations of the distribution 
of a letter detailing an alleged assassination plot of officials opposed to the 
president. This led to a widespread campaign for press freedom (Natabaalo 
2013). The hashtags #MonitorSiege and #RedPepperSiege were used to 
generate awareness and to challenge the state’s actions. The media houses 
were re-opened after 11 days.
In 2015, amendments were made to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 to align the law 
with international requirements by providing for aspects of terror financing and money 
laundering. Police were consequently granted the power to conduct surveillance of 
online transactions with the aim of establishing the sources of funding of terrorism 
activities. In the same year, the crackdown on commentators who relied on social 
media had already begun, with voices critical of the ruling party and independent 
media being curtailed. This was often in the guise of promoting public order and 
unity, as well as preventing the spread of false information, but damaged open 
dialogue on elections, including by hampering free speech. Among these was the 
arrest of state critic Robert Shaka on allegations of being behind the pseudonym Tom 
Voltaire Okwalinga; and, under Section 25 of the Computer Misuse Act, on charges 
of using computers and other electronic devices to issue ‘offensive communication’ 
(NITA 2011). There is no evidence to suggest that Shaka was responsible. 
Mass surveillance concerns were also heightened in 2015, following reports that 
Uganda had procured Remote Control System (RCS), a product developed by the 
Hacking Team (an Italian company that sells intrusion and surveillance technology), 
which enables access to major operating systems and mobile platforms (Frenkel 2015). 
In February 2016, the country held elections that in the lead-up had seen civic 
actors and opposition members face arrest and intimidation. These elections were 
the first time that social media platforms were aggressively used for campaigning 
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 in the country. Amama Mbabazi took to YouTube to officially announce his 
intention to contest the presidential election. Not long after, Museveni released 
a video alleging Mbabazi aides were linked to sectarian content shared on 
WhatsApp (Aine 2015). Shortly thereafter, the authorities announced that a 
cybercrime unit had been established and its head appointed (Anena 2015). This 
alludes to the immediate measures often taken by the state in response to the use 
of new avenues for communication, especially by opposition or critical voices. 
During the 2016 elections, Uganda hosted its first ever live televised 
presidential debates and provided an opportunity for citizens to scrutinise 
candidates’ manifestos, including through the #UGDebates16 hashtag 
(interspersed with various other hashtags). However, on election day (18 
February) social media and mobile money transactions in the country were 
shut down following a directive from the communications regulator to ISPs to 
disable all social media and mobile money services due to a ‘threat to public 
order and safety’ (CIPESA 2016). In May, a day before President Museveni was 
inaugurated for another five-year term, access to social media platforms 
including WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter was again blocked (Nanfuka 2016). 
In May 2018, the government passed the Excise Duty Amendment Act, which 
introduced an excise duty tax of 200 Ugandan shillings (US$0.05) per user per 
day for use of services such as WhatsApp, LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter. 
This became commonly known as the ‘social media tax’. The tax slashed the 
number of internet users in the country by five million within three months of 
its introduction (ibid.). In the same year, the state-run UCC called for all ‘online 
data communication service providers, including online publishers, online 
news platforms, online radio and television operators’ to apply and obtain 
authorisation from the commission (UCC 2018). This raised surveillance and 
censorship concerns across a broad spectrum of online users including bloggers, 
civic actors and media houses. In 2020, an October deadline was published.
With the introduction of more blatant mass surveillance, such as through CCTV 
cameras under Chinese telecoms company Huawei’s ‘Smart City’ programme 
across Kampala, the potential for its misuse remains high (Woodhams 2020). 
In 2019, Huawei also was named in a Wall Street Journal exposé, which 
reported that staff in the Huawei Uganda office had helped police hack into 
the encrypted communications of an opposition figure and thus aided the 
security officers in foiling public mobilisation plans (Mwesigwa 2019). 
Since then, online campaigns in support of social justice activist Dr Stella Nyanzi 
have gained global attention. Further campaigns in support of Bobi Wine also 
gained traction, with the #FreeStellaNyanzi and #FreeBobiWine often supporting 
each other. The campaign #SocialMediaTax (and related campaigns) also 
served to voice public discontent with the introduction of taxes on social media 
and mobile money transactions, and calls for their reversal. The state continues 
to disapprove of civic protest both online and offline. 
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Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Source: Author’s own.
Year Shift Implication
2003 Rural Communications Development Fund. Aims to address last-mile connectivity.
2006 ISPs block access to radiokatwe.com. Online censorship. 
2009 State closes Broadcasting Council of four 
radio stations accused of fanning ethnic 
tensions.
Contributes to self-censorship online.
2009 National Information Technology Authority 
– Uganda is initiated.
Aims to coordinate and regulate 
information technology services in Uganda.
2010 Al-Shabaab bombings. Sparks hasty release of cyber-related laws.
2011 Computer Misuse Act, Electronic Signatures 
Act and Electronic Transactions Act signed 
into law.
No process of public consultation; state 
granted excessive powers.
2011 SMS texts are regulated/blocked; ISPs 
temporarily block access to Facebook and 
Twitter for 24 hours. 
Fears of an ‘Arab Spring’ are prevalent, 
leading to blocking of communications.
2012 Mandatory registration of SIM cards. Concerns over data privacy and 
surveillance are heightened due to the 
amount of data citizens have to part with.
2013 Police shut down media houses for 
publishing/broadcasting a classified internal 
government letter, which allegedly contains 
the succession plans of the presidency. 
The hashtags #MonitorSiege and 
#RedPepperSiege are used to create 
awareness and challenge the state’s 
actions; media houses re-open after 11 days.
2013 Security minister announces that the 
government will start monitoring social 
media.
Promotes self-censorship among media, 
internet users and civic actors.
2013 Uganda Communications Act. Threatens digital rights as it grants the 
state more power, with limited oversight 
mechanisms. 
2014 Data Protection and Privacy Bill drafted. Civic actors point out gaps in the bill.
2015 State procures Remote Control System. Allows access to major systems and mobile 
networks.
2018 Social media tax introduced through Excise 
Duty Amendment Act.
Reduces online engagement, forcing some 
users offline.
2018 Online content regulations. Potential for direct censorship.
2019 CCTV cameras installed across Kampala. Raises concerns over monitoring and 
selective use of data.
2020 Deadline for registration as an online 
content producer.
Potential direct censorship, self-censorship 
and surveillance.
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5. Conclusion
Uganda’s civic and digital rights landscape has been shaped by a mixed 
bag of dynamics over the years. This has been due to the rushed release of 
laws; the surge in numbers of civic actors; a constantly evolving technological 
landscape, alongside the prioritisation of political interests over civic needs; 
and the abuse of state power.
Regressive laws have threatened the civic space, often being used 
selectively at critical times, such as in the lead-up to elections. Their 
presence remains a potential threat to the expansion of the work of 
civic actors. More recent shifts, such as the annulment of POMA and 
announcement of the development of the Human Rights Defenders 
Protection Bill, bring some hope of the easing of restrictions on civic space. 
Despite this positive step, the full potential for digital rights and online civic 
engagement to be realised remains weighed down by restrictions, which 
fuel self-censorship, impact affordability and enhance the perception of 
surveillance. 
This report has demonstrated the potential that civic actors have to 
advance civic space and mobilise for digital rights. However, there remains 
a reactive nature as opposed to a proactive nature to this mobilisation, 
requiring more cohesion between the different actors (e.g. in the fields of 
tech, legal, policy and human rights). Often, gaps have been exploited to 
isolate groups (e.g. the LGBTI community) from more cohesive actions. 
Civic space has adapted over the years, in line with state actions and laws. 
However, this has not kept civic actors safe from various forms of suppression 
tactics such as trumped-up charges, arrests, harassment, blocking of 
websites and intimidation aimed at stifling their work. Ultimately, the closing 
and opening of civic space is not uniform and does not affect everyone 
equally. Where some spaces are closed or more threatened (e.g. media and 
some civic actors, such as LGBTI groups), others remain less affected (e.g. the 
academic and research space may be less affected due to its proximity to 
mass public discourse and actions online and offline). 
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6. Recommendations
More state surveillance capacities call for more digital security and digital 
resilience skills and capacities for civic actors. 
The shift towards more online interaction and engagement has created 
more opportunities for many retrogressive laws to be used. Thus, there is 
a need to more collectively organise civic actors on problematic clauses 
through an assortment of measures; for example, strategic litigation, online 
campaigns and evidence-based advocacy.
Given more sinister methods of information manipulation, such as online 
content regulation and social media taxation, it is fundamental to 
measure what narratives are lost when these avenues are used and the 
impact on digital rights.
Civic actors need to be more proactive in their measures to promote 
digital rights and protect civic space; for example, by working towards 
legislation that promotes digital inclusion and affordability in order for the 
government to comply with international human rights laws and norms.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this report is to understand how the political and 
technological landscapes in Sudan have contributed to openings and 
closings of civic space that have impinged on citizens’ ability to exercise, 
defend and expand their digital rights. Internet access in Sudan is improving, 
and digital technologies are increasingly crucial to the enjoyment of rights 
and livelihood improvements. However, the government has at times taken 
aggressive measures to limit internet freedom and close civic space.
The term ‘digital rights’ refers to an individual’s ability to access, use and 
create digital media freely to exercise human rights, including the right 
to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression (Human Rights 
Council 2016). The term ‘civic space’ refers to the space that people use to 
communicate with each other freely in a specific political and social context. 
Civic space provides people with an environment in which they can openly 
share their interests and concerns, and influence and shape policymaking. 
Closing civic space can shrink social connections and communications, and 
deprive individuals of their basic digital rights (CIVICUS 2016).
Section 2 of this report discusses the political landscape in Sudan, and 
how the digital rights of the Sudanese people are affected by political and 
technological issues. It addresses the ruling party that has played a part in 
opening and closing civic space from 2000 to 2020. Section 3 discusses the 
civic space landscape in Sudan, which includes a timeline of the past 20 
years, plotting key points of political contestation and change as they have 
affected the closing and opening of civic space. Section 4 is a timeline of the 
past 20 years that describes key events in the use of digital technologies to 
open and close civic space. Section 5 describes the digital rights landscape, 
which is an analysis of the previous section. Section 6 is the conclusion, which 
includes the findings of the report and also makes recommendations to 
improve digital rights in Sudan.
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2. Political landscape
Many political parties have ruled over Sudan. Omar al-Bashir led Sudan 
from 1989 to 2019, the country’s seventh president. Al-Bashir came to power 
in 1989 when he became brigadier general of the Sudanese Army. He led a 
military coup that was negotiated with rebels in the south of the country 
and overthrew the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. In 
1992, al-Bashir founded the dominant National Congress Party. Southern and 
northern Sudan had been at war for more than two decades. 
From 2005, Sudan was governed according to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, which ended the conflict. According to the agreement, there 
would be an autonomous government for southern Sudan,1 which would 
manage its own political and legislative issues. The secession of South Sudan 
played a critical role in inducing numerous economic shocks. The most critical 
and direct effect was the loss of oil-producing regions, which accounts for 
about 50 per cent of the Government of Sudan’s revenue and some 95 per 
cent of its exports, which considerably affected the country’s economic 
growth. These factors led to price inflation and have triggered sporadic 
protests since September 2013. 
Al-Bashir was accused of crimes including what United States (US) Secretary 
of State Colin Powell described as genocide (US Department of State 2004), 
and war crimes in Sudan’s Darfur region. In 2008, the International Criminal 
Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In 2010, another arrest warrant was 
issued on three separate counts of genocide. Thousands of people lost 
their lives during the Darfur conflict that occurred in February 2013 as the 
government’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) moved against the Sudanese 
Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement.2 After that 
incident, although the Government of Sudan took action against those 
accused of being involved in the conflict and arrested many people, they 
restricted citizens from putting human rights-related issues on the internet.
From December 2018 onwards, there were massive protests against al-Bashir 
all over the country. On 11 April 2019, the al-Bashir government was convicted 
by the Sudanese military of corruption and replaced by the Transitional 
Military Council (TMC). From 3 June 2019 to 9 July 2019 the internet was shut 
down amid a violent military crackdown that on 3 June led to the deaths of 
100, with 700 injured and 70 rape victims (Taye 2019). 
1 Southern Sudan refers to the south of the country before the independence of South Sudan in 2011.
2 The Sudanese Liberation Movement is a rebel group that has been active in Darfur since 2002. The 
opposition Justice and Equality Movement has been active in Sudan since 2000. 
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The blackout was listed as a near-total restriction on information flow both 
in and out of Sudan for most of the population in the country. Activists such 
as the Sudanese Professionals Association, a trade union, said that the ruling 
military council deliberately enforced a blackout in an attempt to violently roll 
back meagre gains by protesters who had assisted in ousting al-Bashir on 
11 April 2019 (Feldstein 2019). The internet shutdown increased street protests, 
which were already causing a strain on the country. 
This was not the first time the country had experienced an internet shutdown; 
but this time, it was different. The shutdown was coupled with reports of 
organised and systemic killings and looting by government forces, including 
the RSF (Amnesty International 2019). Before the mobile internet was shut 
down, the TMC had been negotiating with opposition groups to set up a 
transitional civilian government (Reuters 2019). 
However, a few days into the shutdown, the TMC stopped the negotiations 
and reportedly sent the Janjaweed militia3 to attack peaceful protesters 
(APC 2019). Phones and other personal belongings of the protesters were 
confiscated and destroyed, so that atrocities would not be shared with the 
world (Human Rights Watch 2019). The only forms of communication that 
remained active in Sudan were mobile phones, text messages and fixed-line 
internet provided by a few operators. It made it difficult for people to know 
whether their loved ones were safe.
On 4 August 2019, the TMC and the opposition Forces for Freedom of Change 
– a political coalition of civilian and rebel groups, which was created during 
the period of the protests – signed a constitutional charter for a transitional 
period. The charter governs a 39-month transitional period with a power-
sharing agreement incorporating political and constitutional agreements 
(ICNL 2020). General elections will follow the end of the transitional period 
in late 2022; an exact date has not been set yet. The power-sharing 
agreement has resulted in the return of some normality to the country. 
However, civil society is continuously monitoring the country’s situation for 
shifts in the state of human rights.
3 The Janjaweed Arab militia is active in Sudan, particularly in the Darfur region. Since 2003, it has 
been one of the main players in the Darfur conflict, which has pitted the largely nomadic tribes 
against the sedentary population of the region in a battle over resources and land allocation. 
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3. Civic space landscape
Civil society in Sudan has always played a key role in Sudan’s ongoing 
struggle for political reform since its independence in January 1956 
(Armstrong et al. 2011). Even though the post-colonial era in Sudan saw 
most civil society organisations engage in a range of social, economic, 
cultural and political activities, President al-Bashir ascended to power 
in 1989 and banned most media outlets (Moorcraft 2015). For instance, 
in 2012 a human rights defender stated in an interview with global civil 
society organisation alliance CIVICUS that all organisations promoting 
human rights within Sudan had been shut down or compelled to flee 
and establish themselves outside the country (Nigam 2019). 
Civil society acts as a service provider to build active citizenship in 
local, regional and national governance. In the past few years, a great 
community of actors has been concerned with civic spaces in order to 
understand the phenomenon behind them better. Sudan’s civic space 
activities have in the recent past faced significant challenges owing to 
the government’s massive censorship and surveillance of the internet 
(Armstrong et al. 2011). According to a study by Freedom House in 2019, 
citizens’ freedom in the civic space was 25 (not free) out of 100, 0 being 
the least free and 100 the freest (Reduce 2020; see Figure 3.1). Such 
scores demonstrate how the country is trying to limit freedom to use 
the internet. 
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Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–194
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
Civic space provides fundamental digital rights to every individual by 
providing a space in which everyone can communicate and share their 
ideas. Since 2000, internet freedom in Sudan has been limited. Al-Bashir 
deprived the Sudanese of their basic right to open civic space. Despite all 
the protests and movements, the civic space is still closed in 2020. 
Civic space in Sudan has faced many challenges in the past 20 years. From 
2000 to 2012, most Sudanese were unaware of their basic digital rights. 
Civil society created awareness among the Sudanese people and tried to 
open civic space for internet freedom. However, major challenges started to 
appear in 2012, when many organisations were working to promote human 
rights. Many human rights advocates were forced to flee the country. 
In June 2012, journalists demonstrating for economic and political change 
were confronted by police, leading to many protesters being injured. In 
September 2013, civil society organisations faced mounting pressure as they 
conducted a large number of public protests when they also faced police 
brutality. In the whole of 2016, the government jailed many human rights 
activists and responded with violence to demonstrators. In the past, many 
human rights activists were jailed and even executed. 
4  Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline
Year Shift Implication
2000–05 Sudanese government oppresses the 
people, who are unable to enjoy basic 
rights.
Closed civic space.
2005 Access to Information Act is passed. Opening of civic space.
2008–11 People are least free to enjoy political 
and civil rights.
Closed civic space.
2012 Sudanese government shuts down many 
organisations promoting human rights.
Civil society activists forced to flee the 
country.
2013 Increased public protests; civil society 
organisations face mounting pressure.
Relative opening of civic space.
2016 Sudanese government increases 
suppression of civic space.
Journalists and protesters arrested.
2018 Telecommunication and Post Regulation 
Act is passed.
Telecommunication and Post Regulatory 
Authority can revoke the licence of any 
broadcasting station or telecoms 
company violating the terms of the act.
Feb. 2019 Government unblocks the internet. People express relief as they can access 
the internet due to the opening of online 
civic space.
June 2019 Provisional government shuts down 
access to the internet.
Widespread protests, with many injured 
or killed.
July 2019 Court orders Transitional Military Council 
to restore internet access.




Internet shutdown makes it hard to share 
information.
The internet has become critical to 
people; civic space is still closed even 
under the current political regime. 
Source: Authors’ own.
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4. Technology landscape
Sudan has seen millions of people introduced to cyberspace since the start 
of the millennium, and an expansion of the ability to share information or 
stay informed about the latest news. As of January 2020, Sudan’s internet 
users stood at 13.38 million people, an increase of 2.4 per cent from 2019, 
when the number was 316,000 people fewer (Ali 2020). Internet penetration, 
which measures the proportion of the population that has internet access, 
remains low, at 31 per cent, as reported in January 2020 (see Figure 4.1). In 
terms of mobile connections, the number recorded was about 32.83 million, 
which is an increase of 7.4 per cent from what was recorded in January 
2019 (Srinivasan, Diepeveen and Karekwaivanane 2019). The same study 
considered the number of mobile connections and found that it was about 
76 per cent of the whole population. The data show an increasing trend in 
the use of the internet. 
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Sudan5
Source: Based on data from ITU (2020)
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The Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) control 
digital media use through multiple strategies, including blocking, 
controlling, jamming and slowing down certain websites, and hacking 
private accounts (email, Facebook, Twitter). The NISS acquired ProxySG 
servers from US cybersecurity and network management company Blue 
Coat Systems, which enable governments and corporations to intercept 
internet traffic. The government also uses software that comes from 
the Italian software company Hacking Team, which enables access to 
private devices, including data, cameras and microphones. Software 
and hardware purchases contravene US sanctions and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement for the non-proliferation of dual-use software (Lamoureux 
and Sureau 2018).
In 2005, Sudan’s government introduced the Sudanese Access to 
Information Act, which stated that anyone had the right to disseminate 
and receive data. The act was passed due to constant pressure from 
foreign countries and also from civil society. However, in 2007 the country 
introduced the Computer Crimes Act, which mandated two years in 
prison as punishment for anyone found guilty of limiting access to 
internet services. 
In 2018, the country introduced the Telecommunication and Post Regulation 
Act, which gave the Telecommunication and Postal Regulatory Authority 
the mandate to revoke communication licences to any broadcasting 
station or telecoms company violating the act (Suliman 2019a). Article 56 
of the Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period enshrined 
the right to access the internet (Suliman 2019b). However, experts argue 
that the charter appears vague in the sense that it contains loopholes 
that the government can use to close civic space and deny digital rights 
to citizens (ibid.).
There are four main internet service providers in the country: Canar, Sudatel, 
MTN and Zain. MTN and Zain have been able to provide internet services 
using mobile networks because they have licences (Mohamed Nour 2015). 
On the other hand, Canar lacks such a licence and therefore relies on 
leased lines – wireless and landlines – to provide internet services. 
To get around the internet shutdowns, Sudanese protesters used various 
techniques to relay urgent information, but they were not as convenient 
as using the internet. Not all service providers were willing to prevent their 
customers from accessing the internet. In particular, Canar refused to 
switch off the internet for its subscribers. However, owing to pressure from 
the Sudanese government, the company was compelled to on 5 June 2019 
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(Suliman 2019b). Canar and Sudatel were providing internet services using 
fibre-optic fibre infrastructure, so some users continued to share political 
news with the global community. However, because it was quite expensive 
to access the internet this way (ibid.), only the few users who could afford it 
were able to access the service.
In April 2018, Suad Ahmed Fadel was charged for sharing information 
on WhatsApp about how she was dismissed from a communications 
company and replaced by a niece of al-Bashir (Ref World, 2018). The 2007 
Cybercrime Act borrows a lot from the Criminal Act of 1991, which prohibits 
any dissemination of information that may be regarded to be in breach 
of morality as well as public order. Suad Ahmed Fadel’s information 
was deemed to be in breach of morality, public order and the sanctity 
of private life. 
There is a need for stakeholders to re-evaluate the cybercrime act to 
remove problematic laws that impinge on freedom of expression on the 
internet. This is not the first time: people had been using social media 
to express their views on politics. However, its use has grown so fast that 
people who use social media just to express their views on politics have 
started to use it for hashtag campaigns. 
The so-called ‘bread protests’ erupted in December 2018, complemented 
by social media campaigns. The protests were not just a result of the 
increased price of bread, but about economic poverty and rising living 
costs, including the struggle to obtain daily necessities in the country 
(Mahmoud 2019). On 19 December 2018, amid the revolution that ousted 
al-Bashir, the government blocked access to social media sites such 
as Instagram, WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook as activists had been 
using them to open civic spaces. However, with the help of virtual private 
networks (VPNs), it was still possible to use social media, but only the 
limited number of citizens who had the necessary technical knowledge 
were able to do so. This move by the government completely contravened 
freedom of expression on the internet. 
On 26 February 2019, the government unblocked the internet for the public 
and people in Sudan could access social media again (Suliman 2019b). 
However, the move drew mixed reactions from different sectors. While the 
public heaved a sigh of relief, human rights defenders and digital rights 
activists encouraged citizens to avoid the temptation to stop using VPNs; 
their privacy was still at stake and the government could not be relied on 
to guarantee it. 
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On 3 June 2019, Sudan’s authorities descended on peaceful protesters in 
the country’s capital Khartoum, which saw hundreds injured. The hashtags 
#BlueforSudan, #SudanUprising and #StayStrongSudan trended on social 
media, creating awareness all over the world of what was happening 
in Sudan. The spike in social media activities as a result of the violent 
crackdown shows the strength of the internet in relaying information. In 
the same month, another hashtag, #SudanMealProject, started trending 
days after the crackdown to rally well-wishers to provide resources 
for those who had been injured. The hashtag earned about 400,000 
followers who pledged to offer food supplies (Frattasio 2019). 
At least 100 people were killed during protests to demand the restoration 
of civilian rule (Taye 2019). From 3 June 2019 up to 9 July 2019, the 
provisional government shut down internet access again, leading to 
widespread protests (Suliman 2019b). On 9 July 2019, a court decision 
ordered the TMC to restore the internet and ensure all internet service 
providers could provide services to all citizens (ibid.). The court decision 
saw the Sudanese people get back online once again. As mentioned 
above, the 2018 Telecommunication and Post Regulation Act gives the 
regulatory authority a mandate to disrupt any broadcasting station or 
telecommunications if it finds that they are violating the law (Suliman 
2019a). However, legal experts argue that the act appears vague and 
does not go into sufficient detail, which creates an avenue for the 
authorities to interpret it in a way that allows them to restrict access to 
services (ibid.).
During the whole period of the internet shutdown, from June to July 2019, 
Sudanese people within and outside the country were worried because 
the shutdown made it hard to share information with loved ones or even 
access essential news (Suliman 2019b). 
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Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Year Shift Implication
2003 World Summit on the Information 
Society held in Geneva.
Internet access is declared a 
fundamental human right. 
2005 Access to Information Act is passed. Every Sudanese citizen has the right to 
receive and disseminate information. 
2007 Computer Crimes Act introduced. Misuse of the internet to relay data 
becomes a punishable offence.
2018 Telecommunication and Post 
Regulation Act is passed. 
Telecommunication and Post 
Regulatory Authority can revoke the 
licence of any broadcasting station or 
telecoms company violating the terms 
of the act.
Dec. 2018 The government blocks social media. The Sudanese people do not have 
access to social media.
April 2019 Al-Bashir government replaced by TMC. Citizens feel safer and access the 
internet without VPNs.
3 June 2019 Hashtags #BlueforSudan, 
#SudanUprising, #StayStrongSudan 
and #IAmTheSudanRevolution trending 
on social media.
Creating awareness all over the world 
about events in Sudan.
June 2019 Hashtag #SudanMealProject trending. Rallying people all over the world to 
offer free food to Sudanese people.
Jan. 2020 Number of internet users increases. Internet access becomes a key issue in 
Sudan.
Source: Authors’ own.
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5. Digital rights landscape
In the presence of the dominant political system and technological 
landscape, Sudanese citizens cannot easily secure their digital rights. There 
is much work to be done in Sudan in order to replace the political systems 
that are not granting the right to digital freedom. Also, the Sudanese people 
need to expand their technological access, understanding and capacities 
so that they can open civic space and defend their digital rights. 
In Sudan there is a need to address vague and contradictory legislation in 
order to provide the people with basic digital capabilities in the worst of 
political or technological situations. Closing of civic spaces stands in the way 
of achieving internet freedom and digital rights. Key civil society actors are 
still unable to effectively assess the tools and methods being used by the 
government to close civic space. Civil society actors should work together 
to build spaces through which every citizen can exercise and defend their 
digital rights. 
Many reputable international organisations recognise the right to connect 
to or access information as a fundamental human right. For instance, in 
2003 the World Summit on the Information Society held in Geneva reached 
a consensus that the internet is key to providing information to society and 
that no one should be denied access to the internet (Access Now 2016). Also, 
in 2016 the United Nations Council on Human Rights passed a resolution 
condemning internet shutdowns and supporting human rights online, as was 
the case in Sudan (ibid.).
From 1977, Sudan was constrained by a US-imposed embargo put in 
place, which in turn reinforced the government’s justification for oppression 
and control over the internet: the internet is necessary for trading and 
most international trading takes place through online transactions (Kehl 
and Maurer 2014). Due to US restrictions, citizens in Sudan were unable 
to download or update US-made software, thus using vulnerable and 
unprotected operating systems. However, between 2014 and 2017, the 
sanctions were lifted (Yahia et al. 2018). Despite the embargo, the country 
went from about 1 per cent of people using the internet in 2000 to about 22 
per cent over the next ten years (Internet Live Stats 2016). About 30 per cent 
of the country’s population can access the internet from the comfort of their 
own home. Thus, more people have internet access, but internet freedom is 
still not free, as shown on Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net Index (see 
Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1 Sudan’s Freedom on the Net Index score, 
2013–19
Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020)
In the past two decades, civil society organisations in Sudan have tried 
to build alliances with other groups in order to make it easy for them 
to maintain and promote their activities in a way that could influence 
governance. However, the government considers civil society as a threat 
and has improved its technical capabilities to have control over political 
activists since 2016 (Lamoureux and Sureau 2019). Sudan’s government has 
invested heavily in its technical capabilities. For instance, the NISS controls 
digital media operating within its borders by using various strategies such 
as hacking private accounts and blocking websites. Also, the NISS uses 
controlling mechanisms and slows down or jams various websites as a way 
of asserting control over the use of digital media (ibid.).
The NISS has proxy servers it bought from the US to allow the government 
to intercept internet traffic. The organisation also uses spyware from Italian 
company Hacking Team to access private devices such as microphones and 
cameras, and data (Suliman 2019a). The proxies allow the NISS to control, 
intercept or restrict private information, which includes but is not limited to 
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proxies can slow down certain websites, thus influencing what information 
people can access. 
The Sudanese government does not rely wholly on technological means to 
control digital media, but also uses the idea of morality. The government’s 
idea to use Islam to control the Sudanese people was first introduced 
into law in 1991, when a criminal code enabled the government to defend 
and control the morality of its citizens using Islamic disciplinary measures 
(Lamoureaux and Sureau 2018). 
The increased use of social media has seen the Sudanese government use 
the internet to monitor communications on social media sites. Moreover, the 
government established a Cyber Jihad Unit that has since been used to 
monitor bloggers and dissenting groups (Freedom House 2016). The NISS thus 
seems to use both technical and social techniques to monitor the activities of 
Sudanese citizens. The Cyber Jihad Unit proactively monitors the activities of 
Sudanese people on the internet and is also involved in political influencing 
through trolls (Freedom House 2014).
120Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Sudan Digital Rights Landscape Report
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Abrar Mohamed Ali © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.009
6. Digital rights in times of Covid-19
The Covid-19 pandemic is a moment when countries need to reflect on how 
not to limit digital rights while trying to protect public health. The internet, as a 
platform for communication, helps inform the public about health threats at a 
relatively faster rate than traditional tools of communication such as radio and 
newspapers (Micek and Krapiva 2020). Even though health data should remain 
confidential, owing to their sensitivity, the government can use health data to 
respond faster to outbreaks. Governments around the world, not just in Sudan, 
may see this period as ideal to introduce controversial technology for surveillance 
to legitimise oppressive tools disguised as public health tools. In most Asian 
countries, for example, facial recognition technology is already being used for 
surveillance and control, and to monitor people’s movements (Jeria et al. 2020). 
As described above, Sudan’s authorities have used internet shutdowns to 
prevent the public from sharing information and convicted citizens of sharing 
information perceived to cause public disorder (Suliman 2020). Therefore, if the 
government thinks that an open debate about the severity and extent of the 
Covid-19 pandemic is not right for the stability of the country or national security, 
it is possible that the authorities could censor information or limit access to the 
internet. Censorship violates the right to access information and free speech, and 
could also encourage the spread of the disease even further. 
This last aspect could arise through disinformation. Much false information has 
spread in Sudan during the Covid-19 pandemic. People spread false information 
to either become famous or to get more likes on social media platforms. To reduce 
disinformation, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) set up help centres to 
provide all the necessary information regarding the Covid-19 outbreak, symptoms 
and management. A hotline has operated during the crisis to provide the public 
with the latest authentic information by phone. People have taken advantage 
of this hotline as they have no internet access by which they can get information 
(Madyun and Abdu 2020). 
The internet can allow (deliberate) disinformation and (accidental) 
misinformation about the disease to spread quickly. False data about vaccines 
or treatments could be spread through social media sites and messaging 
platforms such as WhatsApp (Suciu 2020). In response, social media sites such 
as Twitter and Facebook, as well as the tech giant Google, have introduced 
official guidance from health experts for users looking for coronavirus information 
(Jakhar 2020). The Sudanese government, however, has not developed a 
specific app or tracker to trace Covid-19 cases in 2020. The main reason is that 
most people do not have access to the internet. The Sudanese government, like 
many other African governments, should thus create awareness to prevent its 
citizens from spreading disinformation and misinformation about the disease.  
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7. Conclusion
This report has looked at digital rights in Sudan as a case study. Like 
many other countries, digital penetration in Sudan has increased over the 
years, however, the use of digital tools by civil society to voice dissent and 
coordinate political activities in the country, such as the fall of the al-Bashir 
regime, has encouraged the authorities to shut down the internet. The 
opening and closing of online civic space has become key to digital rights 
in Sudan; specifically, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and 
freedom of political opinion. 
Access to information has become a fundamental right and internet 
shutdowns or restrictions contravene the Sudanese people’s (digital) rights. 
Domestic civil society is working effectively to monitor and analyse the 
opening and closing of civic spaces to provide citizens with their basic 
digital rights. The government continues to rely on foreign software to spy 
on citizens and has taken the Covid-19 pandemic as an opportunity to use 
technology to increase surveillance and limit people’s digital rights. 
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8. Digital rights future 
recommendations
The government should promote the use of digital technologies to share 
information and allow essential services to be offered online. Universities and 
civil society organisations do not currently have the research capabilities 
they need to effectively monitor and analyse internet shutdowns in Sudan. 
The Sudanese people must elect a political party that is willing to provide 
its people with these capabilities and help strengthen digital rights and 
internet freedom. The government must also find ways to open the civic 
space and improve technology. Digital technologies can also be used to 
strengthen governance processes during the pandemic when assembling 
people, or when traditional cash-based ways of doing business in Sudan are 
discouraged.
As discussed, limiting the use of the internet in relaying public health 
information could make Covid-19 spread even further. Therefore, Sudan’s 
government should not discourage online activities or censor information 
shared through social media sites. The potential benefits of sharing public 
health information outweigh the risk posed by the spread of disinformation. 
Sudan’s government, and many other African states, need to revise their 
regulations on the use of digital technologies to remove or amend specific 
laws that encourage surveillance of private data and internet shutdowns, 
and restrict freedom of expression, as is evident in Sudan.  
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1. Introduction
This report provides an overview of the political, and civic space and 
technological context that have shaped digital rights in South Africa since 
2000. The term ‘digital rights’ here refers to the right to access the internet 
as a means to ensure freedom of information, freedom of expression and 
association (UN 2011). 
The report begins with an overview of the political landscape in South 
Africa as it influences the availability of digital rights. This is followed by a 
discussion of the main contours in the country’s civic space landscape, where 
the term civic space refers to the amount of room available for citizens, 
organisations and the government to freely and safely discuss opinions and 
influence policy and governance processes.1 The third section describes 
the technology landscape and explores citizens’ use of mobile phones and 
social media platforms to mount influential advocacy campaigns using 
hashtags including #RhodesMustFall, #FeesMustFall and #ZumaMustFall. 
These are given as examples of citizens’ digital technology use to open civic 
space discussion of issues neglected by mainstream media and politicians. 
The technology landscape section also discusses technology use by the 
government and private companies to close civic space, using examples 
including internet shutdowns, surveillance technologies, and the use of 
automated disinformation campaigns. The report then provides an analysis 
of how these political, civic and technological factors affect the digital rights 
of South African citizens. It identifies what existing capabilities and gaps 
exist to monitor and effectively respond to these developments; and makes a 
number of recommendations for policy, practice and further research, which 
are designed to strengthen citizens’ abilities to more effectively exercise, 
defend and expand their digital rights.
1 Definition adapted from CIVICUS (2020). 
127Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
South Africa Digital Rights Landscape Report
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Tanja Bosch and Tony Roberts © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.010
2. Political landscape
The most dramatic feature of South Africa’s modern political landscape 
was the end of apartheid policies that outlawed freedom of political 
opinion, expression and association for the majority black population. 
However, the struggle to translate political freedoms and rights into social 
and economic justice continues to be contested. 
The 1994 elections were the first in which all South Africans could vote 
irrespective of race. They marked the end of apartheid and the extension 
of political and human rights in South Africa, concluding four years of 
negotiations. The negotiations had begun in 1990 with the unbanning of 
liberation movements and the creation of a new constitution and bill of 
rights under the country’s first black president, Nelson Mandela, as leader 
of the African National Congress (ANC), in partnership with the South 
African Communist Party and Congress of South African Trade Unions.
Since 1994, the ANC has consistently won at least 60 per cent of the 
vote, although its popularity declined by several percentage points 
between 2004 and 2014. The ANC’s main rivals are the Democratic 
Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), although a total of 
48 political parties registered candidates for the 2019 parliamentary 
elections. Despite enjoying a multiparty political system, South Africa 
is often considered a weak or transitional democracy because of the 
dominance of the ANC in the absence of an effective opposition. This 
highlights the generally accepted notion that formal freedoms often do 
not necessarily translate into meaningful political participation, if one 
party monopolises power. 
A prevailing feature of political discourse in South Africa has been 
the idea that opposition parties might be able to recruit the growing 
constituency of unemployed youth and discontented citizens. However, 
despite being politically active in other ways, young people have 
remained largely disengaged from mainstream party politics, though 
politically active in other ways, including the influential hashtag social 
media campaigns of #RhodesMustFall and #FeesMustFall, discussed in 
detail below. In 2019, only 16 per cent of 18–19-year-olds were registered to 
vote. Roberts (2019: 39) argues that this does not reflect political apathy, 
but rather that young people ‘are highly critical of political leaders and 
parties who they feel have ignored their needs and fail to engage with 
them in a meaningful manner’.
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From 2005 onwards, during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), 
there was an upswing in community-led protests tackling poor access to 
water and electricity, housing, corruption and nepotism in local councils, 
and the lack of meaningful participation in local decision-making despite 
policy requiring it (Akinboade, Mokwena and Kinfack 2013; Alexander 2010; 
Atkinson 2007; Ballard, Habib and Valodia 2006; Booysen 2007; Burger 
2009). These protests were initially united under regional banners, such as 
the Anti-Privatisation Forum in Gauteng and the Anti-Eviction Campaign 
in the Western Cape (Madlingozi 2007). 
These protests reflect the co-existence of formally declared openings 
that in practice are closures of civic space. Howell (2019) argues that 
contemporary legislation in South Africa allows for the opening of civic 
space, along with a vibrant network of civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in the post-apartheid era. Citizens and CSOs can generally organise and 
communicate without hindrance, but the state often reneges on its duty to 
protect civil society, and South Africa remains politically fractured and the 
most unequal society on earth (World Bank 2019).
South Africa experienced two waves of extreme violence in 2008 and 2015. 
These waves of violence articulated responses to ongoing poverty and 
inequality, with foreign nationals being accused of competing for low-
paying jobs (Dodson 2010). At the same time, the violence could also be 
seen as defining who is truly South African; and who has the right to access 
public services and who is excluded. In parallel with local-level forms 
of contestation, at the national level various accusations of corruption 
rocked the ANC, spurring the growth of a new political party, the EFF, which 
managed to secure seats in the country’s parliament (Schulz-Herzenberg 
2014). One key corruption scandal was around the exorbitant upgrades to 
President Zuma’s home (Beresford 2015), leading the EFF to disrupt the 2015 
state of the nation address with demands that the president ‘pay back 
the money’.
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3. Civic space landscape
Opening civic space for inclusive deliberation of social issues is foundational 
to democratic governance (Civic Space Watch 2020). Civic space is the 
room available to citizens and civil society organisation to engage with 
government to represent their perspectives on and interests to influence 
policy and governance issues. Such participatory governance is guaranteed 
in the South African Constitution and Bill of Rights, and the government has 
committed to its defence and extension in international conventions including 
the Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015). According to Freedom House 
(2019), South Africa is relatively ‘free’ when compared to other countries 
in the African Digital Rights Network (see Figure 3.1). Civil society is usually 
conceptualised as a network of both citizen associations and CSOs that 
influence democratic governance via their ability to mobilise citizens on behalf 
of public causes (Foley and Edwards 1996). The link between civil society and 
democracy sees the former as providing an impetus for establishing elections, 
and therefore a key element of democracy (Bosch et al. 2019).
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–192
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
2  Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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Many of the key civic struggles in South Africa’s recent history have been 
around public service delivery. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was 
founded in December 1998 to campaign for access to AIDS treatment and 
came to prominence during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki due to the AIDS 
denialism of Mbeki and his minister of health, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. 
The TAC is widely acknowledged as one of the most important CSOs on 
AIDS in the developing world. One of its most significant victories was the 
2002 Constitutional Court ruling in which the South African government was 
ordered to provide antiretroviral drugs to prevent transmission of HIV from 
mothers to their babies during birth. Despite this judgement from the highest 
court in the country, along with continued public pressure, the HIV treatment 
programme only gained significant momentum once Mbeki and Tshabalala-
Msimang had been removed from office in 2008. 
Two independent studies estimate that delays in making antiretroviral 
treatment available in the public sector in South Africa resulted in more than 
300,000 avoidable deaths (TAC 2016). The TAC campaign was instrumental 
in securing a universal government-provided AIDS treatment programme, 
which has since become the world’s largest (TAC 2020). With leadership 
from TAC, South Africa’s AIDS response united civil society and international 
support in a way not seen since the opposition to apartheid (Simelela and 
Venter 2014). The TAC campaign is highlighted here as a reflection of the 
existence of an open civic space in which activists were able to improve 
access to antiretroviral treatment and expand access to HIV treatment. 
Under Zuma’s presidency (2009–18), those exercising the right to peaceful 
protest experienced increasing police violence. The most dramatic example 
of this was the so-called ‘Marikana massacre’ at the Marikana platinum 
mine, where 34 striking miners were killed and 78 injured when police 
opened fire on them. This has been described as the most lethal use of 
force by South African security forces against civilians since 176 people 
were killed in the Soweto uprising of 1976. Dominant media narratives at 
first supported official claims that the police had acted in self-defence 
at Marikana and portrayed the miners as predisposed to violence. Only 
much later did the reporting shift to include the voices of mineworkers and 
providing alternative accounts to the police version of events (Duncan 2014). 
The current president, Cyril Ramaphosa, was at that time a non-executive 
director of Lonmin, the company running the Marikana mine. He was heavily 
criticised for an email in which he recommended heavy-handed action 
against the striking miners (for which he subsequently apologised). The strike 
is considered a key event in South Africa’s recent history and was followed 
by a series of similar strikes at other mines in 2012. Events such as Marikana 
highlight that while the state allows individuals and CSOs formal rights, 
violations of these rights also take place. 
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The 2011 Protection of State Information Bill increased government efforts 
to impose a ‘culture of secrecy’ around investigations of government fraud 
and state information by attempting to control critical or inconvenient 
information. Otherwise known as the Secrecy Bill, it allowed for the 
withholding of information from the public. Discussions around the proposed 
bill took place alongside a government push for a media appeals tribunal in 
2017, arguing against freedom of the press as an absolute right, and instead 
that it should be balanced against government officials’ right to privacy. 
The ruling ANC argued that the press ombudsman was biased towards the 
media, and that a tribunal, appointed by Parliament, would hold the media 
accountable. This was dismissed as political interference, and the resolution 
to establish the tribunal was not tabled in Parliament. These events suggest 
that in instances where government has attempted to shut down civic 
space, there has been push back from civil society against such repressive 
legislation, leading to further criticism from the government.
Government departments periodically make statements alleging that local 
CSOs are colluding with external powers to undermine the state’s authority. In 
March 2016, CSOs condemned the military-style armed robbery of documents 
and computers from the offices of the Helen Suzman Foundation at a time 
when the organisation was seeking to interdict the head of South Africa’s 
corruption and crime fighting investigative unit, the Hawks (Kode 2018). In the 
same month, anti-mining activist Sikhosiphi ‘Bazooka’ Rhadebe, was brutally 
murdered in his home after campaigning against the mining interests of 
Australian mining company Mineral Commodities Ltd (ibid.). Taken together, 
such actions create a climate of fear and uncertainty among citizens who feel 
they do not have access to a safe and enabling civic space (CIVICUS 2016).
South African media have played a significant role in the opening and 
closing of civic space, particularly in terms of building negative perceptions 
of community protests, and criminalising and delegitimising protesters. 
The media affect the parameters of civic space partly due to their role in 
setting the frame of the Overton window (Robertson 2018): which topics it 
is acceptable to speak of, what it is permissible to demand and what is 
off the table. In South Africa, the media have arguably been complicit in 
encouraging xenophobic discourse. Even when the media do well in relating 
xenophobic conflicts, they often fail to cover the causal factors underpinning 
such violence (Hickel 2014). The media were at the centre of the 2015 state 
of the nation address conflict, when government operatives jammed 
communication within Parliament to suppress media coverage. 
In conclusion, there is a history of contention of civic space in South Africa. In 
the late twentieth century, political activists successfully campaigned for an 
end to the racist segregation of the apartheid era and its replacement with 
democratic government. In post-apartheid South Africa, a range of citizen-
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led social movements emerged, many expressing widespread dissatisfaction 
with the continued inequality and inadequate service delivery. These 
grassroots concerns included struggles over housing, land, health, education 
and service provision. The new social movements are part of the marginalised 
subaltern urban class in the developing world that emerged as a result of 
rapid global economic restructuring in the 1990s (Chiumbu 2015), intensified 
by the adoption of neoliberal macroeconomic policies. These movements 
are increasingly combining traditional mobilisation methods with new media 
technologies to mobilise, create networks and lobby for social justice. 
Unlike other African countries, South Africa has not experienced laws 
designed to deregister or cut funding to civil society registration, but there 
has been an upward trend in restrictions and various forms of harassment 
(Smidt 2018). Although freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are 
protected in the South African Constitution, the ability to exercise these 
rights is often limited by restrictive and violent measures by the state to curb 
peaceful demonstrations (CIVICUS 2016).
Table 3.1 Civic space timeline 
Year Shift Implication
1994 End of apartheid; first democratic 
government.
Opening of civic space follows lifting of 
apartheid restrictions.
2002 TAC secures ARTs for people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLHIV).
Civil disobedience campaign opens civic 
space for PLHIV.
2005 Shack dwellers revolt and boycott local 
government elections, and other service 
delivery campaigns. 
CIVICUS reports repression by police, 
destruction of shacks and threats to 
leaders.
2008 First wave of xenophobic violence. Closing of civic space for immigrants.
2009 Zuma’s term as president (2009–18) 
marked by corruption and repression.
Civil society vocal but not enabled or 
protected.
2012 Marikana massacre of striking miners. Strikes expand and general volumes of 
protests increases.
2016 Helen Suzman Foundation robbery and 
Sikhosiphi ‘Bazooka’ Rhadebe murdered.
State repression limits civic space.
2019 After Zuma leaves office, service delivery 
protests escalate.
Citizen-led, non-partisan campaigning 
opens civic space across race/class/
gender divides.
2020 Covid-19 lockdown enforcement kills 
citizens; C19 campaign launched.
The government awards itself new 
surveillance and policing powers, and 
limits digital rights.
Source: Authors’ own.
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4. Technology landscape 
Internet access in South Africa has increased rapidly, with much of the 
growth occurring in the last 12 years (see Figure 4.1). Between 2001 and 
2011, South African national census reports showed that the proportion 
of households owning mobile phones had increased from 32 per cent to 
89 per cent. By 2020, of South Africa’s 59 million citizens 36.54 million were 
internet users, of which 34.93 million were mobile internet users (Clement 
2019). The growth of the mobile internet has resulted in greater access in the 
absence of widespread broadband; but data costs are still a prohibitive 
factor to internet access and the opening up of civic space by digital means. 
Moreover, price discrimination has meant that poorer consumers are usually 
forced to purchase lower-priced bundles, which are valid for a shorter time 
and do not provide as much data as more expensive bundles, and with 
much higher costs per megabyte (Masweneng 2019). A further barrier to 
access is the impact of English literacy on wider adoption – the dominance 
of English limits access to those who are not proficient in the language.
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in South Africa
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In 2014, there was an increase in civic tech organisations in South Africa 
with the establishment of organisations including Amandla.mobi, Grassroot, 
and later GovChat and Vulekamali. These civic tech organisations use the 
affordances of digital technologies for connective action (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013), opening civic space to talk about issues not well covered 
by mainstream media or political parties. The organisations focus on issues 
including transparency and accountability, education, citizen participation, 
open data, governance and journalism (Civic Tech 2020).
South Africa has experienced growing digital citizenship, facilitated by the 
use of social media applications such as Facebook and Twitter to create 
new online civic spaces to advocate for change. South African youth have 
also increasingly used social networking sites to develop a new biography 
of citizenship, characterised by more individualised forms of activism (Bosch 
2017). This can be understood with reference to three influential hashtag 
campaigns in 2015: #RhodesMustFall, #FeesMust Fall and #ZumaMustFall. 
The Rhodes Must Fall movement began on the campus of the University of 
Cape Town in October 2015 with a student activist flinging human waste 
at the statue of colonialist Cecil John Rhodes, which was prominently 
located on the campus. Students’ initially demanded the removal of the 
statue of Rhodes, but protests developed into a broader movement for 
the decolonisation of education across the country. The movement used 
the hashtag #RMF to set the agenda for public debate in online and 
offline spaces, as well as in mainstream media, with the Twitter discourse 
playing a key role in creating a space for debate and discussion (Bosch 
2017). Many of the same activists then took part in the #FeesMustFall 
(#FMF) protests to reduce the prohibitive cost of university tuition. The #FMF 
hashtag generated nearly 1.3 million tweets during the last two weeks of 
October 2015, with Twitter being the most used social media platform for 
the campaign. 
While Twitter served as a choreography of assembly (i.e. to alert users to 
offline protest gatherings and call them to action), Facebook was also 
used for widespread debate and discussion (Bosch 2016), and WhatsApp 
and Google Docs for internal communication and debate. The ‘MustFall’ 
narrative was then re-directed towards the president in the #ZumaMustFall 
(#ZMF) campaign, which had gone viral by the end of 2015. The movements 
shared similarities in that they challenged establishment authority from 
outside party politics or formal civil society, and made productive use of the 
affordances of social media to amplify demands inexpensively, and instantly 
across any geography. 
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In the South African context, there is also evidence that the campaign 
built alliances across barriers of race, gender and class.3 This was one of 
the largest instances of protest action in South Africa, with thousands of 
people taking to the streets in public marches across the country. What 
was particularly striking about both #FeesMustFall and #ZumaMustFall is 
that they represented protest across class and racial divides, as a means to 
express solidarity without physical or social proximity; as well as the use of 
digital technologies for the opening of civic space. 
While most community protests in South Africa take place in the 
impoverished black townships, #FeesMustFall took place on university 
campuses in urban centres, including at former white universities; and anti-
Zuma marches took place in urban centres, uniting citizens across race 
and class, with unusually large numbers of white protesters. While South 
Africans have a range of protest repertoires from the anti-apartheid era, the 
emergence of social media tools and hashtag activism holds the potential to 
amplify citizen discontent through building horizontal connections between 
citizens across demographic divides.
For its part, the South African state has also accumulated a range of 
technologies and mechanisms for influencing civic space that impact on 
digital rights. The rest of this section examines the use of legal, digital and 
violent responses to citizen expressions of the right to freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the rights to privacy and 
freedom of information. 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Act – better known as RICA – came 
into effect in 2005. It regulates when the government can surveil citizens 
through the interception of their communications (Omarjee 2020). RICA 
allows state surveillance of mobile and internet communications, but 
following a legal challenge from South African civil society organisation 
amaBhungane, the High Court ruled that some provisions of the legislation 
were unconstitutional (Staff Writer 2019). There is also evidence that South 
Africa has procured artificial intelligence surveillance technologies from 
Chinese telecommunications company Huawei as part of China’s Safe City 
programme (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2019; Hillman and 
McCalpin 2019). Another instance highlighting the threat to privacy from mass 
surveillance was the disclosure that the South African and UK governments 
were tapping undersea fibre-optic cables via bulk interception of internet 
traffic (Farrell 2019).
3 This is not a claim that social media disappears race, gender or class; it fully recognises that the 
demographics of social media users are not equal to those of the wider population (Boyd and 
Crawford 2012; Tufekci 2014). 
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‘Guptabots’ made headlines in 2016 as South Africa had its first experience of 
a concerted digital disinformation campaign. Guptabots were automated 
Twitter accounts that promoted the agenda of the influential Gupta family 
– financial backers of President Zuma. The bots were programmed to talk 
about ‘white monopoly capital’ in order to deflect attention from corruption 
scandals (Child 2017). This orchestrated campaign of ‘computational 
propaganda’ (Howard 2020) followed the appointment of UK political PR 
company Bell Pottinger as spin doctors for the Gupta empire (Fraser 2017).
The Gupta bot network (botnet) was first identified in November 2016 when 
the former public protector‘s ‘State Capture’ Report into the Guptas was 
criticised by citizens for being incorrect and biased. An analyst, Jean le Roux, 
identified around 100 accounts that were tweeting about the report (Van Zyl 
2016). He demonstrated that many of the accounts were fake automated 
accounts – tweeting identical content within seconds of each other – and 
identified certain ‘control’ or seeding accounts that were supplying the 
content for retweets (ibid.). 
Independent social media researcher Kyle Findlay was also seeing similar 
activity and highlighted a strange convergence between tweets from Andile 
Mngxitama, president of the Black First Land First political party and those of 
The New Age and ANN7 media companies (Superlinear 2016). Independently 
of one another, le Roux and Findlay had isolated a similar phenomenon of 
what appeared to be a botnet of pro-Zuma and pro-Gupta fake Twitter 
accounts, apparently coordinated in part by political marketing companies. 
The EFF also used disinformation to attack both the Commission of Inquiry 
into Tax Administration and Governance, and the Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of State Capture, in effect creating alternative narratives about 
the commissions in the public mind. The effectiveness of these campaigns 
ushered in an era of disinformation in South Africa, where social media was 
weaponised to spread campaigns built on falsehoods (Haffajee 2018). The 
work done by these local researchers highlights the beginnings of local 
capacity to identify and analyse government and non-state actors’ use of 
digital disinformation. 
The Government of South Africa has on occasion used ‘democratic listening’ 
processes to tap into the political concerns of the population. Democratic 
listening is often employed by governments as a rhetorical exercise 
undertaken for instrumental reasons to boost popularity when it is at a low 
ebb. But Sorensen et al. (2019) argue that such disingenuous claims risk 
dismissal and derision by increasingly cynical publics who are repeatedly 
subjected to governments’ misleading gestures. 
In 2015, the South African presidency embarked on a social media 
listening exercise in the weeks leading up to the state of the nation 
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address in response to accusations of corruption and lack of government 
responsiveness. The presidency invited contributions from the public on 
Twitter, asking users to make suggestions for what President Zuma should 
address in his speech. The public responded with more than a thousand 
messages directed at the presidency, disrupting the tightly controlled 
listening exercise, as citizens used the opportunity to conduct their own 
forum for public debate and commentary. Meanwhile, the president 
remained silent, giving no sign of having heard the public outcry.
Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Year Shift Implication
2001 32% mobile ownership increases to 89% by 
2011; a digital divide causes asymmetric 
access to the internet along race/class/
gender lines.
SMS (text messaging) and social media 
open new civic spaces online.
2005 RICA legislation grants state power to 
intercept email and mobile 
communications. 
Right to privacy reduced; chilling effect. 
2014 Civic tech expansion; Amandla.mobi and 
Grassroot launched.
New mobile internet tools added to 
repertoire for opening civic space.
2015 Cynical ‘democratic listening’ by 
government highjacked by citizen 
advocacy.




Citizen-led campaigns use social media 
to open new civic space.
2016 PR company Bell Pottinger’s campaign for 
Zuma funders the Guptas stokes racial 
tension and deploys Guptabots on social 
media.
Coordinated disinformation closes space 
for authentic dialogue in digital space.
2018 EFF launches disinformation campaigns 
online.
Disinformation increasingly drowns out 
deliberation.
2019 Ruling on legal challenge brought by media 
group amaBhungane finds that parts of 
RICA legislation are unconstitutional.
Opens civic space.
2020 Covid-19 powers are introduced that 
re-enable state surveillance.
Closing civic space.
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5. Digital rights landscape 
The political landscape in South Africa provides positive benefits for digital 
rights in the form of a rights-based constitution, and an established culture 
of civic activism and strategic litigation, to robustly contest breaches 
of human rights. South Africa also enjoys a relatively strong technical 
infrastructure capable of providing digital platforms for public deliberation 
and online democracy initiatives. Unlike in many other countries in the 
region, the Government of South Africa has not generally sought to limit 
civic space with laws or regulations, and has not resorted to internet 
shutdowns, or to arresting citizens, bloggers or journalists for expressing 
dissenting views online. 
However, access to the internet, smartphone ownership and affordable 
mobile data are not evenly distributed throughout the population. 
Therefore, the right to online freedom of opinion and expression, and to 
freedom of information, are also unequal. The government’s increased use 
of surveillance and intercept technology brings into question citizens’ right 
to privacy. There is currently a low level of civic literacy and civil society 
capability to effectively monitor and counter these measures, which shrink 
effective civic space and curtail digital rights.
Given the rapid expansion and proliferation of digital technologies to open 
and close civic space, current levels of digital literacy about disinformation, 
access to technology, and social media analytics capabilities are 
insufficient. Many CSOs operate with restricted technology and although 
mobile phone ownership has become affordable, data are still prohibitively 
expensive. Many CSOs are reliant on donated or entry-level computers 
and devices, and have very limited capacity when it comes to monitoring 
the online space. Despite the increase in the use of tech for civil society 
campaigns, and the rise of hashtag activism capacity for monitoring, 
the ability to analyse online activity and to respond strategically remains 
limited. For the most part, CSOs use digital technologies and social media 
in instrumental ways, without having the capability to effectively monitor 
and analyse digital activity and act strategically. 
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6. Digital rights in times of Covid-19 
In March 2020, President Ramaphosa announced a state of disaster and 
national lockdown to curb the spread of coronavirus (Covid-19). The majority 
of citizens, excluding essential workers, were confined to their homes, with 
all non-essential travel banned. The global Covid-19 pandemic highlighted 
existing digital inequalities in South Africa. Those with access to digital 
technologies have, for example, been able to arrange virtual and telephone 
medical consultations, or use online shopping, to avoid crowded waiting 
rooms and grocery stores (Ahmed 2020). Digital inequalities in e-learning 
have also become starkly apparent, with the closure of schools and 
subsequent move to homeschooling and online learning. Many teachers 
and students have been unable to afford the data – and sometimes lack 
the digital skills – required to sustain online learning activities. Data costs in 
South Africa are among the highest in the world, and are the most expensive 
in Africa (Business Insider SA 2020b).
The Government of South Africa has used the national state of disaster to 
grant itself broad powers to do what it considers necessary to save lives. This 
potentially includes the powers of surveillance it awarded itself with RICA, 
but which were ruled unconstitutional (outside of a state of disaster) by the 
High Court. The emergency regulations compel mobile cellular providers 
to disclose the locations of possible contacts who may be infected with 
coronavirus. When these regulations were first published in April, civil society 
contested central provisions of the legislation, and the government issued 
amendments to ease concerns around people’s constitutional right to 
privacy. They included locating the database within the health agency to 
reduce the ability of police or state security officials to access data for spying 
or political reasons (Wild 2020).
The government also used the opportunity to pass regulations that 
criminalised disinformation about the Covid-19 pandemic. The new 
regulations criminalise statements intended to deceive any person about 
Covid-19 or the government’s response to the pandemic. They carry 
penalties including fines, imprisonment or both (CPJ 2020).
The Covid-19 emergency legislation also extended new powers to the army, 
which was mobilised to enforce lockdown rules, resulting in a wide range of 
human rights abuses. Social media, including Facebook and Twitter, was 
used by citizen journalists to document police and soldiers kicking, slapping, 
whipping and shooting citizens, as well as forcing people into humiliating 
positions as ‘punishment’ for alleged lockdown violations. Three citizens 
died at the hands of the police in the first week of lockdown (Knoetze 2020). 
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South Africa’s independent media and civil society responded swiftly in an 
effort to defend rights and hold abusers accountable during lockdown (Faul 
2020). Civil society organisation #NotInMyName held several protests against 
police brutality, linking events in South Africa to the killing in the United States 
(US) of US citizen George Floyd, which took place around the same time and 
mobilised #BlackLivesMatter campaigning internationally.
The C19 People’s Coalition has been at the forefront of efforts to defend 
people’s rights during the Covid-19 response, and has led calls for human 
rights abusers – the police, army and the state – to be held accountable 
during the lockdown. The coalition is an alliance of more than 310 social 
movements, trade unions, community organisations and NGOs rooted in 
social justice and democratic principles. C19 relies primarily on digital tools to 
create civic space to highlight abuse and demand justice; and provide legal 
advice and support to victims including a digital legal guide, The Law During 
a State of Disaster and Human Rights Risks, under its Legal Activism working 
group (C19 2020). 
Technology is a major part of South Africa’s Covid-19 strategy, further raising 
key issues with respect to surveillance. The Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research uses a system that combines data from mobile phones, health 
records and government data sets. If an individual has been infected, health 
authorities receive an alert with the individual’s contact information and an 
address, and begin tracing those who have recently been in close contact 
with the person (Wild 2020). In South Africa, a partnership between telecoms 
companies Telkom and Samsung resulted in the donation of 1,500 handsets 
(and free data) to allow trackers to identify infected people around the 
country (Chaturvedi 2020). 
The government has also used the messaging platform WhatsApp to deliver 
information about the pandemic to millions of citizens in five languages; and 
created a WhatsApp helpline, which is updated with information from the 
latest World Health Organization briefings, and local and international news 
outlets, to provide real-time updates. It uses artificial intelligence to provide 
information as well as dispel misinformation (South African Government News 
Agency 2020). In September 2020, the government introduced a Covid-19 
tracing app, which was zero rated (i.e. free to use) by mobile networks. The 
app uses Bluetooth technology to alert users if they have been in contact 
with any other users who subscribe to the app who have tested positive for 
Covid-19 within the past 14 days (Business Insider SA 2020a).
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7. Conclusion and recommendations 
South Africa has existing strengths in rights-based and digital campaigning, 
and has experience of researching digital disinformation by non-state 
actors. This is a stronger starting position than many of its neighbours. 
However, the rapid pace of technological change, and rapidly growing 
repertoire of state and private sector technologies being deployed to close 
civic space, mean that urgent action needs to be taken. On the basis of this 
preliminary analysis a number of recommendations arise: 
– Work with citizens to raise public awareness about digital rights and 
emerging threats including disinformation and online manipulation.
– Work with CSOs to build the capacity of journalists, CSOs and 
universities to monitor, analyse and effectively respond to the use of 
digital technologies to close civic space and limit digital rights.
– Work with legal rights activists and policymakers to 
understand emerging threats and devise regulatory, 
legislative and strategic litigation responses.
– Work with researchers to better understand who is using which 
technologies to open and close civic space, and how best to enhance 
citizens’ ability to express, defend and expand their digital rights.
A programme of engaged participatory action research with and by 
with citizens and CSOs would be the best way to answer these research 
questions and address the gaps in knowledge and capacity identified in this 
preliminary research.
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1. Introduction
Nigeria has witnessed a high level of adoption of digital devices and 
technologies in the past 20 years. Adoption of those new technologies has 
brought transformations to different aspects of life at the individual, group, 
and societal levels. Those transformations are easily observable in the civic 
space. What used to be private has become public and connectedness, 
especially via mobile telephony and social media, which now appear 
commonplace, were at best only imagined until recently. Thanks to digital 
technologies, voiceless sections of Nigerian society such as women, 
minority groups, and victims of violence now have a voice, which can be 
amplified to the extent to which they can adopt and manipulate these 
technologies. Political corruption has also become voiced through these 
technological advancements.
The disruption caused by digital technologies has also invited new laws, 
particularly from the Federal Government of Nigeria and its ministries 
and agencies: the government institutions that were not used to citizens 
demanding accountability from them (Bischoff 2020). All of this is happening 
at a time when the civic space globally has been found to be shrinking 
or closing. The same fate that befell Nigerian civic space in the pre-
democracy era of military dictatorship is fast befalling it again in the current 
democratic dispensation, and its effects are extending from physical spaces 
into digital ones.
The civic space, which is described as ‘the layer between state, business, 
and family in which citizens organise, debate and act’ (Buyse 2018: 967) 
is said to be shrinking or closing when there are restrictions placed on 
the activities of civic actors. The restrictions, which mainly come from 
governments, may be executed through different strategies such as 
‘political, administrative and extra-legal, including violence, threats, 
de-legitimation, the use of the law to criminalise civic activism, and 
stigmatisation’ (Hossain et al. 2019: 6). The restrictions are characterised 
by denial of right of access to spaces where people express views and 
opinions that appear to be critical of governments, and criminalisation 
of actions directed at demanding accountability from constituted 
authorities. In the last 20 years, just as the civic space has extended 
from geographical spaces to cover digital spaces, so have attacks on it, 
especially from governments.
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In recognition of digital spaces as an extension of the physical civic space, 
governments have introduced legislations which are capable of abridging 
right of access to them as they do with geographical spaces. Protest 
mobilisation, actual protests, and other forms of civic action have been 
organised on digital platforms across the world, in democratic and non-
democratic countries alike. In Nigeria, the first nationwide online protest so 
far with complementary offline protest took place on 2 January 2012, when 
individuals and groups from all the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory 
trended the hashtag #OccupyNigeria on Twitter and other social media 
(Uwalaka and Watkins 2018). The protest, which was mobilised significantly 
online, led to the shutdown of state capitals and major towns in the demand 
for the reversal of fuel subsidy removal.
Since #OccupyNigeria, online protests have become common in Nigeria. 
Global connectivity and the rapidness with which information flows on 
digital platforms especially, pitches governments against the use of digital 
platforms for civic action such as protests. Just like the Nigerian government 
has been doing in the past few years, most governments across the world 
have been found to have taken specific actions to stifle free speech or 
abridge rights to freedom of association in the digital space (Bischoff 2020). 
In Nigeria, civil society groups and citizens have always risen up against such 
measures that restrict digital rights by using the same digital technologies. 
Despite continuous advocacy for civil rights, violations of digital rights are 
growing in Nigeria.
In the internet era, digital rights are described as human rights, an extension 
of the equal and inalienable rights of humans (Hutt 2015). The Human Rights 
Council of the United Nations (2016: 3) declares that:
the same rights that people have offline must also be protected 
online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable 
regardless of frontiers and through any media of one’s choice, in 
accordance with articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This report presents an overview of digital rights in Nigeria with a view to 
highlighting the contextual realities that promote or constrain those rights.
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2. The political landscape
The date of 29 May 2020 marks 21 years since Nigeria returned to 
democratic rule. The political context of the country has seen a lot 
of positive transformations, the most outstanding of them being that 
there has not been any extra-legal disruption to the four-year tenure of 
political office holders at the federal and state levels. Periodic election, 
which is a core element of democracy, has been upheld every four years. 
This stability has made political parties the primary formal machinery 
for seeking and acquiring political power in the country. This political 
development is unfolding at a time when access to the internet and 
adoption of diverse digital technologies are also growing. Different 
sections of Nigerian society have adopted digital technologies for 
different purposes: the government for general governance, information 
dissemination, and election administration; politicians and political 
parties for political mobilisation; and civil society groups and citizens for 
civic action, among other uses.
However, what has been most defining in Nigeria’s political landscape 
is the adoption of digital technologies for election administration and 
management. This has so far had numerous implications for digital rights 
in Nigeria. Digital technology was first widely used in Nigerian elections in 
2015. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) issued the 
electorate the Permanent Voter’s Card which is to be authenticated on 
election day using a biometric smart card reader. However, on election 
days, the technology malfunctioned in many places and election officials 
had to resort to manual accreditation and voting procedures. There were 
claims and counterclaims of deliberate sabotage of the technology to 
rig the elections in favour of the dominant parties. The battle was intense 
on social media between the supporters of the All Progressive Congress 
(APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Former President Goodluck 
Jonathan lost the election which was won by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, 
who also won a re-election in 2019.
Since the 2015 elections, the civic space in Nigeria has been polarised 
with supporters of former President Goodluck Jonathan and his PDP on 
the one side and supporters of the current President Muhammadu Buhari 
on the other side. The supporters of the former are branded in social 
media platforms and media discourse in general as ‘wailers’ while those 
of the former are christened ‘hailers’ (Ibrahim 2015). This simplistic typology 
of actors in the civic space, which was introduced into public discourse 
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by Femi Adesina, Special Adviser to President Muhammadu Buhari on 
Media and Publicity, summed up all views critical of the government as 
being politically motivated. In other words, to criticise the actions of the 
current government or to demand accountability from it is to be seen and 
treated as a member of the opposition party PDP. The typology regards 
all civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), faith-based organisations (FBOs), media organisations such as 
newspapers, television, radio, and blogs, and even individuals that are 
critical of government, as not just being against the government but 
also in support of the ex-ruling party. This polarisation has been defining 
for Nigerian civic space since 2015 when President Muhammadu Buhari 
assumed office.
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3. The civic space landscape
The chaos that characterised the Nigerian political context always spills over 
into the civic space. In fact, Nigeria’s return to democracy was not achieved 
without the activities of vibrant civil society groups, individual activists, and 
public intellectuals, radio, newspapers, and news magazines that stood up 
to the country’s military dictators. The period between the cancellation of 
the 12 June 1993 presidential election allegedly won by Chief MKO Abiola and 
the eventual military handover to the civilian government on 29 May 1999 
witnessed different shades of civic activism in the country.
For example, in 1993, Tell Magazine launched guerrilla journalistic reporting 
after its publications were seized and its premises shut by the tyrannical 
military government of General Sani Abacha for exposing government 
secrets and calling global attention to violations of human rights in the 
country (Ojebode 2011). That same year, four of Tell’s senior editors were 
arrested and detained by the government (ibid.). Activists and opposition 
politicians were arrested for treason and detained for months without trial 
even after the court dismissed the case (Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada 1997). The period was characterised by the arrest, imprisonment, 
murder, and disappearances of those who spoke against the inhumanity of 
military rule in the country. Nevertheless, the end of military rule did not end 
such occurrences. The rest of this section presents a highlight of landmark 
events which had implications for the closing and opening of Nigerian civic 
space between 2000 and 2020. Throughout this time, Nigeria’s ranking 
on Freedom House’s Freedom Index has hovered within the ‘partially free’ 
bracket as civic space experiences a seesaw between events that partially 
open and close civic space (see Figure 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Opening of the civic space
Year Shift Implications
2004 Emergence of 234Next, the country’s first online 
newspaper
Opening of space for journalists
2005 Arrest, imprisonment, and assassination of 
bloggers and journalists
Closing of space for bloggers and journalists
2010 Emergence of civil society groups leveraging 
digital technologies to empower citizens and 
demand accountability from government
Opening of space for civic society groups
2014 Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act Closing of space for LGBTI and other sexually non-
binary individuals and groups
2015 Licensing of first set of community radio 
stations
Opening of space for especially rural and 
underserved community dwellers
Frivolous Petitions Bill rejected Induced fear of imminent closing of space for 
journalists, bloggers, and social media users
Arrest of activists Closing of space for human rights activists
Emergence of a woman-led KOWA Party Opening for women politicians





Rejection of Gender and Equal Opportunities 
Bill by the Senate




NGO Regulation Bill, still under consideration 
before the Legislature
Closing for CSOs, NGOs, and FBOs
2017 Increased number of government-owned and 
private FM radio stations
Opening of space for journalists and media 
consumers
2019 Open Treasury Portal providing online access 
to expenses incurred by government ministries, 
departments, and agencies
Opening of space for civil society groups working on 
public accountability
Nigeria Data Protection Regulation Opening of space and protection from privacy 
violation for journalists, bloggers, CSOs, NGOs, and all 
users of social and other digital media platforms
Hate Speech Bill Closing of space for journalists, bloggers, CSOs, 
NGOs, and all users of social and other digital media 
platforms
Protection from Internet Falsehoods and 
Manipulations and Other Related Matters Bill
Closing of space for journalists, bloggers, activists, 
CSOs, NGOs, and all users of social and other digital 
media platforms 
Digital Rights Bill – presidential assent withheld Closing of space for journalists, bloggers, CSOs, NGOs, 
and all users of social and other digital media platforms
2020 Proposed licensing of online radio and television Closing of space for journalists
Corporate and Allied Matters Act 2020 
empowers government agencies to reconstitute 
board of trustees of CSOs, NGOs, and FBOs
Closing of space for CSOs, NGOs, and FBOs
Source: Author’s own.
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Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN 
countries, 2000–191
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
The information presented in Table 3.1 reveals that events and decisions 
that can open the Nigerian civic space and those that can further close 
it have been happening concurrently over the years. It is striking to note 
that the media landscape has become diverse and has widened to reach 
previously underserved sections of the country. With the commencement 
of community radio licensing, rural communities have gained access to 
information and the right to be creators of media content. An increased rate 
of licensing government-owned and commercial FM radio stations also has 
improved radio penetration across the country. All of these, coupled with the 
emergence of online newspapers, radio, and television, pluralise the country’s 
information landscape, providing people with alternative information 
sources. As the media and journalism space widens for journalists to practise 
in, it also opens for citizens to consume and co-create information.
Despite that, certain actions of government are either closing or threatening 
to close the Nigerian media space and the civic space in general. Of 
particular interest among such actions is legislations (Ibezim-Ohaeri 
2017) which are capable of stifling free speech, especially on digital 
1 Data not available for 2010 and 2012.











Free Partially free Not free
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communication technologies. For example, the Protection from Internet 
Falsehoods and Manipulation and Other Related Matters Bill (2019)2 
criminalises sharing information that can diminish public confidence in the 
performance of any duty or function of, or in the exercise of any power of, the 
Nigerian government. This is a problematic provision whose lack of specificity 
can be taken advantage of to silence voices that are critical of government.
The same bill also criminalises the operation of parody accounts on social 
media and stipulates a fine and/or a prison term for its violation. In spite 
of the fact that the bill has not been passed into law, the Nigerian police 
arrested Babatunde Olusola, a Nigerian university student, for operating 
on Twitter a parody account in the name of former President Goodluck 
Jonathan (Akinkuotu 2020). The bill poses a danger to activists that may 
employ creative devices for communicating their critique of government. The 
Hate Speech Bill (2019) also prescribes a life sentence or a death sentence 
for propagating hate speech (Abdulrauf 2019). Journalists from media 
companies that are perceived to be in opposition to the government are 
at greater risk of falling victim to the provisions of these legislations. For 
example, Nigeria’s Department of State Services (DSS) arrested a student 
journalist Ayoola Babalola for criticising President Muhammadu Buhari and 
another member of the ruling All Progressive Congress (APC), Bola Tinubu. The 
court later granted him bail on a bond of N150,000 (Sahara Reporters 2020). 
Activists and CSOs that are often critical of government are equally at risk. 
The chilling effects of legislations such as these ones are capable of closing 
the civic space.
Furthermore, women and sexually non-binary people are potential victims 
because policymakers guard the country’s hegemonic positions on issues 
of gender and sex. The Nigerian Senate’s rejection of the Gender and Equal 
Opportunities Bill (2016) is a setback to the campaign for gender equality 
in the country. Analysts consider 2015 to be the inception of the worst era 
for civic actors in Nigeria since the end of military rule in 1999, in terms of 
government restriction of rights (Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). As reflected in the 
information presented in Table 3.1, more restrictive laws were introduced 
between 2015 and 2020 than in the preceding 15 years. The year 2015 is 
significant because it marked the ascension to power of former military 
dictator Muhammadu Buhari as a democratic president of Nigeria. From the 
trend established in Table 3.1, Nigerian civic space under the leadership of 
President Muhammadu Buhari cannot be said to be thriving as it should in an 
ideal democracy.
2 See Protection from Internet Falsehoods and Manipulation and Other Related Matters Bill 2019, 
SB 132, 9th National Assembly.
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4. The technology landscape
Nigeria has witnessed a great deal of technological transformation in the 
last 20 years. The most fundamental of them is the introduction of Global 
System for Mobile (GSM) communication in 2001. In the last two decades, the 
number of mobile network service providers has increased, just as their range 
of services has. All service providers offer call, text, and internet services and 
the majority of Nigerians access the internet on their mobile phones. The 
quality of internet service in the country varies based on service provider and 
user location. By 2019, all operating mobile network service providers have 
upgraded their services from 2G and 3G to 4G. Table 4.1 provides an overview 
of mobile telephone penetration in the last 20 years.




2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 (May)
Number of subscribers 2,271,050 19,519,154 88,348,026 151,017,244 192,267,890
Percentage increase (%) 0 759.5 352.6 70.9 27.3
Teledensity3 1.89 16.27 63.11 107.87 100.72
Source: NCC.4
One year after the inception of GSM in Nigeria, in 2002, there were less than 
2.3 million subscribers. Four years later, in 2004, the number of subscribers 
has increased more than seven times. The percentage increase predictably 
slowed down by 2015 because more people had already subscribed to the 
service. It is also noteworthy that compulsory Subscriber Identity Module 
(SIM) card registration began in 2015. This registration could also have 
played a role in the observed trend. As of May 2020, there are over 192 million 
subscribers in the country. Internet subscribers have also been increasing in 
the last 20 years.
3 Teledensity was calculated based on a population estimate of 126 million up to December 2005; 
from December 2006, teledensity was based on a population estimate of 140 million; from 
December 2007 it was based on active subscribers; from December 2001 to 2006, it was based on 
connected subscribers. 
4 See Nigerian Communications Commission Industry Statistics: Annual (2002–19).
155Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Nigeria Digital Rights Landscape Report
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Oyewole Oladapo and Ayo Ojebode © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.011
Table 4.2 Mobile (GSM) internet subscribers
Date Internet subscribers New subscribers Percentage increase (%)
December 2012 30,939,112 0  
December 2013 64,229,097 33,289,985 107.6
December 2014 76,324,632 12,095,535 18.8
December 2015 97,032,543 20,707,911 27.1
December 2016 91,880,032 -5,152,511 -5.3
December 2017 98,391,456 6,511,424 7.1
December 2018 111,632,516 13,241,060 13.5
December 2019 125,728,328 14,095,812 12.6
May 2020 140,761,851 15,033,523 12
Source: NCC.5
The number of internet subscribers has also been increasing in the last 20 
years. It was only in 2016 when the Nigerian economy was in recession that 
the country recorded a decrease in the number of internet subscribers. As 
of May 2020, there are over 140 million internet subscribers in Nigeria and 
broadband penetration has also been increasing in the last 20 years.
Table 4.3 Internet broadband services in Nigeria
Date January 2017 January 2018 January 2019 January 2020
Number of subscriptions 41,403,821 38,117,147 61,732,130 73,466,093
Source: NCC.6
Internet broadband penetration is slower than the general internet 
penetration rate.
5 See Nigerian Communications Commission Industry Statistics: Annual (2002–19).
6 See Nigerian Communications Commission Industry Statistics: Annual (2002–19).
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Nigeria
Source: Based on data from ITU (2020)
The number of internet users in Nigeria as presented by ITU is far lower than 
given by the country’s communications body, the Nigerian Communications 
Commission (NCC – see Table 4.2). This is understandable because NCC data 
are based on telecommunications services subscribers. As a result, the data 
do not exclude cases of multiple subscriptions by individuals – a common 
practice in Nigeria – and neither do they account for business and corporate 
subscribers. ITU data are modelled based on individuals using the internet 
and thus give a more realistic picture of internet penetration in the country. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, individual internet users in Nigeria rose from 0.064 per cent 
of the population in 2000, to 11.5 per cent in 2010, and to 42 per cent in 2019. 
Therefore, although approximately 60 per cent of Nigerians remained without 
internet access in 2019, one could say that it has been a near-steady climb.
4.1 Social media use in Nigeria
Nigerians across age, sex, and literacy level use social media for different 
purposes. However, the use of social media for civic action is popular in 
Nigeria. Facebook, established in 2004, was the first social media platform 
that became popular in Nigeria. When Twitter was established in 2006, 
Nigerians also adopted it in large numbers. While some migrated completely 
to Twitter, some keep both Facebook and Twitter accounts. It is common 
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other platforms that were introduced later have also seen Nigerians open 
accounts on them in large numbers. Nevertheless, Twitter and Facebook 
remain the foremost social media platforms in use. According to Statista.com, 
Nigeria’s social media users totalled 27.6 million in 2017, 29.3 million in 2018, an 
estimated 30.9 million in 2019, and an estimated 32.4 million in 2020 (Statista 
2020). Simon Kemp’s DataReportal, which puts total social media users in the 
country at 27 million, states that there was an increase of 3.4 million between 
2019 and 2020 with a 13 per cent penetration (Kemp 2020).
Individuals and groups in Nigeria have come to depend on social media 
for public engagement. The development is not out of place as Nigerian 
political leaders have also become largely visible on the various social media 
platforms. Facebook, with a 59.57 per cent penetration of the country’s total 
internet users, ranks first among the social media platforms that Nigerians use 
for public discourse. It is followed by Twitter with a 24.54 per cent penetration of 
internet users (GlobalStats 2020). Both Facebook and Twitter have contributed 
significantly to the opening of online civic spaces in Nigeria. Users have always 
been on alert to protest any attempt by the government to restrict access to 
the platforms or to silence critical voices. Between 2012, when #OccupyNigeria 
trended on Twitter and Facebook, to the present, offline protests have 
become risky as a result of the frequent police brutalisation of protesters. 
Nigerians have taken to social media as alternative platforms for voicing their 
dissatisfaction with the government and for demanding accountability.
One advantage that online civic action has over offline is the immediacy 
of global attention to it without a dependence on the mainstream media. 
Nigerians have attracted global attention to local issues on a number of 
occasions. Hashtag trending is one of the major strategies employed to 
pursue their causes. Some of the popular hashtags are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 Key digital hashtag campaigns and actors
Year Hashtag Actor
2012 #OccupyNigeria Opposition politicians, celebrities, and activists 
2014 #BringBackOurGirls Bring Back Our Girls movement
2015, 2019 #NoToSocialMediaBill Social media influencers 
2017 #ENDSARS Social media influencers 
2019 #SexForGrade BBC, social media influencers 
2019–2020 #Buharimustgo Social media activists
Source: Authors’ own.
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Led by opposition politicians, celebrities, and activists, #OccupyNigeria was 
a hashtag that trended in 2012 to mobilise the public against an increase 
in fuel prices by the government. The movement later brought people onto 
the streets, resulting in the complete shutdown of important cities across the 
country. #BringBackOurGirls called attention to the 2014 abduction of over 
200 Chibok girls abducted by Boko Haram terrorists in Northern Nigeria.
The #NoToSocialMediaBill hashtag trended in 2015 (Oladapo and Ojebuyi 
2017) and again in 2019 to protest bills that sought to criminalise social media 
use for critical political commentary in the country. #ENDSARS has been 
trending since 2017 to call government attention to the abuse of power by 
members of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad of the Nigeria Police. The BBC 
was behind the #SexForGrade hashtag with a documentary which exposed 
the sexual exploitation of students of Nigerian and Ghanaian universities 
for grades. The documentary drew attention to the plights of women in a 
Nigerian higher institution of learning where sexual predatory behaviour was 
common (Malaea 2019).
4.2 The government’s capacity to respond
There have been speculations that the Nigerian government planned 
to launch spy satellites, block websites and blogs that are critical of 
the government and its performance, and place mobile phones under 
surveillance (Okunoye 2017). Beyond the speculations, in 2013, the Nigerian 
government under President Goodluck Jonathan contracted an Israeli 
company, Elbit Systems, for US$40 million to monitor online communication 
in the country (Ogala 2013). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
which describes Nigeria as an electoral autocracy, states that the Nigerian 
government uses artificial intelligence technology from China’s Huawei tech 
giant to monitor citizens (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2020).
The foregoing revelations reveal that the Nigerian government has for a long 
time been developing surveillance capacity which can undermine citizens’ 
fundamental rights. Although Section 3.3 of the Nigerian Communications 
Commission’s (NCC) Internet Code of Practice specifically directs that 
no service provider can block internet access to contents, devices, and 
applications that are lawful except for the purpose of network management 
(NCC 2019a), no one can be too sure how long the government will respect 
this provision given its increasing appetite for citizen surveillance.
Meanwhile, as a counterinsurgency strategy, the Nigerian Army in 2013 shut 
down GSM services in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, the three states that 
were most affected by Boko Haram terrorism (Jacob and Akpan 2015). This 
suggests that the government can exploit the state of unrest around the 
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country to implement this kind of shutdown nationwide if it serves its purpose. 
Also, Nigerians cannot be too sure that the government will not subject 
social media use in the country to overt surveillance and strict regulation. 
The position of the country’s communications regulatory body is revealing 
in this regard. The NCC recommends that organisations should install social 
media monitoring devices or set up a monitoring team to avoid being 
implicated by the social media activities of their employees (NCC 2019c). 
This recommendation subtly reveals the stance of the NCC as positively 
disposed to social media monitoring. It could be argued that at the call of 
a government with a similar agenda, the NCC would not hesitate to deploy 
surveillance technology to monitor the public use of social media.
Furthermore, the Nigerian government has taken other decisions that have 
implications for the digital rights of citizens. One of them is SIM registration. 
All subscribers were directed to register their SIM card by the 30 June 2013 
deadline and new SIM cards only become usable upon registration (NCC 
2019b). Also, all old lines that were not registered by the stated date were 
deactivated. In addition, in 2015, the NCC directed that network service 
providers should deactivate all pre-registered SIM cards (ibid.). The latest 
directive on SIM card registration in 2020 makes National Identification 
Numbers (NINs) a mandatory requirement. The directive is likely to restrict 
access to mobile telephone networks in Nigeria as NIN registration services 
are not easily accessible (Kolawole 2020).
SIM registration raises data privacy concerns as the NCC is empowered 
to share subscriber data with security agencies (Olowogboyega 2020). 
Popular social media sites require mobile numbers for registration and SIM 
registration makes it all too easy for security agencies to track activists and 
anyone perceived to be anti-government. The NCC also allows GSM service 
providers to reissue mobile numbers after a period of inactivity. The practice 
resulted in Anthony Okolie spending ten weeks in prison for purchasing a SIM 
card which was previously used by Hanan, President Muhammadu Buhari’s 
daughter (Sahara Reporters 2020). The privacy danger in this practice is high, 
as buying a reissued SIM card may give the buyer access to the contacts of 
the previous users who may still call the number, and to banking and other 
vital information linked to the SIM card.
It was also alleged that in 2017 President Muhammadu Buhari established 
a troll firm named the Buhari Media Centre (BMC), which later changed 
its name several times (Adebulu 2020). The trolls at the firm are said to be 
employed to attack the president’s opponents through fake social media 
accounts. Prior to the 2019 presidential election as well, the Buhari Media 
Organisation, which is in fact the Buhari Media Centre, accused the PDP 
presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar of contracting an American lobbyist 
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Brian Ballard for US$90,000 a month to propagate fake news about the 
APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari (The Cable 2018). Also in 2018, it was 
revealed that Cambridge Analytica meddled in Nigeria’s 2015 presidential 
election to increase the winning chances of the then incumbent President 
Goodluck Jonathan (Ekdale and Tully 2020). All these point to the fact that 
the Nigerian government has been experimenting with technologies that 
are capable of monitoring the activities of citizens online and accessing 
their data without consent.
The BMC is also alleged to be behind pro-government hashtags that 
are trended to counter any hashtag that is critical of the government. An 
instance was the #ReturnOurGirls hashtag that trended counter to the 
#BringBackOurGirls hashtag (Aina et al. 2019). The goal of the counter-
hashtag was to show that the BBOG movement was wrong to demand 
that the government secure the release of the abducted schoolgirls. Rather, 
activists were asked to redirect their demand to the terrorists to return 
the girls they had abducted (ibid.). Nevertheless, the greatest threat to 
Nigerian civic space appears to be from restrictive anti-freedom legislations 
(Ibezim-Ohaeri 2017). Nigeria has some laws and bills being considered for 
law which pose a danger to the rights of freedom of speech, expression, 
and association, both offline and online. Among those legislations are the 
Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act 2013; the Cybercrime Act 2015; the NGO 
Regulation Bill 2016, which was revisited in 2019; the Protection from Internet 
Falsehoods and Manipulations and Other Related Matters Bill 2019; and the 
Hate Speech Bill 2019.7 Should all these bills pass into law, they are capable of 
rolling back all the gains the country has made in terms of the contributions 
of digital actions to the strengthening of democratic institutions.
7 See Federal Republic of Nigeria National Assembly Bill Tracker.
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5. Technology assessment
Since digital rights exist on digital technologies, technology capabilities define 
the extent to which those rights can be exercised and protected. As noted earlier, 
digital technologies have facilitated an overlap of spaces with the interests of 
the state (government), civil society, and individuals intersecting, converging, and 
diverging at different times. When those interests conflict, each party will be able 
to protect its interests to the extent that it can manipulate the technologies or 
defend itself from the manipulation carried out by other parties. The government 
appears to be at an advantage over others in terms of its enormous power to 
regulate the activities of individuals and civil society groups. It may be argued that 
the Nigerian government has a history of abusing its power, and thus individuals 
and civil society groups have constantly put the government under check.
As a way of checking the excesses of government, Nigerian civil society 
groups concentrate on efforts to ensure that citizens are empowered to 
hold government officials accountable. Foremost CSOs in Nigeria that are 
concerned about digital rights include BudgIT, Paradigm Initiative, Enough 
is Enough (EiE) Nigeria, and Dubawa. BudgIT has a platform for monitoring: 
budget implementation (Budget Access8); government project implementation 
(Tracka9); utilisation of Covid-19 funds (CovidFund Track10); and natural 
resources extraction (Extractives11). EiE Nigeria12 promotes good governance 
and citizen engagement in governance and political processes while Paradigm 
Initiative13 engages in digital rights advocacy. Dubawa14 builds the capacity of 
journalists and other interested individuals to fact-check information online.
These actors appear to have enormous capacities to respond to most of the 
challenges posed by the contentious nature of Nigerian politics. For example, 
Dubawa and other digital fact-checking bodies are always quick to verify 
claims made by government officials and other social actors. BudgIT and EiE 
Nigeria are always ready to enlighten citizens on why they should demand 
accountability. BudgIT goes as far as analysing budgets to detect cases of 
inconsistency and tracking implementation. Besides their websites, all the 
organisations utilise social media extensively for engagement, especially Twitter 
and Facebook, and convene occasional offline events. They appear to have 
a mastery of the technology and have attracted large followings on different 
platforms. Also, the organisations appear to have standard digital security 
8 See BudgIT.
9 See Tracka.
10 See Civic Hive.
11 See Fix Our Oil.
12 See EiE Nigeria.
13 See Paradigm Initiative.
14 See Dubawa.
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measures in place. At no point did any of them report a case of hacking or 
important data loss. Attempts to undermine their digital security cannot be 
ruled out as their work is always critical of government at different levels.
CSOs and individual Nigerians utilise a wide range of off-the-shelf 
applications for gathering data. CSOs at times do develop and customise 
data-mining software to address their specific needs. Nevertheless, an 
obvious gap exists in their ability to respond to a case of internet shutdown 
should it happen in Nigeria. Nigerian digital actors depend mostly on 
consultation and formal requests, hashtag trending, online protests and 
petitions, and legal procedures to hold the government accountable. With 
the Covid-19 lockdown measures fully implemented in Abuja, the country’s 
capital, where the headquarters of government ministries, departments, 
and agencies are located, traditional access to government information 
became constrained. Only digital access remained open.
Table 5.1 Technology assessment
Existing 
capacity




















Analytics (likely)Refined data-mining skillsets 




Manual scrape  
 Qualitative analysis 
Source: Authors’ own.
The information presented in Table 5.1 reveals that there is a general lack 
of knowledge about the technologies that are being used by the state to 
abridge digital rights and by non-state actors to protect these rights. It also 
reveals that the government is far ahead of the country’s civil society in the 
deployment of technologies. As a result, civil society actors most likely lack 
the technological capacity to put government activities under watch. To 
measure up, CSOs will need to upgrade their technologies as well. They will 
be more effective in protecting the digital rights of Nigerians if they have 
superior technologies that can detect government surveillance and protect 
themselves and others from it.
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6. The digital rights landscape
The state of digital rights in Nigeria is defined by uncertainty with presidential 
assent withheld from the Digital Rights and Freedom Bill (2019)15 already passed 
by the National Assembly. The current government of President Muhammadu 
Buhari does not disguise its animosity to digital rights and freedom with 
its support for legislations that are capable of abridging those rights. The 
legislations in this category, as presented in Table 3.1, include the Hate Speech 
Bill (2019) and the Protection from Internet Falsehoods and Manipulations and 
Other Related Matters Bill (2019). All of these, coupled with the government’s 
use of Chinese AI technology for monitoring activities on digital platforms and 
devices, and a history of military shutdown of GSM services as counterinsurgency 
strategy, suggests that there is a lot to worry about with regard to digital 
rights in Nigeria. Confirming these ominous signals, CIVICUS downgraded the 
state of Nigeria’s civic space from obstructed to repressed (CIVICUS 2019). 
This means that Nigeria’s civic space is just one step from becoming closed, 
a situation that can only be imagined under a democratic government.
6.1 Digital rights in the time of the Covid-19 pandemic
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought a lot of change to personal and public 
life in Nigeria. The most fundamental was the government lockdown of entire 
states and a restriction on inter-state movement except for essential services. 
Despite this emergency situation in which the government made binding 
pronouncements to abridge citizens’ rights, the Nigerian government did 
not make any attempt to restrict internet use during this period. Government 
responses to the explosion of fake news and conspiracy theories about 
Covid-19 were limited to advisories about fact-checking and seeking 
information only from trustworthy sources.
Nevertheless, the Control of Infectious Diseases Bill 2020 introduced in 
the Federal House of Representatives contains some injurious provisions. 
For instance, it empowers the Director General of the National Centre for 
Diseases Control (NCDC) to forcefully access and seize information based on 
personal judgement (Onaleye 2020). This provision puts journalists and others 
in possession of vital information at risk (Chinda 2020). A similar bill titled the 
National Health Emergency Bill 2020 introduced in the Senate also grants far-
reaching powers to government agents at the expense of the citizens (Umoru 
2020). The two bills are still before the National Assembly for consideration. Again, 
all of this suggests that the Nigerian government is ready to take advantage 
of an emergency situation such as the Covid-19 pandemic to undermine 
fundamental rights, especially those that thrive on digital technologies.
15 See Digital Rights and Freedom Bill, 2019.
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7. Conclusion and recommendations
For many years, the political space in Nigeria has generated conflicts whose 
ripples polarise the civic space. The government in power has often taken 
advantage of this polarisation to propose legislations which summarily 
categorise all views that are critical of it as hate speech punishable by fines, or 
life or death sentences. These legislations have been a source of fear to users 
of digital technologies for civic actions. The situation is worse for CSOs, NGOs, 
FBOs, media organisations, and activists that are critical of the government 
because the government is far ahead of them in terms of technology 
capabilities. With the government’s AI surveillance technology, it can pry into 
what those civil actors do on digital platforms and deploy legislations against 
them. All of this indicates that Nigeria’s repressed civic space is not far from 
outright closing.
Therefore, the future of digital rights in Nigeria hangs mostly on efforts to 
discourage politicians’ penchant for anti-freedom laws. The existing laws in 
Nigeria are enough to discourage civic actions online while the proposed ones 
are even more ominous. Should those bills be passed into law, digital rights in 
Nigeria will be negatively affected. To forestall such development, individuals 
and groups working on or interested in digital rights need to make the 
discourse a prominent part of the political process, such that the protection of 
digital rights becomes prominent on the political agenda.
In addition, civic actors in Nigeria need to develop urgent technology 
capabilities to withstand the government surveillance of digital platforms. 
Since Nigeria’s Data Protection Regulation (2019)16 forbids unauthorised access 
to personal and organisational data, the right of the Nigerian government to 
deploy AI technology to monitor digital platforms is unknown to law. Nigerian 
civic actors need urgent knowledge of anti-surveillance technology if digital 
rights are to continue to thrive in the country. Also, further research into the 
national security implications of digital technology use in Nigeria is of utmost 
importance. The findings of such research can uncover positive alternatives 
to restrictive legislations as measures for ensuring the positive use of digital 
technologies. They can also inform policies that will preserve digital rights 
without compromising national security.
16 See Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019, National Information Technology Development Agency. 
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1. Introduction
This report covers political and social developments in Kenya and connects 
them to the situation in the technological sector, with the aim of identifying 
opportunities to protect digital and civil rights. Kenya is a notable case of 
digital uptake in the global South, with a startling increase beginning in 
2007, making it one of the most digitally connected countries in Africa. Until 
discoveries of oil and titanium in the 2000s, the country did not have any 
notable natural resources and the economy depended on tourism and 
agriculture. After post-election violence in 2007, Kenya witnessed a dramatic 
uptake in digital services, including the development of mobile money and 
other platforms for transport, fintech,1 tax services and so on, which resulted 
in an explosion in the digital sector. 
Moreover, digital technology has been a major part of politics in Kenya 
since 2007. The so-called ‘Silicon Savannah’ is today a frontrunner in many 
aspects. It is a world leader in mobile money use (The Economist 2015) 
and the second-largest fintech market in Africa; and holding the second 
digital election in Africa, among others (Ernst & Young 2019). In 2017, Kenya 
conducted a much celebrated but ultimately disappointing fully digital 
election. Digital platforms are increasingly a part of public life in Kenya, in 
part because of deliberate efforts by the government, but also because of 
organic uptake by citizens, nudged by political and social developments 
(Nyabola 2018). By 2019, the country had a mobile penetration rate of 88 
per cent, with most people connecting through their phones. In 2017, the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics reported that internet subscription rates 
grew from 29.6 per cent to 41.1 per cent in the same year (Communications 
Authority 2018). 
In fact, the Kenyan government has so far failed to create an adequate 
policy and legislative framework, particularly around privacy, digital 
identities and general regulation. Policymaking remains a haphazard affair 
and the state remains on a constant collision course with activists and 
citizens’ rights groups. Laws passed to regulate online risks are routinely used 
to silence critics. 
In 2018, for example, the Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE) successfully 
sued to suspend 25 provisions of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act 
(2018) because it was unconstitutional (CIPESA 2018). The court concurred 
that the suspended provisions ‘contravened constitutional provisions on 
freedom of opinion, expression, the media, security of the person, the right to 
1 Fintech: financial technology.
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privacy, the right to property and the right to a fair hearing’ (ibid.). The ruling 
was subsequently overturned by a superior court, but has been appealed 
by BAKE and is pending admission by the Supreme Court. Arguably, since 
the change in government in 2013, the information and communications 
technology (ICT) policymaking space in Kenya has been characterised by a 
constant, high stakes push and pull between citizens and the state as the 
state increasingly seeks to impose itself on the sector without any perceived 
investment in growing it. 
This paper finds that Kenya’s fluctuating political climate has both enabled 
and stifled digital rights, and that there is significant room for action from 
domestic and international actors to better protect these rights. It also finds 
that while there is significant capacity in civil society in Kenya, particularly 
with the advent of specialist digital rights organisations, a lot of this 
capacity is hampered by the lack of resources to effectively take on both 
the state and large multinational corporations that dominate the digital 
space in Africa. 
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2. Political landscape
According to human rights watchdog Freedom House, Kenya is a partially 
free democracy, scoring 48 out of 100 on the group’s Freedom in the World 
rankings, although the state of freedom in the country has fluctuated 
significantly within the ‘partially free’ brackets since 2000 (Freedom House 
2019; see Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Between independence in 1963 and the end of 
the one-party state in 1988, Kenya was ruled by two authoritarian leaders 
who were notorious for cracking down on political dissidents, students and 
organised political groups. Nor did the advent of multi-party democracy 
in 1988 automatically lead to democratic gains as the authoritarian regime 
of Daniel arap Moi, through widespread electoral violence and use of force 
against members of the opposition, extended its rule by another ten years. 
Thus, even though the country had multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997, 
between 2000 and 2002 Freedom House ranked Kenya as ‘not free’.
Figure 2.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–192
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
2   Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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Figure 2.2 Kenya’s Freedom Index score, 2000–183
Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020)
This ranking improved dramatically in 2002 after the opposition won the 
general election, but declined once again after the 2007 election and 
subsequent votes in 2013 and 2017. The surprisingly peaceful election in 
2002 ended the 40-year Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime and 
ushered in a short-lived period of tremendous growth in political and social 
freedoms. But this was quickly compromised by the return of past practices 
to limit press freedom and individual rights. The 2007 election was preceded 
by notable instances of media intimidation and state-led violence, while the 
election itself marked the worst of electoral violence, which left at least 1,500 
people dead and another 100,000 displaced (Nyabola 2018). 
Meanwhile, inequality in the country has increased considerably, as reflected 
by the annual United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) global 
Human Development Index and specifically the Gini coefficient. In 2005, for 
example, the country had a Gini coefficient of 46.5, but ten years later, the 
figure was 40.8 (UNDP 2019). According to international non-governmental 
organisation Oxfam, less than 0.1 per cent of the country’s population 
owns more assets than the remaining 99.9 per cent, and the numbers of the 
super-rich in the country are growing at one of the fastest rates in the world 
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(Oxfam 2020). Organisations such as Oxfam argue that this significant 
inequality drives Kenya’s high rates of crime and institutional violence. 
Given all this, the state in Kenya remains highly fragile, particularly in 
election years. Civil liberties also deteriorate considerably in the build-up 
to and aftermath of elections, while corruption in the country remains high. 
The ushering in of a new constitution in 2010 fundamentally reorganised 
government, creating hundreds of new elected positions – and thereby 
increasing public spending – as well as new constitutional rights and 
freedoms. Public awareness of these new rights and freedoms generally 
remains low, but particularly with regards to digital rights. The government 
has been slow to implement the new dispensation. For example, Article 
35 of the Constitution provides in part that the state shall publish any 
important information affecting the nation (Republic of Kenya 2010) 
and this creates a constitutional obligation for public participation. 
Regulations based on these laws have interpreted this to mean, among 
other things, that the public shall be invited to participate in the processes 
of lawmaking through public forums, media outreach and other efforts. Yet 
proposed laws are rarely subjected to public scrutiny and where comments 
are provided, they are rarely reflected in the final draft of the law. 
In 2017, four days after a peaceful August vote, the Independent Election 
and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) announced that the incumbent, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, had won the presidential election with approximately 
56 per cent of the national vote (enough to avoid a run-off) (Kimutai and 
Okumu 2019). His main challenger, Raila Odinga, quickly filed a petition 
against the result and was granted a hearing before the Supreme Court 
(Al Jazeera 2017). On 1 September, the Supreme Court held that the 
presidential election had not been conducted to a constitutional standard 
and ordered a fresh election to be conducted within 90 days (de Freytas-
Tamura 2017).
In the interim period, the IEBC struggled to demonstrate that it had 
addressed many of the shortcomings that had led to the dismissal of 
the first round of voting. The remaining uncertainty around the electoral 
register fuels many of the concerns in Kenya around digital privacy 
and data protection in elections. Elections are one of the largest data 
collection exercises in the country, and anxieties over how the electoral roll 
was built and administered underpin much of the ambivalence towards 
digital government. 
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The experience of the election affirmed that many of the anxieties were well 
founded. For example, concerns around OT-Morpho Safran (now known 
as IDEMIA), the French company that built the software that administered 
the election, drew parliamentary attention to data expropriation and 
triggered new impetus to pass a data protection law. Moreover, details of 
Kenya’s electoral register are in the semi-public domain (i.e. they can be 
purchased from the IEBC for a specified fee). Any company or individual is 
able to purchase all or portions of the register under the current regulatory 
framework. 
Taken together, this political context means that Kenya’s digital development 
is constantly under threat of reprisal from an insecure administration with 
authoritarian tendencies, on the one hand, and a systemic lack of investment 
and institutional apathy triggered by corruption on the other.
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3. Civic space landscape
Civic space in Kenya has also fluctuated widely between 2000 and 2020. 
Regionally, Kenya has had a reputation for a historically strong civil society 
despite authoritarian regimes, shaped by notable mobilisations and mass 
protests such as the Saba Saba (7 July 1997) , and the continued action 
of civil society leaders despite significant reprisals (The Economist 1997). 
Mobilisation for the end of one-party rule subsumed all other forms of 
organisation; and so, for example, women’s rights organising has been 
less visible, also in part because of the co-opting of formal women’s rights 
institutions such as Maendeleo ya Wanawake (Progress for Women). 
Although there had always been multiple print media outlets, after the end 
of the one-party state there was also a proliferation of television and radio 
stations, which increased and diversified access to information. Protest 
actions in universities and civil society were the main way through which civic 
space was opened up, culminating in the end of KANU rule in 2002.
Between 2002 and 2007, the situation in Kenya oscillated between extreme 
opening up of civic space and rapid contraction. The first three years 
of the Mwai Kibaki administration saw significant gains in law, truth and 
reconciliation, civil society and other sectors. There was also massive 
expansion in media and internet communications. However, as criticism 
shifted towards the administration, many authoritarian practices resurfaced. 
For example, both the first lady and the cabinet secretary for the interior were 
involved in two separate and highly visible instances of press intimidation 
captured on camera and broadcast live (Nyabola 2018). By the 2007 election, 
there were significant indications that all was not well in Kenyan politics.
Between 2007 and 2013, Kenya remained in political limbo due to 
reconciliation efforts between the two principals who fought after the 2007 
election, and the growing pressure to change the Constitution. The passing 
of the new Constitution inspired a new wave of activism and organising, 
but this was quickly curbed as anti-International Criminal Court and anti-
accountability rhetoric surged (Nyabola 2018). 
After the 2013 election, civic space in Kenya declined considerably. A 2014 
report from the Poverty Eradication Network (PEN), a coalition of civil society 
actors in the country, noted:
Kenyan civil society has been billed as one of the most vibrant in 
the region… operating in more than 26 sectors… [but is] currently 
facing their biggest challenge with the state trying to manipulate 
the regulatory laws with the purpose of controlling it.
(Keter 2014)
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A 2016 Kenya Human Rights Commission report noted ‘actors in the civic 
sector in Kenya, from donors to grassroots networks, media to workers unions 
all experience… attack and threats to their existence and effectiveness’ 
(KHRC 2016). In 2018, anti-corruption watchdog Transparency International 
found that 368 journalists were murdered between 2012 and 2017, and out of 
these 70 were murdered while covering corruption stories (Nyakio 2018). 
Elections are a foundational part of Kenya’s civic space, as most political 
action even between election years is geared towards winning the 
subsequent vote. Since 2007, there has been a dramatic contraction in 
civic space due to reduced freedoms of expression, assembly, protest 
and other key pillars of democratic participation designed to influence 
electoral participation, although there have been some victories, particularly 
those gained through the courts. Many unconstitutional threats are 
usually advanced and consolidated in the interests of preserving electoral 
advantage. With regards to digital rights, for example, the impetus for 
designing governance architecture on data protection stems in part from the 
history of misuse of the electoral register. 
On 19 December 2014, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed into law the 
controversial Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014, a day after Parliament 
approved the law amid nationally televised chaos involving heckling and 
fistfights, as some members sought to air their strong opposition to the 
proposal (KTN News 2014). It amended 21 laws, including the Penal Code, 
Criminal Procedure Code, Evidence Act, Prevention of Terrorism Act and the 
National Police Service Act. Critics argued that this law was a major setback 
for civic space in Kenya as it gave the government unprecedented powers of 
surveillance, arrest and detention, and to silence dissenters and critics (KHRC 
2014).
In all of this, the judiciary has emerged as an inconsistent last resort for the 
protection of civic space. Legal challenges to legislative action have had 
mixed results, particularly as they pertain to digital rights. For example, in 
April 2019 the High Court found that the state could not make registration 
for the Huduma Number (Namba) digital ID system that in 2019 was abruptly 
announced to be mandatory as this was unconstitutional, but allowed the 
programme to continue pending legal determination of its constitutionality 
(Kakah 2019). The court also struck down 26 provisions of the Computer 
Misuse and Cybercrimes Bill, and while a superior court reversed this decision, 
an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court (Lolyne 2020).
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline 
Year Shift Implication
2002 Multi-party election. First election in 
which the opposition defeats the 
incumbent.
Opens civic space to engage millions in 
political discourse and democratic 
participation.
2005 Constitutional Referendum November–
December: voters reject a proposed new 
constitution in what is seen as a protest 
against President Kibaki.
Increases momentum for the opposition 
in the lead-up to the election; more 
radical constitutional proposals are 
protected.
2007 Contentious election leading to post-
election violence. 
Pushes increased uptake in mobile money 
and use of blogging and online platforms 
as the media retreat. 
2010 August: new constitution designed to limit 
the powers of the president and devolve 
power to the regions approved in 
referendum.
Expansive Bill of Rights and explicitly 
states new rights that will affect the 
digital landscape including the right to 
privacy in Article 31.
2012 National Intelligence Service Act (2012). Gives security agencies powers to 
monitor communications but does not set 
out what kind of communications might 
be monitored or what kind of interception 
is permitted. 
2013 Access to Information Bill (never passed). Law designed to encourage proactive 
disclosures by the state and its agencies, 
as well as creating a framework in which 
citizens can demand information from the 
government, as set out in Article 35 of the 
Constitution. 
PBO Act (2013) passed but not 
implemented.
The law would provide more support for 
civil society organisations.
Media Law (2013). Media owners criticise the law for 
expanding the executive’s role in media. 
Kenya Information and Communications 
(Amendment) Act (2013).
Critics argue that it expands the 
executive’s oversight role over the CA. The 
law also creates criminal penalties for 
what should ordinarily be civil or 
professional standards violations.
2014 Security Laws. Gives the country’s national security 
organs broad, unchecked surveillance 
powers. 
2019 Kenya Information and Communication 
(Amendment) Bill.
Attempts to curb criticism in online 
spaces; introduces heavy fines for 
hacking and other cybercrimes.
Data Protection Act. Creates regulatory framework for data 
privacy and protection.
Source: Author’s own.
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4. Technology landscape
Kenya’s technology landscape is characterised both by rapid advances 
and by a growing gap between those who have the most access to and 
capacity for technology, and those who have the least. Because of its 
reputation as the Silicon Savannah, many of the technology advances 
developed elsewhere for use in the developing world are tested in Kenya; for 
example, Google’s ‘internet balloons’ (BBC News 2020). After several years 
of dramatic developments, with only marginal regulatory changes, since 
2013 the government has attempted to pass a rash of measures designed to 
constrain behaviour on the internet, which critics argue is an indirect effort to 
curb freedom of expression in the country. 
First, the government has frequently used legislation to try to curb online civic 
space, and notably avoids meaningful public participation on contentious 
legislation. As such, legislation in the digital space is frequently subject to 
litigation by interested parties, owing to the government’s failure to consult 
the public and to respond adequately to social challenges. The case of the 
Huduma Namba digital identity initiative points out the significant ways in which 
the government is failing to adhere to constitutional standards and creating 
a climate where trust in digital technology becomes increasingly elusive. The 
cabinet secretary for the interior abruptly announced in February 2019 that 
everyone over the age of six who was resident in Kenya had 30 days to register 
for the new digital ID system, but there was no effective public participation 
in the design or implementation plan for the initiative. As such, civil society 
leaders sued the government over the implementation of the programme, 
culminating in a stop order against the ministry (Privacy International 2020).
On 11 August 2017, Kenya held the first of two rounds of what would be one 
of the most contested elections in the country. Prior to the vote, there were 
queries about the methods by which French company OT-Morpho Safran 
had been contracted to build the electoral database – queries that were 
not addressed before election day (Nyamori 2019). This was also nominally 
the country’s first fully digital election and the second digital election in 
Africa. The digital process involved the deployment of electronic voter 
identification, biometric voter registration, electronic results transmission, and 
other computerised standards. However, instead of a fully digital process, 
two weeks before the vote the IEBC declared that voting in at least one-third 
of polling stations would be analogue (Menya 2017). 
Surveillance and lack of privacy remain key threats to civil rights in Kenya, 
with international governments such as the US and China providing funding 
and hardware for an elaborate surveillance network in the country (Kapiyo 
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and Gathaiga 2014). Given Kenya’s experience of terrorism, there has been 
and will likely continue to be resistance to creating a legal framework that 
obscures the state’s ability to intercept, collect and process citizens’ data. 
Much of the justification for the elaborate surveillance regime is that it helps 
the country address terrorism, but human rights defenders have raised the 
alarm that Kenya’s surveillance architecture is part of a broader threat to 
freedom of association and to critics of the state (PBI 2012). 
In fact, state-led efforts at data collection have only grown more intense, 
including the Huduma Namba initiative to create a centralised database 
of citizen information and supplant the national ID cards envisioned in the 
Registration of Persons (Amendment) Act (2009) (Government of Kenya 
2019). Abruptly announced in February 2019, the Huduma Namba initiative 
was the culmination of a multi-year initiative to reform and then digitise 
identity systems in the country. The government estimated that the project 
would cost between $5m and $6m and promised it would streamline service 
provision (Nyawira 2019). Critics of this initiative pointed out that without 
a data protection law, the Huduma Namba project posed major human 
rights challenges, including hardening identity discrimination against 
minority groups and allowing for the unchecked collection, processing and 
commercialisation of citizen data (Yousuf 2019). 
Evidently, corporations are part of the tension around data privacy and 
protection in Kenya. Safaricom, the largest telecommunications company 
in the country and a provider of multiple data-rich services, has been 
implicated in numerous violations of rights to privacy and protections 
from surveillance in Kenya (Privacy International 2017). Given its size 
and domination of the communications landscape, coupled with the 
government’s 35 per cent shareholding in the corporation, legal policy in 
communications is often built around protecting Safaricom; for example, 
the state regulator of corporations refused to declare the corporation 
dominant and therefore subject to a separate regulatory regime from other 
mobile companies (Mwita 2019). But foreign companies are also part of the 
mix; OT-Morpho Safran has received two high-profile, irregularly allocated 
tenders to build technology for a digital ID system and for the 2017 election, 
while Chinese hardware giant Huawei, has built the country’s surveillance 
architecture.
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Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Year Shift Implication
1993 Internet access first available in Kenya.
Launch of the national fibre-optic 
backbone.
Dramatic increase in connectivity.
1999 Break-up of Kenya Posts and 
Telecommunications. Telkom Kenya 
maintains control over communications 
hardware and infrastructure. Safaricom 
takes charge of the mobile phone 
network. The Communications 
Commission of Kenya oversees regulation 
and licensing. Posta Kenya overseas 
postal services.
Privatisation of the communications 
sector, shifting to a profit-based model, 
dramatically increases connectivity in 
the country. 
2007–08 December 2007–April 2008, post-
election violence. First week of January 
2008, Nairobi lockdown. 
Mobile money launched earlier in the 
year. Uptick in mobile money use, launch 
of Ushahidi crowdmapping to monitor 
election violence.
2009 SEACOM, Kenya’s first subsea cable 
system. The East Africa Marine System 
(TEAMS) fibre-optic cable is launched in 
July, connecting Kenya to the Middle 
East. 
Significant boost in internet speeds in the 
country, which stimulates more digital 
connectivity. 
2013 Launch of the Integrated Financial 
Management Information System (IFMIS).
Designed to stimulate open 
governance/digital governance systems.
General election in Kenya; Cambridge 
Analytica contracted by the Jubilee 
Alliance.
2016 First IFMIS scandal revealed, involving the 
National Youth Service, in which just 
under $8m was misappropriated from 
the Ministry of Devolution. 
2017 Controversial fully digital election. 
Source: Author’s own.
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5. Digital rights landscape
There is more capacity to respond to digital rights threats in Kenya than 
in many similarly situated countries around the world, but there is still a 
significant gap between where the country is and where it should be. 
Similarly, there are a growing number of specialist organisations responding 
to digital rights, but for the most part, the work of defending digital rights 
has fallen to non-specialist human rights organisations with limited internal 
capacity to respond to rapidly emerging threats. 
Key civil society actors working explicitly on digital rights include the Bloggers 
Association of Kenya (BAKE), which has been the national leader in civil and 
constitutional litigation on digital rights in the country. The Lawyers Hub, a 
private corporation focusing on the legal aspects of the digital landscape 
has also developed a robust advocacy arm and is looking to expand into 
research and activism. The Centre for Intellectual Property and Information 
Technology Law (CIPIT) at Strathmore University also provides significant 
academic capacity for digital rights activism through research and 
publications. 
Other less specialist organisations moving into digital rights advocacy include 
the Katiba Institute, which specialises in constitutional litigation and led the 
case on the Huduma Namba initiative alongside the Nubian Rights Forum. 
Amnesty International Kenya has also developed a digital rights advocacy 
strategy, as has Mzalendo, a civil society organisation that focuses on 
legislative monitoring and tracking of parliament. Regionally, the Collaboration 
on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) also has a 
researcher based in Nairobi and regularly contributes to conversations on 
digital rights in the country. International actors such as Privacy International 
and Article 19 are also active in the digital rights space in Kenya. 
Key state actors in the digital rights space include the Ministry of Information 
and Communications Technology, currently led by Cabinet Secretary 
Joe Mucheru. The ministry develops government policy and government-
sponsored litigation, as well as representing Kenya in international 
negotiations with ICT companies. The Communications Authority (CA) is also 
a key actor in the space. It primarily provides licensing and regulation, but 
through laws pertaining to the governance of broadcast signals also has the 
capacity to switch media on and off as directed by the government. The CA 
also oversees the licensing and regulation of telecommunications company 
and manages Kenya’s fibre-optic network. Finally, the Office of the Attorney 
General oversees litigation on behalf of the government.
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Major private sector actors touching on digital rights in Kenya include a 
network of hubs inspired by the iHub, a space for technology enthusiasts 
and makers founded on the success of Ushahidi. Similar hubs such as Nairobi 
Garage, Metta and Lawyers Hub have become meeting points for those 
thinking about and working on digital issues in the country. Funders also play 
a pivotal role in the landscape through their convening power, including 
Luminate, Open Society Initiative for East Africa (OSIEA), the Open Society 
Foundation’s Justice Initiative and the Ford Foundation. Other related 
players include independent digital media (The Elephant, Africa Uncensored) 
and data visualisation firm Odipo Dev. 
Still, a great deal of organising around digital rights in Kenya occurs around 
hashtags and spontaneous citizen mobilisations on WhatsApp and other 
platforms. Similarly, because most of the space for pushback against state 
overreach exists purely online and in the courts, much of the organisation 
and mobilisation happens in courts and around legal and technical action.
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6. Conclusion and recommendations
Developments in Kenya’s digital space have greatly outpaced developments 
in digital rights advocacy and protection. There must be a concerted effort 
to support organisations active in this space, and those active in human 
rights in general, to develop a digital rights consciousness and encourage 
activism. These recommendations are premised on strengthening the 
capacity of local organisations to respond to ongoing changes at a 
reasonable pace, and empower communities to advocate for these rights 
themselves.
– For civil society: increase South–South partnerships in digital rights 
advocacy given that many of the initiatives rolled out in Kenya are first 
piloted in other countries of the global South such as India and Brazil.
– Encourage demands for transparency and accountability from 
technology companies working in the region to allow for public scrutiny of 
their contracts and agreements with the government.
– For universities and knowledge sectors: push for investment in research 
and research partnerships between academic institutions in Kenya and 
those in other parts of Africa and the world to deepen knowledge on 
digital rights in the region.
• Deepen technical knowledge on collecting and analysing information 
on automated political campaigning and the influence economy.
• Develop permanent research chairs and positions 
on digital rights and the digital economy.
– For government: invest in local language initiatives to translate digital 
rights language into locally useful terms.
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1. Introduction 
Ethiopia is a country of many paradoxes. It has some of the lowest 
levels of internet penetration in the world, yet applies some of the 
severest measures for surveilling and censoring online communication 
(HRW 2014). It has charted new avenues of collaboration with emerging 
donors, especially China, but also continues to be Africa’s largest 
recipient of development aid from traditional Western donors (Fourie 
2015; Gagliardone 2019). Ethiopia has championed uses of information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) that have later been 
adopted elsewhere in Africa, from videoconferencing for government 
communication to commodities exchanges, and yet it is considered 
backward when it comes to digital innovation (Rashid 2015).
The Ethiopian government, led since 1991 by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition, has developed a 
distinctive approach towards digital media in Africa. Defending its 
monopoly of telecommunications, while almost all other countries on the 
continent liberalised their markets, the government sought to balance 
developmental opportunities offered by ICTs with their destabilising 
potential – with mixed results. On the one hand, through support from 
the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim Bank) and telecom giants ZTE 
and Huawei, it managed to expand access without competition. Its 
tight control of digital space enabled the government to enforce 
drastic measures to curb dissent, including pervasive censorship and 
surveillance, and internet shutdowns in moments of crisis (Dahir 2016; 
Marchant and Stremlau 2020). 
And yet, Ethiopian citizens displayed significant abilities in making use of 
digital media to mobilise and challenge the government: first in 2005, in 
the aftermath of the only contested elections in the country; and later in 
the sustained waves of protests that emerged first in the Oromia region, 
then spread to other corners of the country, ultimately leading to a 
significant change in the balance of power, with the appointment of the 
first prime minister of Oromo descent, Abiy Ahmed. 
The new prime minister initiated a significant process of reform, freeing 
imprisoned journalists and activists, and allowing greater freedoms to 
opposition parties and media outlets. Ongoing transformations, however, 
have created new tensions, leading to another wave of protests in 2020 
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and to the resurgence of older forms of repression, including internet 
shutdowns and imprisonments. These left Ethiopia at a crossroads 
between normalising of the relationship between the government 
and oppositional forces, or continuing the authoritarian rule that had 
characterised the country for more than two decades. The civil war 
that erupted in November 2020, between the central government in 
Addis Ababa, and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), once 
the dominant force within the EPRDF coalition, represents a tragic 
turn in the process of transformation initiated by Abiy Ahmed, and has 
had significant repercussions on online debates among Ethiopians 
in Ethiopia and in the diaspora, leading to a polarisation among 
opposing factions (Wilmot 2020).
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2. Political landscape 
The Ethiopian government’s approach to digital media has to be located in 
the longer history of the relationship with opposition politics and traditional 
media, and what can be considered the ‘original sin’ in the contemporary 
history of communication in Ethiopia: the fact that when the new leaders 
came to power, after two decades of civil war, they opened the space for 
debate but refused to engage with the very debates they had allowed to 
bloom (Gagliardone 2014b). 
In the early 1990s, the EPRDF had to show it was different from its oppressive 
predecessors. In the ostensibly unipolar world that emerged after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, the pressure to respect certain rights and freedoms was 
significant and freer media represented an opportunity to boost the new 
government’s international legitimacy (Stremlau 2011). At the domestic level, 
liberalisation of the press also helped signal to a population traumatised by 
decades of war that a new breed of rulers was now in power. 
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia, which was established to write a 
new constitution and build the foundations for a new Ethiopian state, soon 
created the conditions for the first private newspapers to start publishing 
and later spelled out their rights in the relatively progressive press law 
passed in 1992. However, these measures were to be undermined by the 
EPRDF’s lack of commitment to the freedoms it had allowed, and its failure 
to understand what it really meant to allow a plurality of voices to compete 
in a post-war scenario. 
The criticism in the private press took on an increasingly adversarial tone, 
but the EPRDF leadership stuck to its policy, ignoring dissenting voices and 
labelling them as ‘anti-peace’ and ‘anti-constitution’. This stemmed from a 
belief that those writing for the private press were not part of the EPRDF’s 
constituency in any case, so there was little need to expend political capital 
either repressing or engaging them (ibid.). Over time, however, the trading 
of accusations and the inability of opposing factions to command each 
other’s attention progressively poisoned the debate in ways that would have 
repercussions beyond the press. 
When the internet started to be employed as a space to discuss Ethiopian 
politics, debates were rapidly captured by the polarised tones that had 
characterised the press. Platforms such as Ethiopian Review, Nazret and 
Ethiomedia, all launched by Ethiopians in the diaspora, hosted articles that 
equally could have appeared in the newspapers printed in Addis Ababa. 
Indeed, from the very beginning it became common to find references and 
connections between online and printed articles. 
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The new media, rather than being seized by a new generation of leaders and 
advocates as an opportunity to test innovative ideas, were largely captured 
by ‘old politics’. Instead of debating new issues, as occurred in nearby Kenya, 
authors returned to old grievances that had their roots in the 1960s and 
1970s when the movements challenging Emperor Haile Selassie, and later the 
Derg military dictatorship, started to appear. While some middle ground did 
emerge, both online and offline, the discussions the more moderate outlets 
promoted tended to remain in the background and were unable to galvanise 
or mobilise passions and political energy in the same way as more extreme 
pieces that polarised debate.
The early 2000s represented a moment of transition, when the EPRDF, still 
allowing oppositional forces to voice their criticism, sought ways to develop a 
more aggressive strategy to seize the opportunities offered by digital media. 
In 2001, the prime minister, Meles Zenawi, emerged from the split within 
the EPRDF that followed the two-year war with Eritrea with his leadership 
called into question. He responded by launching an ambitious project to 
reinforce the state. The institutional connections between the centre and the 
peripheries were strengthened and the state was reformed to function as a 
more active player in social and economic renewal. Digital media came to 
play a central role in this strategy of transformation and capacity building.
This time, rather than hastily adopting a policy it could not master, or refusing 
to adopt a technology for fear of its destabilising potential, the government 
closely connected its strategy in the ICT sector to the principles on which its 
larger political project was based; in particular, the ideas of revolutionary 
democracy, ethnic federalism and the developmental state (Bach 2011; 
Abbink 2011b). 
The concepts of revolutionary democracy and ethnic federalism emerged 
during the guerrilla war waged against the Derg, which was initially fought 
in the name of the right to self-determination for the people of Tigray, but 
later expanded in scope to include the goal of national liberation. Once 
the guerrilla fighters came to power, the ideology of ethnic federalism was 
used to reframe Ethiopia, no longer as a unitary nation but as a federation 
of ethnicities, which at least on paper were all entitled to the same right to 
self-determination. By connecting the Tigrayan minority to other oppressed 
groups and offering them, at least in principle, the opportunity to participate 
in the re-founding of the nation, the EPRDF presented its de facto capture of 
the state as a victory for all marginalised groups. 
Ethnicity emerged as both a means and an end. It served as an operational 
principle for the redistribution of resources to those recognised as separate 
ethnic groups, but the provision of material benefits along ethnic lines was 
also aimed at convincing people on the ground that it was in their interests 
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to be recognised as ethnically diverse. By building the state and creating 
new institutions and new rules for citizens to relate to central and local 
authority and claim their rights, the EPRDF aimed to be building the nation, 
offering new categories and ideational referents for Ethiopians to think of 
themselves as citizens (Aalen 2006; Pausewang, Tronvoll and Aalen 2002).
The concept of revolutionary democracy also emerged during the struggle 
in the bush, but its definition continued to evolve after the EPRDF came 
to power. Revolutionary democracy rejects the focus on the individual 
that characterises liberal democracy, preferring to stress group rights and 
consensus. It favours a populist discourse, claiming a direct connection 
between the leadership and the masses, bypassing the need to negotiate 
with other elites that advance competing ideas of the nation state and 
the role different groups have within it (Bach 2011; Hagmann and Abbink 
2011). Through the contribution of Meles Zenawi himself, new concepts were 
progressively added to the core tenets of ethnic federalism and revolutionary 
democracy, borrowed largely, but selectively, from the models of the 
developmental state; and stressing in particular the importance of state 
stability and the role of a determined developmental elite in supporting 
economic performance and avoiding rent-seeking (Fisher and Anderson 2015).
At the turn of the millennium, various large-scale projects sought to 
implement these principles on the ground, becoming their technological 
embodiments. Woredanet and Schoolnet – an e-government and e-learning 
project, respectively – used digital media to sustain a complex process of 
state and nation building. Woredanet, which stands for ‘network of district 
[woreda] administrations’ employs the same protocol that the internet is 
based upon. But rather than allowing individuals to independently seek 
information and express their opinions, it enabled ministers and cadres in 
Addis Ababa to videoconference with regional and woreda offices, and 
instruct them on what they should be doing and how. Schoolnet uses a similar 
architecture to stream pre-recorded classes for a variety of subjects, from 
mathematics to civics, to all secondary schools in the country, while also 
offering political education to schoolteachers and other government officials.1 
The faith in this complex process of state and nation building, the roll-out 
of large-scale projects, and their combined ability to create a stronger 
connection between the political vanguard and Ethiopian citizens, were 
among the reasons that convinced the Ethiopian government to allow 
the first contested elections to take place in 2005. Prior to this, elections 
in Ethiopia had mostly been held for the EPRDF to reaffirm its control over 
the country and for external consumption, rather than to provide a real 
opportunity for political competition (Abbink 2011a).
1 For more information on these systems, see Gagliardone (2014a, 2016).
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The results of this political gamble, however, were unexpected. After 
election day, when the EPRDF realised it had suffered greater losses than 
it was ready to accept and people started protesting over the delay in 
issuing the results (Carter Center 2005), government repression led to the 
imprisonment of most political leaders, and the censoring of some of the 
communication channels that had been used to support mass mobilisation 
(see section 4). As the EPRDF closed avenues for popular protest and 
forcefully consolidated power, it also began an ambitious project to 
legitimise these measures and weave them into a more coherent strategy 
(see section 3). 
The government also sought, and found, new partners that could support 
it in this new endeavour. China emerged as the most significant ally. 
At an ideational level, China’s ability to balance control of information 
and the dramatic growth of internet users became a model and source 
of legitimation for the restrictive practices the Ethiopian government 
employed in the aftermath of the elections. The Chinese government not 
only aided Ethiopia indirectly, by offering legitimation for alternative models 
of media engagement, but also directly, through the provision of essential 
technical and financial support (see section 4). 
In the decade that followed the 2005 elections, the system created by 
the EPRDF through trial and error appeared to hold, ensuring two rounds 
of uncontested elections and the apparent consolidation of power at the 
centre. Some of the steps taken reinforced elements commonly perceived 
as characteristic of a developmental state model, such as strengthening 
the bureaucracy and reinforcing the power of the developmental elite, 
together with its autonomy (Leftwich 1995; Aalen and Tronvoll 2009; 
Hagmann and Péclard 2010). 
Behind the shell of the vast majorities ensured by the EPRDF in 
parliament, however, a number of events progressively undermined 
the party’s hegemonic project. The death of Meles Zenawi in 2012 
represented a challenge not only for its political allies, but also for a 
larger network of political and economic actors who had embraced 
his vision of developmentalism. A controversial figure, at both national 
and international levels, Meles had emerged not only as a political 
leader, but also as an ideologue able to support a distinctive idea of 
African development (de Waal 2013; Lefort 2013). The apparently smooth 
transition, managed behind closed doors by the main power brokers 
within the EPRDF, and the handling of the premiership to Meles’ deputy, 
Hailemariam Desalegn, only for a short while appeared to guarantee the 
legitimacy of the same coalition of forces and political project to continue 
guiding the country. 
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Following uncontested elections in 2015, which were marked by the apathy 
of both opposition parties and activist groups, in a somehow unexpected 
turn of events there were widespread protests that broke out first in the 
Oromia and Amhara regions in 2015–16, and later expanded to the rest 
of the country. They were to significantly reconfigure the power balance 
in Ethiopia. Echoing features that characterised protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt in 2011 and 2012, the loss of credibility of elections as instruments 
of change, and their securitisation to avoid outbursts of violence, had 
elevated other, apparently less critical phenomena – such as the proposal 
of a new policy to extend the administrative borders of Addis Ababa 
further into the Oromia region – to the level of possible catalysts of 
participation and protest. 
The protests, framed not as a generic attempt by activists to overthrow 
an authoritarian government, but in the context of the very type of ethnic 
politics promoted by the EPRDF to rule over a diverse society, asserted how 
the largest ethnic group in the country, the Oromo, had been excluded 
from power, and shook the EPRDF’s ability to maintain control over power. 
They ultimately led to the replacement of Hailemariam Desalegn by the 
first Ethiopian prime minister of Oromo descent, Abiy Ahmed. The new 
prime minister initiated a wave of reforms that dramatically reopened civic 
and political space, freeing journalists and activists who had received 
long jail sentences and promising a redefinition of political competition 
in Ethiopia (Workneh 2020; Fisher and Gebrewahd 2019). A new wave of 
protests in 2020, however, has called some of these reforms into question 
and has seen the resurgence of old forms of repression by Abiy’s regime, 
including internet shutdowns, and imprisonment of protesters and 
journalists (Ayana 2020). 
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3. Civic space landscape 
Ethiopia has a long history of tension with civil society organisations, 
tempered in some periods by the need to attract foreign aid and to 
appease requests from donors to channel some of their funds through 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). During the Derg regime (1974–91) 
NGOs were tightly tied to the government (apart from those created by 
guerrilla groups in control of some areas in the north of the country). Since 
the EPRDF came to power in 1991, there has been greater liberalisation 
of the sector, allowing international NGOs to operate in the country and 
the emergence of some national NGOs, but also trying to exert control 
on large government-organised NGOs, able at the same time to attract 
donor funding, but also to make use of it in ways strongly controlled by the 
central power. 
Similar to the case of the media (see section 2), this situation drastically 
changed after the contested elections of 2005, when the government 
began to seek ways to contain the influence of civil society organisations 
and close civic space in ways that would not irk the international 
community. The main tactic used by the government has been to exploit 
the United States (US)-backed securitisation agenda and promote laws 
that, on paper, were meant to contain the emergence of organisations that 
might threaten national security and stability, but in practice created a new 
space to pursue dissenters and critics (Roberts 2019). 
In August 2009, the Ethiopian parliament enacted its first piece of 
legislation aimed specifically at combating terrorism. Framed as an 
attempt to comply with requests from the United Nations (UN) and the US 
to take the fight against international terrorism to global level, it created 
the legal preconditions to actually prosecute critical voices within Ethiopia 
(or Ethiopians in the diaspora). As indicated by the incarceration of 
journalists, bloggers and political opponents that followed, a legal provision 
aligning with international demands was used not only to fight terrorists, 
but also to stifle dissent. It was around this time that Ethiopia’s ranking on 
Freedom House’s Freedom Index descended from ‘partially free’ to ‘not free’ 
(see Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–192
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
Ethiopia was relatively late to enact domestic anti-terrorism legislation, 
compared to other countries that introduced similar laws in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 (9/11) to comply with UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires states to ensure ‘terrorist acts 
are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws’ (UN Security 
Council 2001). Coming into force only in mid-2009, Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation was framed nonetheless as a response to the resolution 
passed eight years earlier and international pressure to combat terrorism. 
However, when the proclamation is considered not just in relation to the 
evolution of international and domestic terrorism, but also to other legal 
instruments the Government of Ethiopia has been developing during 
the same period and to the type of individuals who have been targeted, 
it acquires a different, more pernicious, meaning. The Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation shares with the Charities and Societies Proclamation (2009), 
the Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation (2012) and the Regulation for 
the Re-establishment of the Information Network Security Agency (INSA) 
(2013) the common goal of extending the government’s ‘legitimate’ sphere 
of action, while limiting the possibility for other actors – domestic and 
international – to influence policy and politics in Ethiopia. 
2  Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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A powerful example of how governments have been able to exploit the 
negative sentiment emerging against civil society organisations mentioned 
above and use it to increase control over them, is how the Charities and 
Societies Proclamation has restricted NGOs that receive more than ten per 
cent of their financing from foreign sources from engaging in human rights 
and advocacy activities. The Telecom Fraud Offences Proclamation has 
re-affirmed the state monopoly over telecommunications, imposing severe 
sanctions on any operator trying to compete with or bypass Ethio-Telecom, 
and has extended the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation to the 
online sphere (Article 6). 
Since its creation, the INSA, shaped in the guise of the US National 
Security Agency (NSA), has taken on the responsibility of ‘protecting’ 
the national information space, ‘taking counter measures against 
information attacks’, which the law frames as any ‘attack against the 
national interest, constitutional order, and nation’s psychology by using 
cyber and electromagnetic technologies and systems’ (Government of 
Ethiopia 2013). Examining the profiles of individuals convicted under the 
Anti-Terrorism Proclamation helps to further clarify the motivations behind 
the law and to understand how, similar to what had been experienced in 
other countries – including Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines and Uganda 
– the Ethiopian government interpreted the global war against terrorism 
as an opportunity to pursue domestic enemies while fending off external 
pressure and condemnation. 
Out of the 33 individuals convicted under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 
between 2009 and 2014, 13 were journalists. Some of them were accused 
of planning terrorist attacks on infrastructure, telecommunications and 
power lines (Woubshet Taye and Reeyot Alemu); others of supporting 
Ginbot 7, an organisation led by Berhanu Nega, who in the 2005 elections 
had won the seat of mayor of Addis Ababa, and was included on the 
country’s terror list soon after its establishment (Eskinder Nega, Abebe 
Gelaw, Fasil Yenealem and Abebe Belew). Two journalists (Solomon Kebede 
and Yusuf Getachew) who worked for the newspaper Ye Musilmoch Guday 
were charged with plotting acts of ‘terrorism, intending to advance a 
political, religious, or ideological cause’ (HRW 2013), as part of a broader 
crackdown on Ethiopian Muslims. Two Swedish journalists, Johan Persson 
and Martin Schibbye, who had embedded themselves with the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front to cover the conflict in southern Ethiopia were 
also charged under the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, but were pardoned 
by the president after having served 450 days in prison. Some journalists 
have been charged in absentia; those apprehended in Ethiopia have been 
sentenced to up to 18 years in prison.
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Numerous international organisations, including the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, Reporters Without Borders, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have accused the Ethiopian government of taking advantage 
of a law they have labelled as ‘deeply flawed’ to persecute and silence 
critical voices. The government has responded to this criticism by re-
asserting the legitimacy of its acts.
The reliance on the Western-backed anti-terrorism agenda to pursue 
domestic goals, however, does not end with legal norms, but extends to the 
material and technological innovations that have come with it. As revealed 
by the leaks of security contractor Edward Snowden, in the aftermath of 9/11 
the US NSA:
set up the Deployed Signals Intelligence Operations Center – 
also known as ‘Lion’s Pride’ – in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa… 
It began as a modest counterterrorism effort involving around 12 
Ethiopians performing a single mission at 12 workstations. But by 
2005, the operation had evolved into eight US military personnel 
and 103 Ethiopians, working at ‘46 multifunctional workstations’. 
(Turse 2017) 
In a leaked document, the officer-in-charge of Lion’s Pride in 2005, Katie 
Pierce, explained, ‘The benefit of this relationship is that the Ethiopians provide 
the location and linguists and we provide the technology and training’ (ibid.). 
Alongside Lion’s Pride, the Ethiopian government’s hunger for tools that could 
expand its ability to control communications led it to uniquely combine 
technologies purchased from a diverse range of actors. ZTE, as the largest 
telecommunication provider in the country, offered a customer management 
database, which, in addition to collecting records of calls made in Ethiopia, 
could allow access to the content of text messages and phone call audio 
when needed. Another tool developed by ZTE, called ZXMT, which used deep 
packet inspection to scan internet traffic, is also likely to have been used in 
Ethiopia, even if irrefutable evidence is missing (Marczak et al. 2014). 
The Ethiopian authorities have actively shopped in the European market 
for advanced surveillance technologies, acquiring tools to spy not only on 
individuals living in Ethiopia, but also on Ethiopians in the diaspora. The 
government purchased FinSpy, a surveillance system sold by a firm first 
headquartered in the UK and later in Germany, to allow remote access 
to computers infected with FinSpy software. Hacking Team, an Italian 
company that provided ‘eavesdropping software’ that ‘hides itself inside 
target devices’ – which, ironically, was hacked in 2015, leading to 400GB of 
private communications entering the public domain – provided services 
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to the Ethiopian government allowing it to acquire communications from 
opposition leaders and journalists in the diaspora (Marczak et al. 2014; HRW 
2014; Gagliardone 2019). 
As this complex web of legal and technical resources indicates, far from 
being pushed into complying with an agenda imposed from above, either by 
partners in the West or in the East, the Ethiopian government has displayed 
a remarkable ability to exploit the weaknesses of different agendas to 
strengthen its own political plan. 
Table 3.1 Civic space timeline 
Year Shift Implication
2000–05 New media plurality. Opening of civic space to engage 
millions in political discourse and 
democratic participation.
2009 Restrictive NGO law. Disengagement.
Restrictive anti-terrorism law. Increasing use of global anti-terrorism 
agenda to stifle dissent.
2010 Arrests of activists. Chilling effect and closing of space.
2015 First wave of protests in the Oromia 
region.
Unprecedented threat to EPRDF 
dominance over Ethiopia.
2018 Abiy Ahmed becomes prime minister. Wave of reforms and opening up.
2020 New wave of protests in Oromia. New tightening of civic and political 
space.
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Gagliardone (2014); Stremlau (2011); Mulualem (2019); Chala (2015); 
Bach (2011).
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4. Technology landscape 
The strategy elaborated by the EPRDF-led government to shape digital 
technologies in Ethiopia has been fairly distinctive in Africa. The evolution of 
this strategy can be mapped following two parallel trajectories: one charting 
the efforts to maintain a strong, centralised control over expanding access to 
digital media; the other in response to attempts by opposition forces to use 
digital technologies as instruments for political change. 
While most countries on the continent slowly overcame their scepticism 
towards liberalising internet provision, only to later introduce regulatory or 
technical mechanisms to contain the tensions these measures unleashed, 
the Ethiopian government decided from the very beginning to sacrifice 
access for control and security. In the 1990s, when the first initiatives to 
promote internet access in Africa began to take shape, in Ethiopia, as 
elsewhere on the continent, there were great expectations regarding 
the internet’s potential. Eventually, however, the government’s concerns 
prevailed in defining the initial and future steps that the internet would take 
in the country.
The initiative launched to structure Ethiopia’s first moves in the internet era, 
called BITE (Bringing Internet to Ethiopia), is a vivid example of this approach. 
Initiated in 1995 by Dawit Yohannes, the speaker of the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives, BITE was aimed at producing concrete recommendations 
on how policymakers could handle the internet effectively. Initial debate 
benefited from the active participation of representatives from NGOs and 
professional bodies, who were trying to strike a balance between the hype 
coming from the West and the initial scepticism and conservatism shown by 
the EPRDF. BITE’s suggestion was to create a public network service provider, 
a ‘not-for-profit service organisation with the main objective of serving the 
public and developing services’ (Furzey 1995), independent from any actor in 
particular and accessible to all. The Ethiopian government, however, rejected 
the idea and decided to place service provision under its direct control. 
This was only the first of a series of frustrations the private sector and 
civil society faced in their attempts to import tools, regulatory norms and 
best practices emerging at the international level. The efforts made by 
actors other than the government to develop a more dynamic information 
environment were strongly opposed. This reaction was motivated by the 
need to slow down the pace of transformation in order to exert more control 
over it; and by the desire to occupy the new political space that was created 
by the internet in ways that would primarily benefit the government and its 
national project.
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This stubborn project, however, had the result of containing mobile and 
internet expansion for many years to come. As neighbouring countries – 
Kenya above all – marked rapid progress in extending connectivity across 
their national territories, Ethiopia languished at the bottom of digital 
rankings. In a dramatic move, in 2006 the government managed to secure 
a unique form of support that would allow it to maintain control over digital 
technologies while extending connectivity. In 2017, internet penetration in 
Ethiopia stood at just 18.6 per cent (see Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Ethiopia
Source: Based on data from ITU (2020)
On 8 November 2006, Chinese telecom giant ZTE and the Ethiopian 
Telecommunication Corporation signed the largest agreement in the history 
of telecommunications in Africa. Backed by China Development Bank, ZTE 
offered a loan of US$1.5bn (to which it added US$0.4bn for engineering) to 
overhaul and expand Ethiopia’s telecommunications system. The loan, to 
be repaid over 13 years, was disbursed in three phases. The first phase had 
a particularly symbolic value. Branded the ‘Millennium Plan’, it was expected 
to produce its results – laying down more than 2,000km of fibre-optic cable 
connecting Ethiopia’s 13 largest cities – by 11 September 2007, the day 
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The second and third phases similarly focused on infrastructure development, 
expanding coverage to rural areas and building the capacity of the system to 
support 20 million mobile users (from the initial 1.2 million) and more than a million 
internet broadband users. Resources also went towards upgrading the 
government’s ambitious Woredanet and Schoolnet projects, allowing some 
public administrations and schools served by the two systems to progressively 
switch from expensive and inefficient satellite connections to terrestrial broadband.
China’s support allowed the Ethiopian government to reach goals no other 
African country had achieved before, dramatically expanding access under 
a monopoly. Elsewhere in Africa, liberalisation of the market has driven 
expansion in coverage and lowered costs. Countries that opted for a system 
tightly controlled by the state, such as neighbouring Eritrea, have severely 
lagged behind in developing information infrastructure and services. By 
providing capital, equipment and expertise, all with no strings attached in 
terms of policy changes (e.g. liberalising the market), ZTE not only brought 
the Ethiopian government out of the cul-de-sac in it had put itself into by 
stubbornly defending its monopoly; it also helped it realise its vision of a 
tightly controlled but developmentally oriented national information society.
On 7 June 2011, the now rebranded Ethio-Telecom issued a tender to 
further boost the capacity of Ethiopia’s mobile phone network to 50 million 
subscribers by 2015 and to introduce 4G connectivity in selected areas. The 
tender was similarly based on a vendor-financing scheme, as had previously 
been the case with ZTE. However, in contrast to 2006, the tender was public 
and various companies competed. As The Wall Street Journal put it, however, 
‘again, financing won the day, with the two [ZTE and Huawei] pledging a 
total of US$1.6bn. Western equipment suppliers, such as Ericsson and Alcatel 
Lucent SA, couldn’t match the Chinese offer’ (Dalton 2014). 
With the signing of two separate contracts of US$800m each with Huawei 
and ZTE, competition was introduced in the shape of a rivalry between two 
Chinese companies that have been contending for shares of the Chinese 
market for a long time. China’s contribution, therefore, served not only to 
support the unique vision elaborated by the EPRDF, but also to introduce and 
experiment with limited forms of competition that would not threaten the 
government’s hegemonic position in shaping Ethiopia’s information society. 
Shifting the attention towards digital activism, Ethiopia has similarly charted 
a distinctive trajectory. During the events that followed the contested 
parliamentary elections of 2005, Ethiopian protesters combined new and 
traditional communication channels in ways that closely resembled the use 
of media that would characterise the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 (Gagliardone 2016; 
Harlow and Johnson 2011). Yet during these protests, Facebook was still in 
its infancy, with no presence in Africa, and Twitter had yet to be launched. 
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In Ethiopia in 2005, bloggers represented a new critical node that allowed 
innovative forms of communication to be experimented with. In the 1990s, 
Ethiopians in the diaspora had already created platforms that allowed 
bloggers to voice their opinions (e.g. Nazret), in ways that pre-dated 
the approach later adopted by online magazines such as Slate or The 
Huffington Post (Skjerdal 2011).
By 2005, however, a younger generation of journalists and activists (e.g. 
Enset, Ethio-Zagol), who were less aggrieved by long-term power struggles, 
had begun to experiment with new ways of reporting that eschewed the 
most polarised tones (ibid.), becoming representative of a new willingness to 
embrace technology to promote political change. In a move that dramatically 
increased their reach, commentaries and political manifestoes published 
online began to be printed and were turned into leaflets for distribution on the 
ground in Ethiopia. Before and after the 2005 elections, mobile phones, and 
especially SMS (text messages) were also widely used to mobilise protests in 
real time and disseminate calls to action initially posted on web forums. 
This convergence of different media channels used in 2005 deeply resonates 
with the ‘media relays’ that characterised the protests in Tunisia and Egypt 
in 2010, when activists combined different media to reach those who had 
no access to the latest technologies (Wilson and Dunn 2011; Aouragh 
and Alexander 2011). Yet, in striking contrast to the media and scholarly 
attention given to the Arab Spring, similar use of new media in Ethiopia five 
years earlier received negligible international attention. International news 
coverage mostly focused on the political violence around the elections and 
not on this revolutionary use of new media avant la lettre. 
While international commentators did not understand or report on these 
early forms of digital activism in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian rulers took notice. 
So much so that, after the protests and the violence had subsided, 
the Ethiopian government started to progressively trim the complex 
communication network that had assembled different voices across a 
plurality of media. First, the SMS network was interrupted (June 2005). A few 
months later, some of the most vocal Ethiopian journalists who challenged 
the results of the elections and called for greater democracy were arrested 
and their papers forced to close (November 2005). Finally, one year after the 
contested elections, the government started to block access to blogs and 
websites where dissenting opinions were found (May 2006). 
This ‘failed revolution’ represented the beginning of a complex process of 
negotiation between the Ethiopian government and various generations of 
digital activists seeking to use new media to promote political change. Two 
events epitomise the evolution of this process, indicating significant shifts in 
the power dynamics between government and civil society. 
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The first was the emergence and repression of yet another generation of digital 
activists seeking to use social media to engage and seek to constructively 
challenge the Ethiopian government. Centred on Zone9, a collective of bloggers 
created in 2012, the criticism that emerged in this phase distanced itself from 
older grievances and accusations. Instead, it advocated reform from within, 
rather than beyond the political framework created by the EPRDF. Unlike bloggers 
posting on diaspora-led platforms such as Nazret or Ethiomedia, they decided 
not to attack core elements of the EPRDF’s ideology (i.e. ethnic federalism and 
revolutionary democracy). The Zone9ers, on the contrary, asked Ethiopian rulers 
to #RespectTheConstitution, the hashtag used for one of their campaigns 
pressuring the government to live up to the principles it had established to 
rebuild the nation after the civil war, including the right to freedom of expression. 
In contrast to many bloggers in the Ethiopian diaspora who tended to 
write in English, most Zone9ers privileged Amharic in their posts, signalling a 
willingness to contribute to national debates and reach a broader audience 
within Ethiopia. Rather than considering Ethiopian rulers as enemies to 
confront and attack, they exploited the power of social networking platforms 
such as Twitter to initiate conversations with those in power; for example, 
engaging in unprecedented debates with Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom, 
the government’s most active presence on social media.
Despite efforts to build a middle ground from which to engage with the 
Ethiopian government, and calling for reform from within rather than an 
overthrow of the regime, on 25 April 2014, six of the bloggers – Abel Wabella, 
Atnaf Berhane, Mahlet Fantahun, Natnail Feleke, Zelalem Kibret and Befekadu 
Hailu – were arrested, along with three other journalists – Asmamaw 
Hailegeorgis, Tesfalem Waldyes and Edom Kassaye. The initial charges included 
working with international human rights organisations and taking part in digital 
security training (BBC News 2014). The group was subsequently also charged 
with terrorism. The accusations included collaborating with outlawed opposition 
groups such as Ginbot 7 and conspiring with foreign organisations to use social 
media to destabilise Ethiopia. Some of the evidence given in support of the 
charges of terrorist activity during the court cases included the use of Tactical 
Technology Collective’s ‘Security in a Box: Tools and Tactics in Digital Security’ 
and blog commentary on Wael Ghonim’s book Revolution 2.0 about the use of 
social media during the Arab Spring and its potential relevance for Ethiopia. 
The arrests stirred a high-profile international social media campaign to free 
the arrested bloggers, which spread online behind the #FreeZone9Bloggers 
hashtag. The popularity of the campaign was unprecedented in Ethiopia. 
After its launch, the campaign gained visibility internationally, including 
the first Africa-wide ‘tweetathon’ organised in solidarity by Nigerian and 
Tanzanian bloggers, and legal petitions addressed to the African Union and 
the UN Human Rights Council. 
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The campaign was especially active during the initial months of imprisonment, 
and was promoted by international human rights and freedom of speech 
organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights 
Watch, Global Voices, the Media Legal Defence Initiative, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and Reporters Without Borders. After tens of delayed court 
hearings and over 500 days in prison without charge, the Zone9 bloggers 
were finally acquitted of terrorism charges in October 2015 (BBC News 2015).
Table 4.1 Technology timeline
Year Shift Implication
1995 Bringing internet to Ethiopia (BITE) 
commission.
First failed attempt at multi-stakeholder 
engagement in Ethiopia; it poisons the 
relationship between government and civil 
society in the digital space.
Late 1990s Launch of first blogging platforms 
by the Ethiopian diaspora (e.g. 
Ethiomedia, Nazret, Ethiopian 
Review).
First attempts with online media are very 
antagonistic towards the EPRDF-led 
government, creating a perception that online 
media are by nature adversarial.
2004 State-sponsored projects 
Woredanet and Schoolnet go 
online.
These projects represent the first attempts by 
the Ethiopian government to use digital media 
to empower its communication and control 
with the peripheries of the state. 
2005 First openly contested elections in 
Ethiopia and widespread 
censorship online.
After losing control of more seats in parliament 
than expected, and blaming digital media for 
some of the losses, the government begins its 
first experiment with online censorship, building 
the foundations for subsequent measures to 
control and contain online dissent.
2006 First contract with ZTE for network 
expansion project.
Largest Chinese intervention in ICTs in Africa.
2011 Second contract with ZTE and 
Huawei to further expand mobile 
and internet connectivity. 
Consolidation of relationship with China.
2016 First internet shutdown in Ethiopia. Proclaimed by the government as a measure 
to prevent cheating in national exams – but it 
will become increasingly pervasive in the 
country in stifling political dissent.
2017 Qero and Faro hashtags and 
memes.
Opening up of new space with new actors 
outside formal civic organisations.
2018 Rise to power of Abiy Ahmed and 
opening up of online spaces.
Greater freedom allowed for online media, as 
well as for the press.
2019 Return to internet shutdowns and 
repressive measures.
Initial opening by Abiy’s government called 
into question; return to ‘old tactics’.
Sources: Authors’ own, based on Chala (2019); 2018; Mulualem (2019); Marchant and Stremlau (2020); 
Gagliardone (2013); Skjerdal (2011); Gagliardone (2016).
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5. Digital rights landscape 
As mentioned in previous sections, the Ethiopian government has been able 
to combine skills and tools acquired from different partners (e.g. surveillance 
training from the US government; software sold by European, Israeli and 
Chinese companies) to develop a complex apparatus of surveillance. It has 
also developed unique systems to project its control over the country, while 
improving service delivery. An example is TeleCourt, a system offering remote 
trials through plasma-screen TVs disseminated in government offices (Beyene, 
Zerai and Gagliardone 2015). Its centralised control of telecommunications 
has also made it relatively easy to enact internet shutdowns at local and 
national levels. Internet shutdowns became a recurring feature starting from 
2016, affecting either specific regions where protests emerged (e.g. Oromia), or 
extending to the whole country (sometimes with the exception of the capital 
Addis Ababa) when protests became more generalised. 
The threat posed by the rising discontent ultimately leading to widespread 
protests in the Oromia and Amhara regions, and the role social media 
played in fuelling and coordinating the protest, also led the Ethiopian 
government to develop and sharpen its computational propaganda tools 
(Chala 2018; Bradshaw and Howard 2019). Available evidence illustrates how 
the government has mostly made use of human agents (e.g. paid trolls or 
individuals belonging to party ranks) to steer public opinion, on issues related 
to the causes and motivations of protests, but also in the preparation of events 
of national relevance (e.g. religious or public events), as well as promoting 
fake news that could undermine support for dissenting groups (Chala 2018). 
As political competition became fiercer after the rise to power of Abiy Ahmed, 
new fronts of disinformation emerged, pitting members of the EPRDF coalition 
against one another (Chala 2019). Also, oppositional voices have joined the 
fray and popular representatives of political parties that have emerged as an 
alternative to the EPRDF have been accused of fomenting disinformation in 
ways that can lead to violence among competing ethic groups (Meseret 2020).
Individuals and civil society organisations are caught in a complex conundrum. 
In the past (e.g. during the 2005 elections discussed in section 2), Ethiopian 
journalists and activists displayed great ingenuity in combining old and new 
media, and a variety of tactics to amplify their messages and reach different 
types of audiences. Collaborations have emerged between activists and 
academics to assess digital rights in the country (e.g. between the OpenNet 
Initiative and The Citizen Lab to uncover surveillance; collaborations with the 
University of Oxford to map hate speech online) but these have not led to a 
consolidation of skills in the country that can be easily deployed when required 
(Marczak et al. 2014; OpenNet Initiative 2007; Gagliardone et al. 2016). 
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6. Conclusion 
Ethiopia is at a complex crossroads. On the one hand, the rise to 
power of Abiy Ahmed built the foundations for important reforms in the 
media and civic space. Since 2018, media outlets have blossomed, also 
allowing long-time critics of the regime to launch publications and voice 
their opinions. Telecommunications have been liberalised, ending the 
anachronistic monopoly that had characterised Ethiopia for decades. 
Greater opportunities for political competition have been created and 
future elections – originally planned for August 2020, but postponed due to 
Covid-19 – may be the most contested since 2005. 
On the other hand, Abiy’s reforms have created tensions within the 
EPRDF coalition, especially with the once hegemonic Tigrayan People’s 
Liberation Front. In 2020, new waves of protests led to the resurgence of 
repressive techniques used by rulers who preceded Abiy, including internet 
shutdowns and the imprisonment of critics of the regime. Digital activism 
holds the promise of engaging the government on new grounds, allowing 
the consolidation of digital rights and new alliances between extra-
parliamentary and formal politics. But these avenues are fragile and it is 
unclear how they will evolve in the short and medium terms.
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1. Introduction 
Egypt has experienced many political and social changes prior to and since 
the 2011 uprising. These changes have had a significant impact on civic 
space offline, as well as online. Digital rights are simply human rights in online 
spaces and are recognised as being of central importance. This is especially 
true when closing civic space in the physical world means that opening civic 
space online is a necessary last resort. The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic 
has highlighted the importance of digital rights, especially for vulnerable 
groups such as refugees and people in rural and remote areas.
The main objective of this report is to give an overview of digital rights in 
Egypt, especially in the context of freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly, the right to access the internet, and for access to information, and 
the right to knowledge; and to explore the impacts of the political context on 
civic space in general and digital rights in particular.
Social media played a significant role during the political mobilisation of 
2011 that led to the removal of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, the Middle East 
and North Africa region’s longest-surviving regime at the time. Subsequent 
regimes have paid special attention to digital rights and social media, and 
taken all possible measures to control internet access and target activists, 
whether using technical means through censorship and surveillance of their 
online activities; or through legislative tools that legalise internet shutdowns, 
banning websites and criminalising the right to freedom of expression by 
labelling anything that challenges the government as fake news. These 
practices have proliferated during the Covid-19 pandemic, which has been 
dealt with as a national security issue. As a result, bloggers, journalists and 
doctors who share information about the number of infected people have 
been targeted and jailed, accused of publishing fake news.
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2. Political landscape
Undoubtedly, civic space and its actors and dynamics in general are 
affected positively and negatively by the political environment. There is 
a positive direct relationship between the political environment and civic 
space in terms of how open or closed it is. The political environment is 
described as an open environment when it allows and accepts criticism, 
and accommodates different variables and positively interacts with different 
components of the political environment. 
Egypt has witnessed significant political openings and closings throughout 
the past 20 years. For the purposes of this report, the political landscape will 
be addressed during two main phases. The first phase extends from 2000 to 
2010. The second phase extends from 2011 to the present.
2.1 First phase (2000–10)
This phase was under the Mubarak regime, which was in power from 1981 until 
the 2011 ‘revolution’. The political situation was stable during the period from 
2000 to 2010 as regards civic space and digital rights. The Mubarak regime 
adopted policies that led to a relatively open civic space. Irrespective of the 
human rights situation, human rights activists enjoyed the freedom to speak 
out about the human rights situation and establish new organisations.
Although, the political atmosphere under the Mubarak regime permitted 
some level of openness in civic space, it did not prevent the eventual uprising 
against the regime. Many factors contributed to the uprising, including 
corruption (Hassan 2011), control of the political space and human rights 
violations (Rastegari 2012), but there were two main triggers: firstly, electoral 
fraud during the 2010 legislative elections, which resulted in the National 
Party controlling the vast majority of seats in parliament (Bakr 2016: 61, 66); 
and secondly, the death of Khaled Saeed, a youth who was reportedly 
tortured to death by Egyptian police in June 2010 (ibid.: 65).
2.2 Second phase (2011–present)
The second phase is divided into two main landmark periods of political and 
social changes: the first period from 2011 to the end of June 2013; and the 
second period from July 2013 up to the present day. During the first period, 
also known as the Arab Spring, civil society played a significant role and was 
the main engine of the social and political mobility that took place not only in 
Egypt but in all countries that witnessed political regime change during the 
period (ANND 2020). 
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Egypt saw a transitional period from the end of February 2011 until Mohamed 
Morsi was elected as president in June 2012. The Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) managed the transitional process, implementing 
laws and regulations, and issuing a constitutional declaration to regulate 
the interim period between the revolution and the adoption of the new 
constitution. ‘Other issues of national interest addressed by the SCAF 
included electoral law reform, adoption of pro-freedom of association 
measures and media related reforms such as appointment of new editors’ 
(Dube, Simiyu and Ilori 2020: 26). Thus, this period could be characterised as a 
period of relative political opening.
2.3 Muslim Brotherhood regime (2012–13)
The Muslim Brotherhood regime came to power in Egypt after the 
presidential election on 30 June 2012, which resulted in Mohamed Morsi 
being elected as president. Ten months later, the Tamarod protest movement 
was established and began collecting signatures to ‘withdraw confidence’ 
from President Morsi and mobilise citizens for a demonstration on 30 June 
2013. Social media was the main tool used to mobilise for the demonstration, 
which led to the removal of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood regime from 
power. In July 2013, the General Command of the Armed Forces issued a 
statement that led to the ousting of the regime (Arab Republic of Egypt 2013). 
The political situation and civic space changed significantly after July 2013, 
resulting in a closing of civic space. 
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3. The civic space landscape
Civic space is one of the most influential factors in Egyptian political 
dynamics. In light of weak political parties, civil society has become the 
real political opposition to the regime. It is recognised that civil society 
does not operate or develop in a vacuum, but instead reflects the general 
political situation. The political context in Egypt as described in section 2 
has a significant impact on the degree of openness of civic space in Egypt. 
Civic space in Egypt could not be described as completely closed, but it is 
relatively restricted (ANND 2019). In contrast, Egypt has consistently received 
a score of ‘not free’ by Freedom House (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–191
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
In light of the political changes in Egypt since 2011, civil society took the lead 
in demanding political regime change; the use of technology and social 
media for social mobilisation that facilitated the 2011 uprising and, later, the 
removal of the Mubarak regime, marked the beginning of the closure of civic 
space in Egypt, and different measures were taken to reduce the activities of 
civil society or totally stop activities.
1 Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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The period from 2000 until the 2011 uprising had witnessed an increase in the 
activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the establishment 
of new organisations (ANND 2020). Although international and internal 
pressure led the Mubarak regime in this period to take steps to open civic 
space (ibid.) and take the lead in democratic transition from the top down, 
this does not reflect the fact that Egypt’s NGO laws were flexible or in line 
with international human rights law and standards. 
For example, Law No. 84 of 2002 concerning national associations required 
that all NGOs register with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs; 
banned any civil society activities that threatened national unity or violated 
public order or morality, and prohibited groups from receiving foreign funding 
without advance approval; and made the establishment of new NGOs 
subject to authorities’ absolute discretion. Despite the restrictive nature of 
the law, civic space at that time could be described in general as relatively 
open compared to the current Egyptian civic space landscape. Civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and activists enjoyed the freedom to criticise the 
political situation and the regime: 
The NGOs legal framework did not serve to ban civil society outright but 
rather gave enormous discretionary powers to the Ministry of Social Solidarity 
and other government agencies. In practice, this authority was brought to 
bear against certain organizations and individuals that crossed the 
government’s ‘red lines’ in pushing for social reform and political liberalization. 
(ICNL 2020) 
Thus, political regimes in Egypt, whether during the Mubarak era or since 
2011, ‘have selectively used civil society restrictions to ensure civic 
mobilization did not cross the ruling regime’s red lines’ (Brechenmacher 
2017: 37).
Following the 2011 uprising, the civil society environment became more 
repressive. The new regime took action to close civic space with measures 
targeted at NGOs: 
there were concerns by the civil society that the SCAF did not adequately 
consult and open up space for civil society in initiating the reforms which 
undermined the right to participation in decision-making processes. The 
brief period following the uprising in 2011 was a short-lived relief for the civil 
society as the civic space closed and the government began to implement 
repressive practices under the current presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. 
(Dube et al. 2020: 26)
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Egypt has used various tactics to close civic space, and reduce and 
control the activities of civil society activists and organisations, or force 
them to give up their activities to avoid being targeted. These tactics 
include criminalisation of public dissent in the name of national security 
and counterterrorism, use of legal reforms and decrees to institutionalise 
previously extrajudicial repressive practices, public vilification, sweeping 
legal measures, and civil society co-optation. For instance, the regime has 
used sweeping antiterrorism and anti-protest measures to institutionalise 
previously extrajudicial practices. 
Egyptian authorities have targeted human rights groups with travel bans, 
asset freezes and legal harassment, while local development and civic 
initiatives struggle to access resources for their work (Brechenmacher 
2017: 45; Dube et al. 2020). The government engaged in a more overt and 
sweeping crackdown on civil society including a criminal case launched 
in 2011, focused on Egypt-based international organisations alleged to 
have received foreign funding without government permission, which was 
reopened and expanded in 2016 to focus on Egyptian organisations.
The Penal Code also contributed to the closing of civic space in Egypt. Under 
the Penal Code, assets could be frozen and travel bans imposed for vague 
criminal charges mostly associated with terrorism. Article 78 of the Penal 
Code was amended by the 2014 presidential decree to enforce penalties 
of up to 25 years in prison for receipt of foreign funding to undertake 
activities deemed detrimental to national security by the government. The 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) reports that: 
From 2016 through 2019, a number of Egypt’s most prominent civil society 
leaders have been banned from travel in connection with the amended 
law, and several had their personal and organisational assets frozen under 
court order. Others have been detained and interrogated. 
(ICNL 2020)
Egyptian authorities initiated a wave of raids, interrogations, asset freezes, 
and travel bans. Brechenmacher (2017: 45) reports, for example, that: 
In September 2016, a criminal court issued an order to freeze the 
personal assets of five prominent human rights advocates and three 
NGOs: the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Hisham Mubarak 
Law Center, and the Egyptian Center for the Right to Education. Four 
months later, women’s rights advocate Azza Soliman became the first 
to be arrested in connection to the case – a few weeks after authorities 
had frozen her personal and organizational assets and prevented 
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her from traveling abroad. In 2017, the government approved a new 
draconian law to govern CSOs, ‘Law 70 of 2017 on Associations and 
Other Foundations Working in the Field of Civil Work’ which replaced 
Law 84 of 2002. Domestic and international CSOs, governments, and 
UN entities roundly condemned the restrictive new law, which created 
egregious constraints on CSOs’ formation, funding, activities, contact 
with international entities, internal governance, and imposed severe 
criminal penalties on CSOs for violations. Despite its ratification, the law 
was never fully enforced—the government never issued implementing 
regulations to guide its application—and in November of 2018, President 
el-Sisi publicly indicated that he supported amendment of the law.
In 2019, the Egyptian parliament (House of Representatives) adopted the new 
NGO law. Groups most affected included bloggers, trade unionists, students, 
opposition political activists, lawyers, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
intersex or queer (LGBTIQ) and women’s rights activists, doctors and CSOs 
(Dube et al. 2020). The restrictive measures were extended to include non-
activist citizens who use their own accounts on social media applications 
to criticise government policies or share and address topics that might 
be considered prejudicial to national security, such as the health situation 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. According to CIVICUS Monitor (CIVICUS 
2020), civic space in Egypt is rated as ‘closed’. 
In the conclusion of this section, a quick comparison between the situation 
of civic space before and after 2011 shows that domestic civic space has 
historically been restricted, but to varying degrees. As mentioned earlier, 
the Mubarak regime enforced red lines for civil society, but never closed 
civic space completely and the situation could be described as close to 
being open. However, ‘the opening of civic space under Mubarak’s regime 
was not a sign of democratisation but it was a move towards consolidating 
authoritarianism’ (Hassan 2011: 3). Under successive regimes, civic space 
never totally closed but witnessed an increasing number of red lines and 
could be described as a closing of civic space. One common feature of the 
situation of civic space under the different ruling regimes is that it was never 
fully open.
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline 
Year Regime Shift Implication
1971 Anwar Sadat Adoption of permanent 
constitution
Explicitly stipulated rights 
to freedom of assembly 
and to establish NGOs. 
2002 Hosni Mubarak NGO law The new law was 
restrictive: NGOs could 
only be established upon 
approval from the Ministry 
of Social Affairs. 
2012 Mohamed Morsi/Muslim 
Brotherhood
New constitution after 2011 
uprising 
NGOs could in theory be 
established by notifying 
the authorities, but this 
was not the case in 
practice. 
2014 Abdel Fatah El Sisi Penal Code The Penal Code 
criminalised NGOs that 
received funds from 
abroad without prior 
approval.
2015 Abdel Fatah El Sisi Counter-terrorism law The law was a new tool to 
close civic space and 
criminalise NGO activities, 
especially those which 
received funds from 
abroad. 
2017 Abdel Fatah El Sisi Restrictive new NGO law The proposed new law 
was to completely close 
civic space. It was 
condemned by domestic 
and international 
organisations and 
activists, which led to its 
suspension. 
2019 Abdel Fatah El Sisi New NGO law The new law seemed to 
promise an opening up of 
civic space, but it is still too 
early to judge its 
implications.
Source: Author’s own.
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4. Technology landscape
Undoubtedly, the use of technology, the internet, information and communication 
technology (ICT) tools and applications, social media and digital rights 
characterised the uprising in 2011, through communicating and ‘organising 
through Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and YouTube’ (Bakr 2016: 68). It had a 
significant role in mobilising for political changes in Egypt, both during the 
2011 uprising and second uprising on 30 June 2013:
Between 11 January and 10 February 2011, there were 34 million participants 
in the revolution on Facebook across 2,313 pages, where 9,815 participants 
got 461,000 commentaries. During the period between 10 January and 
10 February, 93 million tweets on the revolution were exchanged within Egypt, 
and between Egypt and the outside world. 
(Ibid.)
As a result of political changes and the closing of civic space offline from 2011 
up to now, political activists, human right activists, journalists, bloggers and 
citizens have moved to online platforms as a last resort to exercise their rights 
to access and share information, criticise government policies and political 
measures, and engage in public affairs. Therefore, very restrictive measures 
have been taken to repress and criminalise digital rights and access to 
information. Due in part to these restrictive measures, Egypt’s score on 
Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net Index fell from ‘partially free’ to ‘not 
free’ (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 Egypt’s Freedom on the Net Index score, 
2009–192
Source: Based on data from Freedom House (2020)












2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Year
Free (0–30) Partially free (31–60) Not free (61–100) Internet freedom
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4.1 Using technology: legal framework
Internet use is governed by the Telecommunications Regulation Law of Egypt 
No. 10 (2003), which was used as the legal basis to shut down the internet 
during the Egyptian uprising in 2011. Article 67 of the law allows authorities to 
shut down telecommunications operator networks for reasons of ‘national 
security’ as defined by the authorities.
In 2018, the Egyptian parliament issued Law No.175 of 2018 on Combating 
Information Technology Crimes (Cybercrimes Law) and Law No. 180 of 
2018 on regulating press and media. The new provisions gave authorities 
the power to block websites if they violated national security. Article 1 of 
the Cybercrimes Law defines national security as everything related to 
the independence, stability and security of the homeland, and anything 
related to the affairs of the Presidency, the Ministry of Defence and General 
Intelligence and so on. The same definition is also repeated in many laws 
regulating the internet, without any definition or explanation of the concept 
of national security or clarification of its determinants (El Asouad 2016). 
It is clear from the text that the term ‘national security’ is a loose phrase 
that cannot be defined. Just as the authorities define what is considered 
as security, some believe that through the Cybercrimes Law the state 
aims to fully control the internet, suppress its users and to legalise state 
practices in censoring this space, including blocking websites and using 
mass surveillance of communications. Some would add that the Cybercrime 
Law and the press and media regulation law are two laws that clearly 
establish the practice of blocking websites and monitoring communications 
in Egypt. Before the adoption of these controversial laws, the Egyptian legal 
environment lacked the legal cover and legal justification for the practice of 
blocking online content. Egyptian authorities scaled up their online content-
blocking efforts in May 2017, resulting in the blocking of nearly 500 websites. 
According to Article (19) of Law No. 180 of 2018 on regulating press and media 
(Press and Media Regulation Law), the authorities have the right to block 
websites and electronic news that they characterise as fake news. 
4.2 Using technology: background and practices 
Prior to January 2011, Egypt witnessed an IT revolution. Egypt was classified 
as one of the emerging powers in IT regionally. The number of internet users 
rose from 450,000 at the end of 2000 to 20 million – mostly youths – by 
2011 (Bakr 2016: 59) and reaching 29 million during 2011. Internet penetration 
increased from 0.83 per cent in 2000 to 25.6 per cent in 2011 (see Figure 
4.2). By the end of 2019, there were 49,231,493 internet users and internet 
penetration had increased to 48.1 per cent (Internet World Stats 2020). 
According to a report for the BBC, ‘Egypt was the primary market for BBC 
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Arabic online in 2010, through both its regular and mobile websites, with 
roughly 2 million page views per month’ (SecDev 2011). The number of 
Facebook users increased from 4.2 million in 2010 to 9.4 million in 2011 (MCIT 
2013). By the end of 2019, Egypt had reached 42,400,000 Facebook users 
(Internet World Stats 2020).
Figure 4.2 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Egypt
Source: Based on data from ITU (2020)
Social indicators – such as, but not limited to, rate of literacy, fixed mobile 
contracts and number of internet users – before 2011 showed that, ‘Egyptians 
enjoyed the freedom to be exposed to the internet and express their views 
in the press, media, and blogs’ (Bakr 2016: 60) with no evidence of internet 
filtering, despite Egypt being under emergency law and perennial restrictions 
on freedom of the press. The report for the BBC (SecDev 2011) emphasises 
that civic space was more open before 2011 than under the current political 
regime. However, levels of internet surveillance were also high under the 
Mubarak regime. Since August 2008, internet cafe customers have had to 
provide their names, email addresses and phone numbers before they can 
access the internet. But this has not necessarily translated to measures 
to close civic space. According to Freedom House (2014), the Egyptian 
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censor websites or use high-end technologies to block online discussions 
until 2010. Instead, the Mubarak regime mainly attempted to track members 
of terrorist groups: ‘surveillance and control were targeted at specific 
individuals’ (Hassanin 2014).
Internet and mobile application shutdowns continued after 2011. Some 
reports showed that in 2016:
Internet shutdowns [were] frequent in heavily militarized areas of North 
Sinai and [were] claimed to be carried out to deter communications 
between insurgent groups in the area. In September 2016, one such 
shutdown lasted for eight hours before the services were restored. 
(Grewal 2016: 5)
Signal, a messaging app, was reportedly shut down for a week in December 
2016. Media reports said the shutdown aimed to stifle political dissent (ibid.). 
In general, Egypt has not witnessed an entire internet shutdown similar to 
what happened during the 2011 uprising, but blocking of websites and media 
platforms are frequently reported.
In May 2017, there was a significant increase in the number of blocked websites: 
496 sites were blocked; the blocking of websites has become a frequent 
phenomenon in Egypt (Paradigm Initiative 2019: 14). The further legitimisation 
of website censorship and blocking under the Egyptian Cybercrime Law 
issued in 2018 is evidence that internet censorship in Egypt has now become 
pervasive (AFTE and OONI 2018). The Egyptian government continues to refrain 
from clarifying its decision to block websites in spite of a guarantee in Article 
68 of the Constitution that ‘all information, data and official documents are 
the property of the people; disclosure of it from its various sources is a right 
guaranteed by the state’ (Arab Republic of Egypt 2014).
The deterioration of the political and security situation since 2011, and the 
closing of civic space in Egypt have forced human rights and political activists 
to move their activities to online spaces, and increasingly use technology and 
social media to exercise their right to freedom of expression. The Cybercrime 
Law of 2018 legalised the targeting of journalists, human rights activists, 
bloggers or any persons accused of misusing social media to spread fake 
news. The above-mentioned legal framework is used to criminalise online 
activities and close the online civic space in Egypt. For example:
In 2016, online journalists Amr Badr and Mahmoud Sakka were held in 
detention for attempting to overthrow the regime and incitement on 
social media while a news website photographer was jailed for 2 years. 
Hamdy Mokhtar, a photographer for an opposition news website was also 
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sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. Khaled Elbashy, the Chief Editor of Al 
Bedaiah online newspaper and board member of Egypt’s Press Syndicate 
was detained on May 29, 2016, for ‘disseminating false news and rumours’ 
and ‘sheltering criminals’. Egyptian authorities have also been accused of 
abusing the 2-step verification process for the surveillance of bloggers and 
shut down telephone and Internet services in the North Sinai region during 
the weekend of September 17, 2016. 
(Paradigm Initiative Nigeria 2016: 13)
Table 4.1 Technology regulation timeline
Year Shift Implication
2003 Telecommunications Regulation Law Legal basis for communications 
shutdown during the 2011 Egyptian 
uprising.
2011 Internet shutdown Entire internet shut down in Egypt for 
first time. 
2014 Establishment of Egyptian Supreme 
Cybersecurity Council 
The council was formed of intelligence 
and military personnel, prioritising a 
military perspective over a human rights 
perspective.
2018 Cybercrime Law Used to legalise blocking of websites 
and targeting of activists. 
2018 Press and Media Regulation Law The law gave the authorities the right to 
block online media platforms and target 
journalists. 
Source: Author’s own.
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5. Digital rights landscape
The roots of the current legal framework on digital rights in general can 
be found in the International Bill of Human Rights, especially the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. It is worth mentioning that Egypt is party to most of the 
international human rights instruments used as the initial basis for digital 
rights, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Article 31 of the Constitution stipulates that: ‘The security of information 
space is an integral part of national economy and security. The state 
commits to taking the necessary measures to preserve it in the manner 
organized by law’. In the field of digital rights, which is one of the pillars of 
Internet governance, Article 57 stipulates that: 
Telegraph, postal, and electronic correspondence, telephone calls, 
and other forms of communication are inviolable, their confidentiality is 
guaranteed and they may only be confiscated, examined or monitored 
by causal judicial order, for a limited period of time, and in cases 
specified by the law. The state shall protect the rights of citizens to use 
all forms of public means of communication, which may not be arbitrarily 
disrupted, stopped or withheld from citizens, as regulated by the law.
Article 65 adds that: ‘Freedom of thought and opinion is guaranteed. All 
individuals have the right to express their opinion through speech, writing, 
imagery, or any other means of expression and publication’. Article 68 
stipulates the right to access information, as well. It is prohibited to withhold 
information or intentionally give false information.
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6. Digital rights in times of Covid-19
Egypt’s government has dealt with Covid-19 as a national security issue. 
The government took restrictive legal measures to prevent information 
circulating about the outbreak of Covid-19 in Egypt (AFTE 2020b). Social 
media is surveilled by the government to track and ban any information 
about the number of infected people in the country that contradicts 
government information or data: ‘The Egyptian authorities took a legal 
measures (sic) against the individuals who broadcasts (sic) fake news, 
statements, or rumors on Covid-19. Furthermore, the General Attorney 
stated that it would deal with such fake news and stories according to 
the Law’ (ibid.). According to the Association of Freedom of Thought and 
Expression (AFTE): 
Most likely, the security services’ move came within the framework of a 
broader plan or approach in order to prevent citizens from expressing 
their opinions regarding the policies of state institutions in the face of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, as the Corona issue – now open to include more 
activists and users of social media (sic). 
(ibid.: 5)
Many journalists and citizens have been prosecuted, interrogated and 
sentenced for criticising the government response to the Covid-19 crisis or 
citing numbers of infected people that contradict figures announced by 
the government, as well as people accused of spreading fake news and 
misinformation about the health situation (ibid.).
The Egyptian government’s attempts to restrict digital rights during the 
Covid-19 pandemic are attributed to three main reasons, which have led 
to the majority of arrests of activists and users of social media: (1) criticising 
the Ministry of Health’s policies in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic; 
(2) spreading information about the presence of unannounced cases of 
Covid-19; and (3) requesting the release of prisoners for fear of spreading 
infection in prisons, in particular political prisoners and pre-trial detainees 
(ibid.). 
In addition, in its report about how the Egyptian government dealt with the 
internet during the pandemic outbreak, AFTE emphasised that: 
the aim of arrest the activists and social media users is to restrict the 
public debate about Covid-19 and prevent the Egyptian citizens from 
using the only reaming (sic) means to interact with public affairs, which is 
using the Internet and Social Media to circulate information and express 
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opinion on public policies In this regard, the Egyptian authorities use their 
security services, which surveillance (sic) the accounts of social media 
users. Furthermore Egypt has witnessed the banning of many websites 
that provided contents related to Covid-19 during the pandemic. 
(ibid.: 6) 
6.1 Digital rights of vulnerable groups 
Since it started, the Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically transformed 
most daily activities such as work, learning, communication and access to 
information that is only accessible through the internet. Therefore, access to 
the internet during Covid-19 is an essential issue, and governments are under 
an obligation to provide and secure affordable devices and access to the 
internet for vulnerable groups. 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-
Egypt: 
The majority of refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt were already 
highly vulnerable prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 and has been directly 
impacted by the evolving circumstances. Many have lost their source of 
income and cannot afford to buy sufficient basic supplies or pay their rent. 
(UNHCR-Egypt 2020)
According to Farahat (2020), obstacles that contribute to denying refugees 
their right to access the internet include their limited financial capacity, 
mainly because they cannot afford to buy appropriate equipment that has 
features to connect to the internet and operate the different applications 
and digital platforms used for e-learning and communication. In addition, 
lack of official recognition of refugee documents such as personal ID 
prevents them from registering with different internet service providers 
to have access to the internet or to purchase SIM cards under their own 
names, which means they are unable to access portable financial wallets, 
online cash payments and various other mobile financial services and 
smartphone applications.
In summary, digital rights for some vulnerable groups such as refugees have 
been ignored by UNHCR and the Egyptian government during the Covid-19 
pandemic. So, the Egyptian government and UNHCR-Egypt have to work 
together to ensure refugees’ – and, in particular, students’ – access to the 
internet and other digital rights. 
227Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Egypt Digital Rights Landscape Report
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Mohamed Farahat © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.014
7. Conclusion and recommendations 
There is a direct relationship between the political environment, civic space 
and digital rights. Digital rights could be described as human rights in 
‘virtual civic space’. The political environment in Egypt has negatively affected 
civic space both offline and online. Social media technologies were used by 
civic activists in 2010 and 2011 to open civic space. The government has since 
used a range of technologies to close civic space, shutting it down, monitoring 
messages and manipulating discourse. Legislation has been used to mitigate 
the effectiveness of civil society institutions as well as individual activists.
The role of social media during the events of 2011 and afterwards 
encouraged the government to use new tools to monitor, control and surveil 
online activities and adopt very restrictive laws that deprive people of their 
rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression using the internet; 
also, the right to privacy has been affected by surveillance.
For reasons of counterterrorism and national security, civic space is restricted and 
seems closed. The new political environment does not seem like it will change 
in the near future. Moreover, parliament is upholding the trend of government 
and plays a negative role, particularly regarding laws linked to digital rights. 
The above conclusion leads to the necessity to:
– Adopt advocacy campaigns at national, regional and international levels 
that call to change existing laws, producing policy papers and briefs 
related to digital rights. One of the strong points is that there are a lot 
of NGOs focused on human rights, but not specialised in digital rights. 
Capacity building for civil society on digital rights is urgently needed. 
– Build the capacity of political party members and parliament on digital 
rights issues, to be able to change or adopt legislation in line with 
international human rights law – this is urgently required.
– Adopt ‘strategic litigation’ as a mechanism to change the government’s 
policies that negatively affect civic space and digital rights. 
– Design capacity-building programmes for lawyers, especially on strategic 
litigation, digital rights and using international human rights instruments 
before national courts.
– Raise the awareness of human rights activists and civil society about 
digital rights.
– Increase the number of organisations that focus on digital rights. This is 
essential: the shortage of organisations that work on digital rights and 
related issues creates a gap. Only a few organisations specialise in this field.
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1. Introduction
Internet users in Cameroon face many challenges when it comes to 
accessing civic space, and particularly digital civic space – not least the 
notorious months-long internet shutdowns. Economic, social, cultural, and 
political factors all play a part in the landscape of the digital rights of this 
badly divided country. This report aims to briefly sketch the relevant political, 
civic, and technological landscape. It examines the various barriers to 
accessing digital civic space faced by journalists, minorities, and ordinary 
citizens, and identifies gaps in knowledge and capacity that must be 
addressed in order to allow the citizens of Cameroon to monitor their civic 
space and exercise their digital rights. The report suggests that some of 
the essential steps are securing internet access and educating citizens in 
identifying fake news, and concludes that internal security and international 
scrutiny are the necessary foundation for protecting civic space.
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2. The political landscape
2.1 Background
Cameroon is a lower-middle-income country in West Africa with a 
population of around 25 million (World Bank 2019), comprising more than 200 
ethnic groups (Tchouteu 2017). Around half of the population live in an urban 
setting (Benneh and DeLancey 2020). Economic development is held back 
by economic and political corruption: Cameroon scores only 25 out of 100 
on the Corruption Perceptions Index, where 100 indicates the absence of 
corruption (Transparency International 2019). The country suffers from high 
unemployment as well as ongoing ethnic and regional tensions, which have 
escalated to the point of being almost a civil war – notably in the Northwest 
and Southwest regions of the country. Since 2008, it has consistently been 
rated in the ‘alert’ category for state fragility (Fund for Peace 2020).
Cameroon is divided into majority francophone (French-speaking) and 
minority anglophone (English-speaking) regions. Many anglophone 
Cameroonians feel sidelined by the francophone regime, which has led to 
protests and even separatist movements in recent years.
Cameroon is officially a democracy with universal suffrage, but the 
effectiveness of the democracy is undermined by an autocratic regime. 
Paul Biya has been president of Cameroon since the 1980s, and is entitled 
to appoint ministers, vice-ministers, and regional functionaries. He is also 
the head of the armed forces (Nations Encyclopedia 2020a). Although there 
has been a multi-party system since the 1990s, and despite major anti-Biya 
protests in 2008, Biya’s party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement 
(CPDM), has retained power at every election.
Contested elections have been a recurring theme of Paul Biya’s premiership. 
The CPDM has convincingly won every election since the introduction 
of democratic elections, but there have frequently been accusations of 
irregularities, fraud, and voter intimidation. In 2006, Elections Cameroon 
(ELECAM) was created as an independent body to monitor elections, 
although it did not begin work until 2010. The fact that 11 of its 12 members 
were members of the CPDM and appointed by the president made its true 
independence questionable (Cameroon Today n.d.).
Despite the oversight of ELECAM, there were accusations in the 2011 
presidential election that the opposition had colluded with the government. 
At that point, all of the leaders of the opposition were still former members 
of the Cameroonian National Union, the party (headed by Biya) that ruled 
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Cameroon when it was a single-party state, until 1985 (Tchouteu 2017). 
Likewise, in the first senatorial elections in 2013, there were reports that the 
main opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), had cooperated 
with Biya for personal reward to ensure that the CPDM established control of 
the senate (ibid.).
Biometric voter registration was introduced in 2013 but allegations of serious 
electoral irregularities have not gone away (Reuters 2018). The president has 
abused his political power to remove restrictions to presidential terms and 
to ensure that the new senate was full of his supporters, avoiding genuine 
political scrutiny (Tchouteu 2017).
2.2 Recent political developments
Since 2016, there have been protests and political unrest in the anglophone 
regions, which led to these regions being badly underrepresented in the 2018 
elections. Separatist groups have been involved in conflict with government 
forces, and both sides have been accused of atrocities against civilians 
(Human Rights Watch 2019).
Since the unrest began in 2016, separatists have imposed ‘ghost town days’ in 
the anglophone regions every Monday, when all social and economic activity 
is suppressed. ‘Ghost town’ protests were originally used in the 1990s as part 
of a strike by transportation workers, but the idea has been revived and 
imposed by threat of force. Separatist factions in the western (anglophone) 
regions of Cameroon seek to create the state of ‘Ambazonia’. A symbolic 
Independence Day was celebrated in the anglophone regions in October 
2018, which provoked a government backlash. However, separatist groups 
remain divided, reducing their effectiveness (Foute 2019b). Other activists in 
anglophone regions simply want more representation for English speakers 
within Cameroon. There was considerable unrest in 2016 when proposals 
were released for French to replace English in the education and judicial 
systems within the anglophone regions (Atabong 2016).
Paul Tasong, Economic Minister Delegate in charge of Planning, was 
appointed as National Coordinator of the Presidential Plan for the 
Reconstruction and Development of the Northwest and Southwest regions 
in April 2020. This ten-year plan aims to promote social cohesion, revitalise 
social infrastructure, and revive the economy of the region, but time will tell 
whether these measures will end the conflict in the area (Cameroon Tribune 
2020).
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3. The civic space landscape
The term ‘civic space’ refers to an open and democratic society. An open 
civic space allows citizens and civil society organisations to organise, 
participate, and communicate without hindrance. In doing so, they are able 
to claim their rights and influence the political and social structures around 
them. This can only happen when a state holds by its duty to protect its 
citizens, and respects and facilitates their fundamental rights to associate, 
assemble peacefully, and freely express views and opinions (see CIVICUS 
2020). These rights are not available in Cameroon, with the country being 
classed as ‘not free’ every year since 1977 (Freedom House 2019, 2020; see 
Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Freedom House ranking for ADRN countries, 2000–191
Note: ADRN – African Digital Rights Network.
Source: Adapted from Freedom House (2019)
Flashpoints over civic space have generally occurred around the time of 
elections, which are widely regarded as fraudulent and corrupt. Biometric 
voter registration was mandated in 2012 and rolled out from 2013, using 
German technology. The permanent biometric register of voters is now 
1 Data not available for 2010 and 2012.
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updated each year (Azonga 2014). Despite this attempt to regularise voting 
practices, suspicions and allegations of fraud and disenfranchisement still 
accompany elections in Cameroon.
Cameroon is a member of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union, 
and as such has ratified many UN human rights conventions such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (National Commissions for UNESCO of France and Germany 
2010). However, in practice, Cameroon has been accused of many human 
rights abuses during the last 20 years, particularly since the beginning of 
the anglophone crisis in 2016. Accusations include unlawful or arbitrary 
killings, forced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention (US Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2019). Civic space is closed down 
by restrictions on political participation, peaceful assembly, and freedom of 
association, while the media is controlled by violence, threats, and unjustified 
arrests (ibid.).
3.1 The civic space and the media
Cameroon is currently ranked 134 out of 180 in the World Press Freedom 
Index (Reporters without Borders 2020). Much of its media is controlled by 
the state. While there are dozens of private newspapers, none of them is as 
regularly produced or as widely read as the government newspaper, the 
Cameroon Tribune. Cameroon’s radio and TV network is controlled by the 
Office de Radiodiffusion–Télévision Camerounaise (CRTV), which is under the 
authority of the Ministry of Information and Culture (Nations Encyclopedia 
2020b). The government is willing to use its power to shut down criticism or 
scrutiny by the private media. In 2008, Equinox TV was forcibly suspended. 
The reason given by the government was that it had failed to pay a 
broadcast licence fee, but it was generally believed that it was actually 
because of Equinox’s coverage of the 2008 protests against the removal of 
limits on presidential terms.
Abuses against the media and journalists followed the contested 2018 
election (CPJ 2020). In November 2018, Equinoxe presenter and prominent 
anglophone journalist, Mimi Mefo Takambou, was detained and charged 
with disseminating fake news, endangering state security, and terrorism (BBC 
Monitoring 2018). Then in 2019, pidgin journalist Samuel Wazizi died in military 
custody, allegedly from torture (CPJ 2020). In August 2019, the USA excluded 
Cameroon from a regional trade pact because of its human rights abuses 
(Ekonde and Adebayo 2019).
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The latest example of intimidation of the media is the arrest in July 2020 
of Ojong Joseph, a human rights reporter. On 14 February 2020, there was 
a massacre in Ngarbuh, a village in the anglophone Northwest region, 
allegedly by government troops. The government initially denied the 
massacre and denigrated international human rights observers, saying 
civilian deaths were an unfortunate accident during a clash with separatist 
terrorists. However, they later carried out an inquiry and arrested three 
soldiers for the outrage (Finnan 2020). This provides a glimmer of hope 
about Cameroon’s future attitude both to civil rights and to disinformation.
3.2 The civic space and minorities
The key minority in Cameroon is the English-speaking population, who 
make up about 20 per cent of the country. The recent anglophone crisis 
was precipitated by the neglect of English as a medium, and the prioritising 
of French systems, in the anglophone education and judicial systems 
(Atabong 2016). Since the beginning of the crisis in 2016, it is estimated that 
3,000 people have been killed and half a million have had to flee their 
homes (Human Rights Watch 2020b).
Both the government and anglophone separatists have been accused 
of violence, including sexual violence. This means that women and girls 
are especially vulnerable to being targeted in the conflict. In addition, 
the Cameroon government is poor at tackling crimes of violence against 
women (US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour 2019). Girls are 
entitled to access education on the same basis as boys, but female literacy 
continues to lag behind that of males (UNESCO Institute of Statistics 2020). 
Women are also less likely to have access to the internet (Toussi 2019).
Same-sex sexual activity is against the law in Cameroon, and there is 
widespread discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) people. The lack of legal protection from discrimination makes it 
harder for members of this community to access education, health care, 
and employment (Acodevo et al. 2017). The 2010 law on cybercrime and 
cyberterrorism explicitly criminalises using electronic communications to 
sexually proposition a member of the same sex, a prohibition that does 
not extend to opposite-sex propositions. Blackmail and extortion against 
people who have (or are perceived to have) a homosexual orientation are 
common, and there is very little redress. Organisations that support LGBT 
rights find it difficult to register in Cameroon, and lawyers who defend 
people accused of LGBT crimes can be subject to intimidation (ibid.).
236Digital Rights in Closing Civic Space: Lessons from Ten African Countries 
Cameroon Digital Rights Landscape Report
ids.ac.uk
© 2021 Kathleen Ndongmo © Institute of Development Studies. DOI: 10.19088/IDS.2021.015
All of these restrictions and difficulties mean that the severely limited civic 
space in Cameroon is even more limited for people other than heterosexual, 
francophone males.
3.3 The civic space timeline
The first major disturbance of the last 20 years in Cameroon began in 
February 2008. President Paul Biya proposed a constitutional amendment 
that would remove limits upon presidential terms, which would enable 
him to continue as president even though he had already held office for 
25 years. The major opposition party organised a demonstration but the 
presence of gendarmes (military security forces) forced this to be called 
off. Gendarmes and police used tear gas and water cannons, but this 
only inflamed the situation, leading to the deaths of two young men. A TV 
channel that focused on the protests was shut down on a pretext (Global 
Security n.d.).
Protests continued in February 2008 over the death of the two youths, 
the extension of presidential terms, and worsening economic conditions, 
including high food prices. Rather than engaging with criticism, the 
government of Cameroon responded with high levels of violence, leaving at 
least 16 people dead (Global Security n.d.).
In 2010 and 2014, the government of Cameroon responded to new 
threats with new laws. The 2010 law on cybercrime and cyberterrorism 
was intended to stop the spread of harmful false information and the 
promotion of terrorism, but the terms of the law mean that it partly 
criminalises free speech online, as there are possible fines and jail terms 
for those who disseminate information that they cannot verify. Cameroon 
is troubled by genuine terrorists connected to Boko Haram and ISIS in 
Africa, but the law on terrorism that was passed in 2014 was later abused 
to hold journalists in detention. One problem with these laws is that the 
government of Cameroon may define ‘terrorism’ very differently from 
those posting content online – content that they believe to be legitimate 
criticism. This was illustrated in 2016 when there was a serious train 
derailment. Reports circulated on social media while the government 
was still officially denying knowledge of the accident, and later individual 
statements and videos of the accident on social media contradicted 
official government accounts about the cause and the number of 
casualties. The government of Cameroon and the state-run media 
reacted with strong criticism of social media use in general, with Cavaye 
Djibril, Speaker of the National Assembly, calling it a ‘social malaise’ and 
even ‘a new form of terrorism’ (Tande 2016).
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The year 2017 was that of the long internet shutdowns, which were used 
as a tactic to shut down civic space, especially for anglophones. The 
first shutdown began in 2017 and lasted for 93 days. It seems to have 
been in response to anglophone protests about the sidelining of English 
in education and the justiciary. English and French officially have equal 
status in Cameroon, but in practice, French has priority and English is 
often neglected by the francophone regime (Atabong 2016). The first 
shutdown originally affected the whole of Cameroon but was later 
restricted to the anglophone regions. After international pressure from 
the UN, internet access was restored, but a further, longer shutdown 
followed in October 2017. Money transfers, online businesses, certain kinds 
of health care (e.g. coordinating malaria treatment), and education 
all relied on internet access. Tech entrepreneurs, without access to the 
internet, were forced to move to other parts of Cameroon or to leave the 
country (Ritzen 2018).
In 2018, Paul Biya won a seventh term as president in an election that 
was marred by low turnout, especially in anglophone regions, where 
intimidation of anglophone voters kept voter turnout in single figures 
(Reuters 2018). In an effort at public relations, CRTV featured an interview 
with a person claiming to be a Transparency International observer who 
said the elections were ‘extremely good’ (O’Donnell and Gramer 2018). 
This person was later exposed as a fraud with no links whatsoever to 
Transparency International (Transparency International 2018).
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Table 3.1 Civic space timeline table – key events
Year Shift Implication
2006 ELECAM created to monitor elections, starts to 
function in 2010.
Shows government intention that elections be seen as 
free and fair, despite no actual improvement.
2008 Riots over food prices harshly suppressed. Increasing government authoritarianism.
2010 New law on cybersecurity and cybercriminality. Limits freedom of speech online.
2011 Paul Biya stands for re-election.
Mobile access to Twitter stopped for ten days 
because of protests.
The first major incident of internet censorship in 
Cameroon, demonstrates growing importance of online 
activism.
2012–13 Introduction of biometric voter registration. Aimed at reducing electoral irregularities.
2014 Journalists arrested for defamation. Chilling effect on freedom of the press.
2015 New law requires registration for all SIM card owners 
to target criminal and terrorist activity.
Increases government control over telecoms companies 
and citizens’ access to communications.
2016 Journalists arrested for failing to disclose information 
and sources.
Restriction on press freedom.
2017 Anglophone journalists, opposition politicians, and 
civil society figures imprisoned.
Anglophone voices silenced, power reserved for 
francophone administration.
2017 Writer Patrice Nganang arrested after criticising 
government on Facebook.
Chilling effect on freedom of speech and online 
dialogue.
2018 Paul Biya re-elected in contested election. Abuses 
against media and journalists follow.
Criticism of the government and electoral process 
becomes more dangerous.
2019 Journalist Samuel Wazizi dies in military custody. Chilling effect on freedom of the press.
2019 New law passed criminalising hate speech and 
tribalism.
Gives the government new powers over freedom of 
speech, can be used in partisan manner.
2020 Human rights reporter Ojong Joseph is arrested. Sends a message about lack of respect for human 
rights.
Source: Author’s own.
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4. The technology landscape
Although privately owned television stations have been allowed in 
Cameroon since 2001, the government still maintains a high degree of 
control over the media.
Fixed-line telephones are comparatively rare, but there is high uptake of 
mobile telephone services. In 2000, there were 95,000 landline telephones 
in use whereas in 2002 there were already 300,000 mobile phones in use 
(Nations Encyclopedia 2020b). The use of mobile phones has increased 
steadily over the last 20 years, especially as costs for fixed lines continue 
to be prohibitive. Recent data show that mobile phone penetration has 
reached 90 per cent of the population, or 23.6 million people.2
Fixed telephone lines are provided by the Cameroon Telecommunications 
Corp (CAMTEL), which is owned by the state. In 2020, there are four private 
mobile telecoms providers, but telecoms are still controlled by CAMTEL, 
the state-owned mobile provider that holds the monopoly of optical fibre 
management (African Telecoms News n.d.). CAMTEL can suspend the access 
of other internet providers, something that happened in October 2017, when 
Orange Cameroon’s use of the networks was unlawfully suspended as the 
result of a payment dispute that Orange strongly denied, cutting off service 
for its users (Medou Badang 2017).
The introduction of 3G and 4G mobile internet took place in 2015–16. 
This allowed wider use of the internet, as people had previously had to 
rely on internet cafes. Unfortunately, lack of real competition between 
mobile providers has kept mobile internet expensive and therefore either 
inaccessible or severely limited for most people in the country (Owono and 
Blanc 2014). Neither mobile telephones nor fixed-line telephones are an 
affordable internet solution for most Cameroonians.
Internet penetration has grown hugely in Cameroon over the last 20 years, 
from 0.25 per cent in 2000 up to 23.1 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 4.1). 
However, this total remains low compared to the African average of 39.3 per 
cent and the world average of 58.8 per cent (Statista 2020). Internet services 
are notoriously slow in Cameroon, with bandwidths of 340 gigabytes in 2014, 
compared to 12 terabytes in nearby Ghana (Owono and Blanc 2014).
2 See Mobile Connections in Cameroon.
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of the population with 
internet access in Cameroon
Source: Based on data from ITU (2020)
In 2010, the government took its first major step in trying to control 
cyberspace. It passed a new law relating to cybersecurity and 
cybercriminality. While many countries have laws aimed at preventing online 
crime and terrorism, what was significant about this law was that users of 
social media could be punished with fines and imprisonment if they shared 
information that could not be verified:
Whoever uses electronic communications or an information system to 
design, to publish or propagate a piece of information without being 
able to attest its veracity or prove that the said piece of information 
was true shall be punished with imprisonment for from 06 (six) months 
to 02 (two) years or a fine of from 5,000,000 (five million) to 10,000,000 
(ten million) CFA francs or both of such fine and imprisonment.3
This naturally places ordinary citizens at a disadvantage, as they may be 
forced either to accept government accounts of events or to face legal 
punishments for disseminating information from other sources. This law also 
discriminates against LGBT people by criminalising ‘sexual propositions to 
another person of the same sex’ (Acodevo et al. 2017: 6).
Although the government set up a bilingual web portal as early as 2001, 
its use remains limited, partly due to citizens lacking access to the internet, 
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and partly due to a failure of government to engage with the potential of 
the new medium. The train derailment incident in 2016 (see section 3.3) clearly 
demonstrated the government’s distrust and suspicion of social media and 
instant internet communication.
This hostile attitude is also shown in the internet shutdowns that have been a 
notorious government tactic in Cameroon within the last five years. Despite 
difficulties of access due to high expense, the internet has been used in recent 
years for education, health care (e.g. access to malaria treatment), and for 
entrepreneurial, web-based businesses. Government shutdowns in 2017 into 2018 
had a catastrophic effect on all web-based commerce and amenities, driving 
some entrepreneurs out of the country (Ritzen 2018). These shutdowns have often 
been contained to just the anglophone regions, highlighting their political nature. 
The justification given by the government for shutdowns (when one is offered) 
is to prevent the dissemination of misleading and harmful information. The 
government has also ‘throttled’ internet access at times by deliberately reducing 
bandwidth. Sometimes this throttling is targeted, as with the slowdown of social 
media before the announcement of the 2018 election results (Netblocks 2018).
There is also evidence that the Cameroon state engages in surveillance 
of emails and social media, although this is not highly developed, given 
Cameroon’s low level of internet usage (APC and Hivos 2014).
Despite a low level of Twitter use, hashtag campaigns have been used to 
express discontent about the political and economic situation in Cameroon, 
and to garner international attention (Nganji and Cockburn 2020). This method 
was used successfully in 2017 with the #BringBackOurInternet hashtag. The 
prominent whistle-blower Edward Snowdon tweeted his support. International 
attention may have contributed to the decision of the Cameroon government to 
restore internet access. However, it did not stop them from imposing a second, 
even longer shutdown after the protests in the anglophone regions following a 
symbolic anglophone ‘Independence Day’ on 1 October 2017.
The Cameroonian diaspora helped with the #BringBackOurInternet campaign. 
Emigrants often use web-based technology to take part in the civic space of 
Cameroon, using platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp (Okwuosa 
2017). Their internet access tends to be much better, especially when they are living 
in Western countries such as Germany or the USA, but government restrictions 
on internet access within Cameroon have the power to limit the effectiveness of 
diaspora interventions, if the resident population cannot receive communications.
The government imposed higher transfer charges on wire transfer agencies 
such as MoneyGram and Western Union in January 2019. Later in 2019, 
there were allegations that funds transfers to anglophone regions of the 
country were being deliberately blocked (Mimi Mefo Info 2019). During the 
Covid-19 pandemic, they also requested telecoms companies to shut down 
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electronic money transfers to a relief fund for needy families because it was 
coordinated by the opposition party Cameroon Resistance Movement (CRM) 
(Paradigm Initiative 2020).
Table 4.1 Technology timeline table
Year Shift Implication
2001 E-government web portal set up: Services 
du Premier Ministre 
Groundwork for e-governance and open 
government data
2010 Universal Telecom Service Law Opens phone and internet access to 
badly-served regions, increasing civic space
2010 Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Law Fines and imprisonment for anyone unable 
to prove the veracity of online posts
2011 Mobile access to Twitter blocked for ten 
days because of protests
Demonstrates that online protest was 
impacting government 
2013 Compulsory biometric ID To address election irregularities
2014 Third mobile phone provider introduced Potential for service improvement through 
competition (not realised yet)
2015 Mandatory SIM registration Reduces privacy. Aids surveillance
2015–16 Introduction of 3G and 4G Open access to online info and 
communications
2016 Digital Cameroon strategic plan 
launched
Positive intention to increase digital access, 
but this did not last
2016 #AnglophoneCrisis campaign goes viral 
internationally
Opens international space to issues and 
puts pressure on government
2017 Two major internet shutdowns:
1st: 93 days, whole country
2nd: 250 days, anglophone region only
Dramatic closing of civic space and 
increase in government control
2017 Use of VPNs to evade shutdowns Keeps space open for those able to afford 
access to VPN software
2017 #bringbackourinternet campaign gains 
international traction
External pressure forces reopening of online 
civic space
2018 Throttling of bandwidth to slow social media 
before announcement of election results
Closes space for citizen voices in 
commentary on events
2019 Tax imposed on international app 
downloads
Expense restricts access and creates class 
divide in digital access
2019 Higher transfer charges imposed on wire 
transfer agencies
Restricts financial options of Cameroonians
2020 Government requests shutdown of 
opposition fundraising for pandemic relief
#BringBackOurRice hashtag started
Citizens attempt to hold government 
accountable
Source: Author’s own.
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5. The digital rights landscape
Digital proficiency in Cameroon is still at a low level. Citizens face particular 
challenges to using the internet in general, and to effectively using it as a 
medium of civic space. The government launched a Strategic Plan for a Digital 
Cameroon by 2020 in 2016 which aimed to improve infrastructure and increase 
cybersecurity and digital literacy, but these laudable aims were undermined 
by shutting off the internet the following year (Digital Cameroon 2016).
The high cost of internet on both mobiles and landlines leaves many 
Cameroonians unable to access the internet. Cameroon has lower internet 
penetration than average for Africa, at 23.1 per cent. Only 10.2 per cent 
of citizens have a Facebook account (Statista 2020). This problem is 
compounded by the limitations of the electricity network, which does not 
extend to most rural areas (Ndongsok and Ruppel 2018).
The state has strong control over both telecoms and the media which it uses 
to the disadvantage of its citizens, for example by bandwidth throttling, 
internet shutdowns, and sanctioning private telecoms providers and TV 
channels. These tactics are particularly focused on anglophone regions. 
Digital advances in Cameroon have usually been located in these regions 
(for example at ‘Silicon Mountain’ in Buea) so this antipathy to anglophone 
culture holds the whole of Cameroon back digitally (Atabong 2019).
There are major restrictions on free speech online. Laws on terrorism and 
cybercrime make it a serious offence to share information that the sharer 
cannot prove to be true, which places a high burden on netizens. Using 
electronic communications for same-sex relationships is also illegal.
Cameroon is one of several African countries implicated in recent Russian 
disinformation campaigns, apparently recruiting local people with genuine 
social media accounts (Ilyushina 2019). It is too early to know what the effects 
will be on Cameroonian online civic space, but it seems unlikely that the 
Cameroonian government has the technical knowledge to deal with this new 
and sophisticated threat, given its acknowledged weaknesses in the area of 
ICT (Digital Cameroon 2016).
Cybersecurity remains poor for institutions and individual users in Cameroon. 
The country scored only 0.432 (out of 1) in the latest Global Cybersecurity 
Index (ITU 2018).
The government of Cameroon clearly views digital space as more of a threat 
than an opportunity, which is in line with its authoritarian view on civil rights 
in general, particularly in relation to minorities. The government deliberately 
restricts citizens’ access to the internet, as well as carrying out surveillance 
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of social media. A lack of transparency means that, as yet, not very much is 
known about where the government is sourcing its surveillance technology 
from, although CAMTEL’s telecommunications equipment is sourced from 
its principal Chinese partners (APC and Hivos 2014). In 2019, Cameroon’s 
government launched a video-surveillance command centre built and 
implemented by Chinese technology company Huawei. The centre runs off 
Huawei equipment and provides connectivity for the transmission of footage 
(itweb.africa 2019).
Despite these difficulties, Cameroonians who are active online, and 
Cameroonian emigrants, have made use of social media to challenge the 
status quo and hold the government to account, using Twitter hashtags 
such as #BringBackOurInternet and #KeepItOn (#KeepItOn 2018) to highlight 
internet outages, and #anglophonecrisis to report the ongoing tensions and 
violence in the anglophone regions. Some net-savvy citizens have been able 
to maintain their internet access using virtual private networks (VPNs) but 
these are expensive and must be downloaded before shutdowns occur in 
order to be effective.
Deliberate disinformation is a new threat that is not yet fully understood, by 
the government or by citizens. Social media, and Facebook in particular, 
have been a means of spreading ‘fake news’, hate speech, and inflammatory 
posts, worsening the situation between separatist or federalist anglophones 
and the francophone regime, security services, and supporters (McAllister 
2018). The government has responded by passing a law criminalising 
hate speech, with higher penalties for hate speech spread via media 
(#defyhatenow 2020), but they fail to implement this consistently. Human 
rights lawyer, Felix Agbor Balla, said: ‘The problem with government is that 
they politicise it – they use it when it is convenient for them. When people use 
[hate speech] against people who are against the government – nobody 
cares’ (Ekonde 2020).
The Cameroon government itself has recently made use of a number of 
USA-based PR companies in an attempt to garner political support for the 
regime in Washington, but they do not appear to be targeting citizens within 
Cameroon so far (Foute 2019a). In 2018, it also tried to persuade Facebook to 
remove anti-government ‘fake news’ even when that news had been verified 
by international organisations such as Amnesty International (Atabong 2018).
In this environment, citizens need education in assessing and using 
information that is disseminated online in order to judge its veracity, and 
education about what constitutes hate speech. Facebook has so far failed 
in its duty of care in this area, but government censorship is not a viable 
alternative.
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6. Digital rights during Covid-19
Cameroon is the country in central Africa that has been worst affected by 
Covid-19, despite implementing typical restrictions on freedom of movement 
and association such as prohibiting gatherings of more than 50 people, 
encouraging e-meetings, and closing ports and airports to passengers 
(Republic of Cameroon Prime Minister’s Office 2020). Whether any extra 
restrictions on liberty will continue once the pandemic is over remains to be seen.
The government’s handling of the crisis has been marred by a double 
scandal. In June, Human Rights Watch called on Cameroon’s government 
to disclose why funds for tackling the virus had not been released from the 
Health Solidarity Fund. Since 1993, public primary care facilities have been 
obliged to pay 10 per cent of their monthly revenues to the fund (Human 
Rights Watch 2020a). Then in July 2020, human rights groups warned that 
the US$40m solidarity fund raised by civilians had been embezzled, including 
4,000 bags of rice that were illegally sold (Kindzeka 2020). Citizens placed 
pressure upon the government by starting a Twitter campaign using the 
hashtag #BringBackOurRice, along the lines of #BringBackOurInternet. 
The government initially denied all allegations but has since ordered an 
investigation.
The effect of the pandemic on digital rights has been mixed. CAMTEL, 
Orange, and MTN have all offered reduced prices for internet data to help 
people stay connected during lockdown, keeping online space open. On 
the other hand, personal data are under threat, with information being 
shared online about people who arrived in the country and were suspected 
of having the virus. The government also abused its power to try to get 
telecoms companies to block payments to a relief fund coordinated by an 
opposition party (Paradigm Initiative 2020).
Tracking and tracing infection is likely to be an important part in the next 
phase of controlling the virus. So far, the Cameroon government has not 
implemented any form of digital track-and-trace, relying instead on public 
awareness messages. However, should the government start collecting data 
about citizens for virus control purposes, the level of corruption in Cameroon 
means that there is a danger it would be retained after the crisis passes 
and/or used for other purposes, to the detriment of its citizens.
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7. Conclusion
The major challenges to both civic space and digital rights in Cameroon 
come from the autocratic government’s tight grip on discourse, both online 
and in the press. International observers have noted major infractions of 
freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the freedom of the press, 
despite Cameroon being a signatory of many human rights treaties. Abuses 
against ordinary citizens, and especially against writers and journalists, 
create an environment where using electronic or traditional media to voice 
dissenting opinions can come with a high cost. It is not reasonable to expect 
people to risk their freedom or their lives to enter civic space in Cameroon. 
Therefore, international pressure on the Cameroonian government to 
deal with its record of human rights abuses is essential to digital rights 
in Cameroon. The government has softened its stance lately, launching 
investigations into both abuses by soldiers and embezzlement of funds. This 
may be an indication that it is prepared to take action to be welcomed back 
into the international fold.
Lack of access to the internet is also a huge problem for Cameroonians when 
it comes to exercising their digital rights. Again, the root of the problem is 
government control. Although the Cameroon government does not have 
a monopoly on telecoms, its high level of control over all providers restricts 
meaningful competition that might bring down prices. The government has 
failed miserably to achieve the aspirations in its 2016 Strategic Plan for a 
Digital Cameroon by 2020 (Digital Cameroon 2016) and has in fact taken 
backwards steps by bandwidth throttling and shutdowns. National and 
international pressure must be placed upon the government to prioritise 
citizens’ access to fast, affordable internet. In 2020, this is an essential 
requirement for taking part in civic space and being part of the international 
community. Better use of digital resources could also be an advantage to the 
functioning of the government, if it could manage to see the internet as not 
merely a threat but also an opportunity.
For netizens in Cameroon, current priorities are education about, and 
access to, VPNs. These are essential to circumvent government shutdowns 
of the internet or of particular web-based services such as Twitter and 
WhatsApp. Cameroonians who are online should be encouraged to select 
and download a VPN before any shutdown occurs, so that they can continue 
to occupy the civic space and draw international attention to the situation. 
VPNs can be expensive to use (although often free to download) so it would 
be useful to develop an affordable VPN targeted at netizens of countries at 
risk from shutdowns.
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Disinformation or ‘fake news’ has become a serious problem worldwide in 
recent years, particularly from malicious state actors. While there is as yet 
no evidence that the Cameroon government is targeting its citizens in this 
way, the fact that Cameroonian social media users have been implicated 
in Russian disinformation campaigns is a signal that Cameroonian citizens, 
and all netizens, need to be educated about this threat: what it is, how to 
spot it, what to do about it. Often the solution is as simple as checking the 
source of a news item or article via a basic online search. However, as ‘fake 
news’ becomes more complex, education from experts in this field will be 
more valuable. Attempts to get the social networks themselves to stem the 
problem have failed, so education on the ground will be essential, ideally 
both by digital means (to reach a digitally active audience) and also through 
in-school education, to reach the upcoming generation of internet users.
All of these suggestions would be valuable for Cameroon, but the 
uncomfortable truth is that not much progress is likely to be made while the 
anglophone crisis rages on. Efforts to build capacity within civic society, 
whether the educational or the private sector, are too precarious in what is 
effectively a one-party state with the ability, and the will, to shut off internet 
access overnight. With a highly corrupt government that is paranoid about 
terrorism, real and imagined, and prepared to use draconian laws against 
not only hostile militants but also impartial journalists, the civic space will 
not be a safe place for Cameroonians, and especially not for anglophones 
during the current crisis. Therefore, urgent diplomatic action is needed to 
bring about an end to the conflict and restore relations within Cameroon. 
Establishing internal security is the essential foundation for building an 
effective, accessible civic space in Cameroon.
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